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Introduction 
 
David A. Frenkel 
Norbert Varga 
 
 
According to Salmond, philosophy of Law may be divided into three main 
branches: Dogmatic, Ethical, and Historical,
1
 to which we add a fourth branch: 
Sociological. 
The Dogmatic branch means analysing the pure principles of the law, with no 
reference to historical origin, development, validity or ethical significance. 
The Ethical branch examines the ethical significance of the law which is 
concerned with the theory of justice and its relation to law.  
The Historical branch deals with the general principles coveting the origin of 
the law and its development. 
The Sociological branch means that a good practice of law should encompass 
human nature and sociology of law.   
One method of legal research is to interpret and analyse any law from itself, 
by reading it, compare the various versions of the amendments legislated, analyse 
the differences and changes, compare it to other contemporary laws, either in the 
same country or elsewhere. 
Another method, which should be added to the first, is study and research into 
the reasons that caused the legislation and its amendments; to learn what and how 
political, cultural, economic, moral and social interests and trends influenced and 
affected the legislation, and, on the other side to learn how the laws influenced 
them. This is needed not only in order to understand and interpret the law 
correctly, as binding documents, but also to draw conclusions regarding the need 
for changing the existing legislation, planning future legislation taking in to 
consideration the possible effects of any legislation on the lifestyle, culture, 
financial, philosophical, moral and social behaviour of the people and the 
international relations of the country.
2
 
Current life, trends and views cause change in laws, and laws cause changes 
in everyday life. Life and law are reflections of each other. Law is the mirror of 
life and life is the mirror of law. One cannot separate law and life. Each affects and 
influences the other. It is impossible to understand law and legal trends of any 
period, without learning and understanding the real life and trends during the 
period, not only in a definite geographical location but also the international trends 
and political pressures. Likewise it is impossible to understand and follow social 
and political trends, without being acquainted and understanding the law of that 
time.
3
    
                                                          
1
Salmond, J. (1947) 10
th
 ed. by Glanville K. Williams. London: Sweet & Maxwell, §§ 1-4. 
2Frenkel, D.A. (2015). ‗Introduction‘ in D.A. Frenkel & N. Varga (eds.) Law and History. Athens, 
Greece: Atiner, at 5. 
3
Ibid. 
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History is the present of the past. The present of today will be the past and 
history of the future. We should not ignore nor forget any part of history. The 
present without past and history is like a rootless tree or a building with no 
foundations. 
This book offers a collection of essays whose research is focusing on the 
interrelationship between history and law. 
The essays are revised versions based on selected presentations at the 
International conferences organised by the Athens Institute for Education and 
Research (ATINER) held in Athens, Greece. They have been peer-reviewed and 
selected on the basis of the reviewers‘ comments and their contributions to the 
research discussion of the History and Law issues. 
The following will briefly present the different contributions. 
The book comments with Vasileios Adamidis‘s essay Manifestations of 
Populism in Late 5th Century Athens. In this essay the manifestations of this 
phenomenon in fifth century Athens are analysed, while pointing to some legal 
responses to counter it. Despite the rigorous and comprehensive study of Athenian 
democracy, no systematic application of the concept of populism to classical 
Athens has taken place. This essay aims to fill this gap. The author‘s conclusion is 
that modern political theory on populism can be legitimately applied to contexts 
other than Western liberal democracies, being particularly suitable for a closer 
analysis of ancient Athens, while, in return, Athenian legal and extra-legal 
responses to populism could provide valuable guidance on how to tame this 
phenomenon. 
The second contribution is Norbert Varga‘s essay The Jurisdiction in the 
Hungarian Cartel Law: Historical Background. The practical validation of the 
Cartel Law in Hungary can be reconstructed based on judicial practice. The 
existing memorials, essentially, only contain the verdicts of the courts of the first 
and second instances, and there are only a small number of archive sources which 
describe the factum in its entirety. Due to this, only the information found in the 
verdicts‘ dispositional and justification portions can aid us in the examination of 
the rules of Procedural Law. All in all, it can be stated, by taking archival sources 
into account, that the peremptory majority of cartel cases were jurisdictional legal 
actions. The specialised nature of the procedural rules can be viewed as unique in 
the history of legal action in Hungary. Apart from the problems in the field of 
Substantive Law, we can observe the process of the lawsuits and the procedural 
acts, especially the act of verification. We can observe what data and information   
the courthouses used in order to reach their decisions. 
Dénes Legeza in his essay Development of the Hungarian ‗Work Made for 
Hire‘ Provisions raises many questions which concern the copyright qualification 
of the works created under employment, including what rights do the employer 
and the employee have, does the employed author of a work have any moral rights 
and is the employing company entitled to grant licence to third persons. After 
clarification of the differences between copyright and author‘s right systems, the 
author examines the development of the regulation of this legal field from the 
Prussian origins, introduces the achievements of judicial practice and 
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jurisprudence, the ambitions for codification in the sixties, towards to the 
regulation in force in Hungary.  
The next essay in the book is Máté Pétervári‘s The Establishment of the 
Districts in Hungary after the Austro-Hungarian Compromise. After the Austro-
Hungarian Compromise of 1867, Hungary regained independence and 
consequently bourgeois reform of the state started on the basis of the April Acts of 
1848. The legislator wanted to create an administrative system which would be 
able to carry out the acts and decrees on the local levels.  The need for 
modernising the administrative system resulted in reshaping of feudal territorial 
division, thus redrawing of the districts territories was also put on the agenda 
during the implementation of the Act. The essay is based on the examination of the 
archive material of the Hungarian Royal Ministry of the Interior which implied the 
drafts of the Hungarian counties about the public administration organization and 
the controlling of the Hungarian Royal Ministry of the Interior. The attribute of the 
new Hungarian district system on the basis of the Act 42 of 1870 is presented in 
this essay. 
Kristóf Szivós is the author of the fifth essay The Eventualmaxime in the 
Hungarian Civil Procedure – A Historical Perspective. The Hungarian Parliament 
adopted a new Code of Civil Procedure on 22 November 2016. During the 
codification proceedings, the gravity of the Hungarian traditions and the 
achievements of European legal development were emphasised. One of the most 
notable features of the new Code is the application of the structure of ‗divided 
litigation‘, which means that the proceedings before the courts of first instance are 
divided into two parts: the preparatory stage and the main hearing stage. One of 
the main principles of the preparation is the Eventualmaxime, which had not been 
applied as a main rule since 1911. The essay introduces the historical basics of this 
legal institution. It examines the theoretical features including analysing the 
definition and highlights the reasons behind the necessity of the Eventualmaxime. 
The second part, the main hearing stage, will introduce the presence of this 
principle in the Code of 1868, where it became the main directive principle in the 
ordinary procedure before the regional courts.   
The sixth contribution is Ivan Kosnica‘s Social Rights in the First Yugoslavia 
(1918-1941): Tradition, Model and Deviations. Following T.H. Marshall‘s 
conception on gradual development of citizenship rights and an argument about 
20
th
 century as a century of social citizenship, the essay highlights development of 
social rights in the First Yugoslavia. The essay describes the various traditions of 
social rights on the Yugoslav territories before 1918 and then elaborates thesis 
about normative model of social rights established in the rules of the first 
Constitution of 1921 and in laws that implemented constitutional principles. In 
addition, it points out some deviations from that model, mainly lack of significant 
rules about social rights in the second Constitution of 1931, non-adequate 
implementation of regulations on social rights in legal practice, as well as pointing 
out the important role of municipalities in providing social transfers for the poor in 
1930s.   
The next essay is Legal History of the Development of the Process of Forced 
Execution of Claims in Croatian law authored by Jelena Kasap and Višnja 
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Lachner. Although modern legal science recognises a specially defined legal 
institute for enforcing claims that is realised in the framework of a special 
procedure governed by the Croatian Enforcement Act, the historical context of the 
development of that institute, although undisputable, was not so uniform. It is well 
recognised in numerous legal-historical researches that the emergence of the first 
forms of compulsory settling of the claims can be found in old legal systems, 
features inherent to that institute suitable for modern legal interpretation begin to 
be individualised in medieval law. When it comes to Croatian mediaeval law, it 
should be borne in mind that the determination of that institution cannot be 
interpreted by means of unique legal source. For this reason, the subject of analysis 
in this essay will be the provisions of the medieval statutes of Croatian coastal 
cities and the customary law that was valid in the area of Slavonia and a smaller 
part of Croatia through the Werbőczi's Tripartitum.  The purpose of this essay is to 
realise the filling of obvious gaps in Croatian legal-historical science when it 
comes to the development of enforcement proceedings.  
In the final essay in this book, Charalampos (Harry) Stamelos, in his essay 
Ancient Cypriot Kingdoms: Political and Legal Aspects of Their Regimes (1200 
BC to 30 BC), leads us back to the second and first millennia BC.  His essay 
presents the political and legal aspects of the Ancient Cypriot Kingdoms from 
1200 BC to 30 BC. It is about the historic period during which the various Ancient 
Cypriot Kingdoms had to pay taxes to various rulers: the Assyrians, the Egyptians, 
and the Persians. Alexander the Great established a system of autonomy, 
expanding the autonomous systems of the previous rulers. However, in 312 BC 
under the Ptolemaic rule, Cyprus was one province, whilst various local 
institutions remained unaltered. Finally, in 30 BC Cyprus became a Roman 
province. Public law was based on the system of the Kingdoms of Mycenae since 
the Greek Kings and Princes established the Ancient Greek Kingdoms after the 
Trojan War in 1.200 BC. As described and explained in the essay, the King had all 
the powers under his control. However, private law also existed and there is a 
significant written contract, the Tablet of Idalion, being considered as the first 
written contract in the world. Less evidence exists concerning criminal law. 
We hope that the readers will find this collection of essays stimulating and 
interesting not only in the particular issues discussed but also to acquaint 
themselves with the history and law field of research. 
The views expressed in the essays in this book are of the authors and do 
neither represent nor are they intended to express the views of any other individual 
or body.  
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Manifestations of Populism in late  
5
th
 Century Athens 
 
Vasileios Adamidis 
  
Abstract 
 
In this chapter, by reference to modern research on populism, the 
manifestations of this phenomenon in fifth century Athens are analysed, while 
pointing to some legal responses to counter it. Despite the rigorous and 
comprehensive study of Athenian democracy, surprisingly enough no 
systematic application of the concept of populism (as defined by modern 
political theory) to classical Athens has taken place; this chapter aims to fill 
this gap. My conclusion is that modern political theory on populism can be 
legitimately applied to contexts other than Western liberal democracies, being 
particularly suitable for a closer analysis of ancient Athens, while in return, 
Athenian legal and extra-legal responses to populism could provide valuable 
guidance on how to tame this phenomenon. 
 
Keywords: Populism; Populist Ideology; Rule of Law; Athenian 
Democracy; Athenian Law. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The purpose of this chapter is twofold: i) to offer a definition of populism 
in classical Athens, the first and best attested direct democracy, by reference to 
its various manifestations, and ii) a comparison of the findings with those of 
modern political theory on the field. This inductive and progressive definition 
of the concept of Athenian populism and the original application of its main 
features to the evidence from the ancient sources, will support the arguable 
applicability of populism per se to contexts other than liberal representative 
democracies. Populism, if universally defined, can be seen as an integral part 
of authoritarian regimes, as well as of radical, direct democracies. 
Classical Athenian democracy is the main paradigm used by those who 
(truthfully or hypocritically) exalt popular will as the main – and sometimes 
only – legitimate source of political power. Yet the Athenians, recognising the 
pathologies of their late fifth-century BCE (largely populist) regime, proceeded 
to a series of legal and extra-legal amendments to their constitution, promoting 
the rule of law at the expense of the unlimited and undiluted will of the people
1
. 
Despite the rigorous and comprehensive study of Athenian democracy, 
surprisingly enough, no systematic application of the concept of populism (as 
defined by modern political theory) to classical Athens has taken place.  
                                                          
1
See, for example, Ostwald (1987). 
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The analytical description, within the above context, of this transition from a 
‗populist‘, radical democracy to a demarcated democracy based on the rule of law 
is the second main objective of this chapter. A close examination of the means for 
this transition will take place, focusing on an indicative number of legal reforms, 
as well as on the ‗rhetoric of law‘, mainly on the popular forensic fora, which 
strengthened the idea of the rule of law and allowed it to dominate the ideological 
arena of Athenian politics. This will be a concluding suggestion as to one possible 
way of combating populism in modern politics. 
Populism is a widely used, catch-all term in modern political discourse, yet 
would it be appropriate to apply it to settings other than the modern Western, 
representative democracies? For example, would it be appropriate, and to what 
extent, to argue that the Athenian democracy of the fifth and fourth centuries BCE 
was dominated by populist ideology? In the course of this chapter it will become 
evident that some manifestations of Athenian populism coincide with and 
corroborate the findings of modern research on the field and that the latter offers 
the conceptual tools to better analyse and comprehend Athenian democracy. 
Reference to the radical, direct democracy of classical Athens, will assist in 
the further conceptualisation of the ‗notoriously elusive, slippery and hard to pin 
down‘1 notion of ‗populism‘. It will also be useful to explore the similarities and 
differences between its modern manifestations and the Athenian practice. The 
main problem is that the suppleness, chameleonic nature and alleged applicability 
of populism (sometimes at whim) in different political and cultural contexts have 
contributed both to its resilience in practical terms but also to a relativism and 
variation in its definition and theoretical conceptualisation. Nevertheless, this fact, 
from a methodological point of view, legitimises the current endeavour to apply 
this concept to a non-liberal, direct (or radical), pre-modern democracy.  
Additionally, it sanctions this study of Athenian populism as referring to a regime 
regularly appealed to by modern populists as the putative model for wider 
democracy, more power to the people and more direct relationship between citizen 
and governance. This endeavour could easily slip to anachronistic conclusions. 
Yet I strongly argue that it is worth the attempt. If this experiment proves valid and 
Athenian populism shares common features with its modern counterpart, this 
would contribute to the better definition of this elusive concept on a universal 
rather than an ad hoc basis.  Also, the application of current research to Athens will 
enhance our understanding of the unconceptualised ideology of Athenian 
democracy.  
Scholars usually approach populism on an inductive and sometimes 
comparative way, examining and analysing its different appearances, in an effort 
to extract generally applicable conclusions. In other words, the definition of 
populism rests on the identification of common practices employed by various and 
diverse political actors, operating in different regions, under disparate ideologies, 
in dissimilar contexts. Therefore, empirically figuring out what might unite under 
the multifaceted umbrella of populism authoritarian, hybrid socialist-populist 
regimes in Latin America, the democratically elected radical left and radical right 
                                                          
1
Canovan (1984); Canovan (1999) esp. n.3; Stavrakakis & Katsambekis (2014). 
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Syriza-Anel coalition in Greece, and movements such as the Tea Party, Occupy 
Wall Street in the U.S.A. or the Indignados in Spain, as well as tracing the 
different connotations of the term in diverse historical and geographical settings, is 
seen as the best method to approach and to better understand the concept.
1
 If we 
add to this picture the application of the term to non-democratic political regimes, 
such as the Nazi Germany
2
, it becomes evident that the assemblage and analysis of 
such a large volume of data, has the epistemological risk of blunting the accuracy 
and analytical sharpness of the relevant terms and concepts
3
. As a result, the term 
‗populism‘ itself could be criticised as lacking a coherent definitional frame, 
heavily depending on the context it is applied.  
 
 
Defining Populism in Modern Political Theory 
 
Despite the apparent difficulties, some common ground has been found and 
progress has been made on, provisionally at least, agreeing on a set of practices, 
principles and characteristics that could be labelled as populist.
4
 As a preliminary 
note, it can be said that despite the fact that populism is ‗chameleonic, culture-
bound and context-dependent‘5, the concept per se is ‗relatively robust‘6. A 
definition, with arguable reservations, is provided by Cas Mudde who views 
populism as ‗a thin-centred ideology that considers society to be ultimately 
separated into two homogenous and antagonistic groups, ‗the pure people‘ versus 
‗the corrupt elite,‘ and which argues that politics should be an expression of the 
volonté générale (general will) of the people‘7. Scholars who perceive populism as 
an ideology
8
 generally agree with its characterisation as ‗thin-centred‘, not existing 
in a ‗pure‘ form, requiring a thick-centred ideology with a solid normative 
programme for political action (e.g. liberalism, socialism, or even communism and 
nationalism) as a vehicle for its utilisation and flourishing. As it will become 
evident later in this chapter, Athenian populism (in the sense that politics should 
                                                          
1
For the regional relativism of the term see Müller (2016); For the cultural relativism of the term see 
Canovan (1984), Canovan (2004), and Ochoa (2015). For the historical uses of the term, especially 
in the United States, see Kazin (1998). For the academic relativism see Ionescu & Gellner (1969), 
characterised as the ―the definitive collection on populism‖ (Taggart (2000), in encapsulated by 
Wiles (1969) at 166), ―To each his own definition of populism, according to the academic axe he 
grinds‖; cf. Gidron & Bonikowski (2013).  
2Depending of course on how populism is defined, few would deny that the use of the ‗Volk‘ by the 
Nazi discourse had no similarity to populist practices. For example, the slogan ―One People. One 
Reich. One Fuhrer.‖ found in a 1938 poster, is essentially populist according to current approaches. 
3―[T]he mercurial nature of populism has often exasperated those attempting to take it seriously‖, 
Stanley (2008).   
4Woods (2014):  ―[C]ontrary to the now somewhat clichéd assertion that populism is a vague 
concept and lacks a coherent definitional frame is that the concept, in fact, is relatively robust. 
Almost without exception those who have engaged in a critique of the concept have conceded that 
there are three or four elements that lie at its core.‖ 
5
Arter (2010) at 490. 
6
Woods (2014). 
7
Mudde (2004) at 543. 
8
For populism as an ideology see Abts & Rummens, (2007); Stanley (2008); Mudde & Rovira 
Kaltwasser (2012); Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser) (2013).  
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be an expression of the popular will) differed in that respect; I argue that it was 
thick-centred, matching the needs and requirements of Athenian radical 
democracy, thus becoming the dominant, freestanding ideology. 
On the other hand, populism can be defined as, primarily, a unique style, 
discourse, strategy, political logic or simply as an impulse, an outlook, an 
approach to or a way of doing politics
1
. Those who see populism as a strategy 
have also attempted to offer a minimal definition, with Weyland‘s being popular 
among them, particularly applying to Latin American populism. Populism is thus 
defined as ‗a political strategy through which a personalistic leader seeks or 
exercises government power based on direct, unmediated, uninstitutionalised 
support from large numbers of mostly unorganized followers‘2. The main focus of 
this approach is on the persona of the leader, the unmediated communication, 
directness, informality and plebiscitarian linkages with the ‗People‘ and the 
expressed general frustration with institutionalism and intellectualism. Yet, and 
although there is no reason to believe that populism thrives only in instances of 
low institutionalism or organisation
3
, the specific tactics and rhetoric of this 
broader strategy for the ascendancy to and preservation of power might still be 
similar to those described by scholars who define populism as a style or discourse. 
This view asserts that populism is an appeal that pits the (often marginalised and 
discontented) ‗people‘ against a loosely defined ‗establishment‘, ‗elite‘ or 
‗oligarchy‘4. Here, the focus lies on the mode of political expression evident in 
text, speech, and performance
5
.  
Finally, Laclau, focusing on structural considerations and following Carl 
Schmitt on viewing politics as an arena of antagonism and a friend/enemy 
conception, interprets populism as the inner logic of the political
6
.  Laclau claimed 
that any political project is premised on the division between two competing 
antagonistic groups. The way in which these groups are formed stems from what 
he posits as the minimal unit of politico-social analysis: the demand. To put it 
briefly, when a demand is unsatisfied within any system, and then meets other 
unsatisfied demands, they can form an equivalential chain with one another, as 
they share the common antagonism/enmity of the system. A frontier is thus 
created between this equivalential chain (the underdogs) and the establishment. 
From here, the loose equivalential chain between demands is interpellated and 
finds expression as ‗the people‘ through a leader. ‗The people‘ then demand 
change to, or of, the system. To put it in more concrete terms, Laclau‘s formulation 
of populism acknowledges that populists do not speak to or for some pre-existing 
                                                          
1
Knight (1998). A useful compilation of the different views on populism is Moffitt (2016). 
2
Weyland (2001) at 14. Others who view populism as a strategy include Barr (2009), Ellner (2003), 
and Roberts (2003).   
3
The European right-wing populism of Le Pen‘s ‗Front National‘ and Wilder‘s ‗Partij voor de 
Vrijheid‘ or the left-wing populism of Syriza might be enough to prove that party discipline and 
organisation is not an obstacle to the thriving of populist strategy.  
4
Hawkins (2009); De La Torre (2010); Kazin (1998). 
5
For populism as style, which takes in both the rhetorical and the aesthetic aspects of populist 
communication, rather than merely discourse, see Moffitt (2016). 
6
Laclau (2005). 
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‗people‘ but arguably bring the subject known as ‗the people‘ into being through 
the process of naming, performance or articulation.
1
. 
To recap, the primary common features among the different approaches to 
populism are:  
 
i) The ‗People‘ as the nodal point (i.e. as a homogeneous, largely fictional, 
majority);  
ii) antagonism/division in different manifestations (usually against an 
‗Establishment‘ or a corrupt Elite). 
 
      Secondary features include:  
 
i) anti-pluralism;  
ii) bad manners and anti-intellectualism / anti-institutionalism; 
iii)charismatic leader;  
iv) unmediated communication between the leader and the People. 
 
These primary and secondary features will be used in the next part of this 
chapter for a close examination and definition of Athenian populism. 
 
    
Manifestations of Populism in Late 5
th
 C. Athens 
 
Athens of the late fifth century was a radical democracy, basing its decision-
making on the decrees of the Assembly, i.e. almost exclusively on the will of the 
people. There was no hierarchy of laws and subsequent decrees could annul earlier 
ones. Appeals to the Demos (the people of Athens, all male citizens over the age 
of eighteen) were common since power rested with them. At the start of each 
Assembly meeting, curses were pronounced by the herald on any orator who 
attempted to mislead the people. Whoever wished to speak, delivered his speech 
directly to the people, in an unmediated way. Although the real addressee was only 
a minority, representative segment of the citizen body, speakers nevertheless 
addressed the Assembly as if the whole citizen body was present. The people were 
unaccountable and penalties against illegal or inexpedient proposals were solely 
directed against the orators
2
. Extremely severe penalties were provided by law for 
anyone who misled or did harm to the people of Athens
3
. The Demos was 
emerging as the single most important and overwhelming unit of Athenian 
politics, as the nodal point of the political discourse.  
The interpellation of the Demos (or, the Athenian People)
4
, namely the 
formation of a group sharing a common, distinct identity (and, as a result, having 
                                                          
1
Laclau (2005); Moffitt (2016). 
2
Landauer (2014). cf. Thucydides 3.43.4-5. 
3
E.g. the decree of Cannonus in Xenophon. Hell. 1.7.20. 
4I use the ‗People‘ and the ‗Demos‘ interchangeably, although the latter might be seen as a more 
clearly and restrictively delineated group. In modern discourse, the ‗People‘ refers to a 
homogeneous, almost transcendent, group which might include people with no right to vote, such as 
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common interests and demands), formally emerged (and through time advanced) 
by the legal measure introduced by Pericles in 451/0 BCE, the so-called Pericles‘ 
Citizenship law
1
. This law provided that citizenship would be conferred only on 
gnesioi, namely children whose mother and father were both Athenians, while 
previously the offspring of Athenian men who married non-Athenian women was 
granted citizenship
2
. Modern scholars interpret this measure as embracing the 
common people, against the aristocratic practice of inter-marriage with rich non-
Athenian oikoi, enhancing the status of Athenian mothers and making Athenian 
citizenship a more exclusive category, thus definitively setting Athenians off from 
all others.  
The formulation of the Demos‘ group distinct identity went a step further six 
years later, when in 445/4 BCE Psammetichus, the king of Egypt, sent a present to 
the people of Athens of forty thousand measures of grain, and this had to be 
divided up among the citizens. This triggered a diapsephismos (a check on the 
registers of citizens) and a series of prosecutions, resulting, according to Plutarch, 
to a little less than five thousand convictions by the popular courts
3
. The Athenians 
as a distinct group were beginning to consciously act for the defence of their 
common interests, deriving from their exclusive rights of now formally and well-
defined citizenship.  
The interpellation of this group emerged and developed not in a bottom-up 
way like the one Laclau envisages (i.e. as a front equivalential chain of unsatisfied 
‗demands‘ of the marginalised people) but primarily from top-down initiatives by 
people like Pericles (the ‗leader‘) who strengthened a specific group‘s identity (not 
necessarily or exclusively the ‗underdogs‘, who supported and voted for the 
Citizenship law in the Assembly), and could rely on this group to advance and 
preserve their political dominance. Supposedly, it is not a coincidence that a few 
years after the introduction of measures such as the jurors‘ pay and the citizenship 
law, especially after the ‗clearing up‘ of the registers from nothoi (non-gnesioi) 
and the coming of age of those benefited by the law of 451/0, Pericles succeeded 
in formulating an electorate which would keep him in the forefront of Athenian 
politics until his death in 429 BCE. 
The division between the gnesioi citizens and the non-citizens sharpened and 
was now demarcated by law. The first group shared common advantages, such as 
jury pay
4
, and – at the issue of who should qualify as citizen – a common demand, 
                                                                                                                                                         
minors and immigrants (although the latter are usually – in Right wing populist rhetoric - presented 
as outsiders who assist in the binary definition of the ‗People‘). The ‗Demos‘ on the other hand was 
a group clearly defined by law and, thus, its interpellation was easier. Yet, appeals to the ‗Demos‘ in 
Athens shared many common features with appeals to the ‗People‘ in modern populist discourse.  
1
Plutarch, Life of Pericles, 37.3. Patterson (1981). 
2
Dmitriev (2017). Carawan (2008); Ogden (1996).   
3
Plutarch, Life of Pericles, 37.4. 
4
Ca. mid-450s BCE: Pericles‘ law on pay for jury service was introduced soon after the ‗democratic 
faction‘, under the leadership of Ephialtes, managed to take power away from the (aristocratic) 
council of the Areopagus, creating more popular courts and manning them with ordinary citizens. 
Initially, pay for jury service was 2 obols per day, increased to 3 obols by the ‗demagogue‘ Cleon in 
420s. Pay for participation in the Assembly was introduced c. 410-407 BCE (Aristotle, Ath. Pol. 
28.3): Cleophon the lyre-maker first introduced the (daily) two-obol dole; he went on distributing 
this for a time, but afterwards Callicrates of the Paeanian deme abolished it, being the first person to 
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deriving from their exclusive citizen status. It seems that while Cimon, Pericles‘ 
main political opponent in the 460s, focused on the people of his deme as the main 
target group of supporters
1
, Pericles (successfully, as proven by his subsequent 
career) expanded his perspective and promoted policies to first interpellate and 
then to appeal to the Demos as a whole, as a distinct and increasingly venerated 
group
2
. Pericles cultivated a magisterial image of a charismatic leader, being the 
opposite of a modern populist persona, making rare public appearances and 
usually relying on his network of friends and supporters to introduce and propose 
measures he endorsed
3
. Yet, the aforementioned strategy, which assisted in the 
interpellation of the People as a group, can be described as populist.  
Old fashioned, mainly aristocratic, politicians operated through (more or less) 
institutionalised networks (family ties, friends, gene, hetaireiai). Plutarch in the 
Life of Pericles (11-14), despite somewhat anachronistically referring to the 
presence of political parties
4, describes Thucydides‘ (son of Melesias) tactics, as 
the leader of the conservative group and main opponent of Pericles in the 440s. 
Plutarch says that Thucydides:   
 
‗would not suffer the party of the "Good and Noble," as they called 
themselves, to be scattered up and down and blended with the populace, as 
heretofore, the weight of their character being thus obscured by numbers, 
but by culling them out and assembling them into one body, he made their 
collective influence, thus become weighty, as it were a counterpoise in the 
balance‘. 
 
This visualisation of the distinct group in the Assembly, possibly had the 
unpredicted result of the further interpellation of the common people through 
the deepening of the division and the antagonism between the ―Good and 
Noble‖ and the masses (which, of course, is the second main feature of populism)5. 
Thucydides, in 444/3 BCE, was eventually ostracised and Pericles dominated 
Athenian politics until his death in 429 BCE
6
. Roughly at this period, the 
Pseudo-Xenophon (also known as the ‗Old Oligarch‘), proving the now conscious 
division of the Athenian society, wrote in his ‗Constitution of the Athenians‘: 
 
                                                                                                                                                         
promise to add to the two obols another obol. It is not a coincidence that this pay for participation 
was seen as a democratic measure, abolished by the oligarchs in the coup of 411 BCE. 
1
Aristotle, Ath. Pol. 27.3: ‗For as Cimon had an estate large enough for a tyrant, in the first place he 
discharged the general public services in a brilliant manner, and moreover he supplied maintenance 
to a number of the members of his deme; for anyone of the Laciadae who liked could come to his 
house every day and have a moderate supply, and also all his farms were unfenced, to enable 
anyone who liked to avail himself of the harvest.‘ 
2
Plutarch, Life of Nicias, 3, claims that Nicias surpassed all his predecessors and contemporaries in 
extravagance and favour, the recipients of his generosity being the people as a whole. Nicias‘ great 
wealth allowed for this but the effect of the already, by Nicias‘ time, interpellated group of the 
Demos as a whole should not be underestimated.  
3
Azoulay (2010) at 40; Connor (1971).   
4
See Hansen (2014). 
5
Cf. Plutarch, Life of Pericles, 11 and Connor (1971) at 63 n. 54. 
6
Plutarch, Life of Pericles, 16. 
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‘the poor and the Demos generally are right to have more than the highborn 
and wealthy, for the reason that it is the people who man the ships and impart 
strength to the city.’ 
 
This observation describes the now opposing interests and demands of the 
distinct, more or less antagonistic, groups in Athens. This conflict would 
eventually escalate with the war, as usually happens during crises. The emergence 
of the Demos as the nodal point of Athenian politics continued after the death of 
Pericles, with new politicians (the so-called demagogues), of a different style and 
manners, taking advantage of this new structural development in Athenian politics, 
hence becoming prominent particularly during the Peloponnesian War
1
. Cleon, the 
most typical example of them, established uninstitutionalised and unmediated 
communication with the People as a whole. He was both a real strategist and 
tactician as far as populism is concerned. To embrace the People as a whole, in a 
symbolic gesture, Cleon repudiated his friends, thus liberating himself from their 
influence
2
. He was not a member of an hetaireia (an upper-class political club), as 
was the case for other politicians too of this new style
3
, thus enabling themselves 
to legitimately represent the underdogs and rely on the following and support of 
the unorganised masses. Hetaireiai, solely confined to upper classes, contributed 
to the marginalisation of poor citizens who gradually saw them with suspicion, and 
divided the citizen body in classes and factions
4
.  
Many of the features of modern populists are concentrated in the persona of 
Cleon: a charismatic leader who appeals to the People in an unmediated way, a 
proponent of anti-institutionalism and anti-intellectualism, exhibiting a populist 
style characterised by divisive rhetoric and bad manners. Cleon is described by 
Thucydides (3.36.6; cf. 4.21.3) as ―the most violent man at Athens, and at that 
time by far the most powerful with the demos‖. He had carried a motion of putting 
all Mytilenians to death after their revolt against Athenian rule in 427 BCE, but the 
demos changed their mind and a further debate was called. During this second 
debate, Cleon demonstrates his leadership skills, though refrains from pandering 
                                                          
1Humphreys (2004) at 233 claims that: ―Conditions in the Peloponnesian war increased the need for 
state employment in military service, since many Athenians were cut off from their land, and made 
it easy for Kleon to play openly on the demos‘ economic interest in assembly decisions […]. It was 
easy enough thereafter to turn the accusation of importing private interests into public business 
against Kleon, by accusing him of appealing to the (metaphorical) pockets of the demos. This 
became a stock accusation against demagogues and, in time, the basis of the oligarchic political 
theory that banausoi [low-grade workers] could not be trusted with political power‖. On the 
demagogues see Finley (1962) and   Rhodes (2016). 
2
Plutarch, Moralia, 806 F: ―Cleon, when he first decided to take up political life, brought his friends 
together and renounced his friendship with them as something which often weakens and perverts 
the right and just choice of policy in political life‖. Cf. Aristophanes, Knights. The ideological 
hegemony of populism and the success of populist tactics persisted until the end of the 5
th
 century. 
In the ‗Trial of the Generals‘ after the naval battle of Arginusae, Euryptolemus, speaking in defence 
of the generals and in accordance with the law, nevertheless he thought it necessary to clarify that 
his kinsman Pericles should be tried too, for he ‗should be ashamed to put Pericles‘ interests before 
those of the city as a whole‘ (Xenophon, Hell. 1.7.21) 
3
Connor (1971) at 29 n. 47. 
4
On the hetaireiai, see Connor (1971); Jones (1999); Roisman (2006). 
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the people. Nevertheless, his divisive rhetoric, through an affiliation with the 
ordinary people, who are presented as the real upholders of the laws, and a sheer 
anti-intellectualism, is evident: 
 
‗[o]rdinary men usually manage public affairs better than their more gifted 
fellows. The latter are always wanting to appear wiser than the laws, and to 
overrule every proposition brought forward, thinking that they cannot show 
their wit in more important matters, and by such behaviour too often ruin 
their country; while those who mistrust their own cleverness are content to be 
less learned than the laws, and less able to pick holes in the speech of a good 
speaker; and being fair judges rather than rival athletes, generally conduct 
affairs successfully. These we ought to imitate, instead of being led on by 
cleverness and intellectual rivalry to advise your people against our real 
opinions.‘ (Thucydides. 3.37.3-5) 
 
To this argument, Diodotus, Cleon‘s main adversary in the Mytilenean 
debate, replied along the following lines. Firstly, open debate and pluralism are 
integral features of good decision-making and anyone opposing this is senseless or 
interested. If such a person, ―wishing to carry a disgraceful measure and doubting 
his ability to speak well in a bad cause, he thinks best to frighten opponents and 
hearers by well-aimed calumny‖ (Thucydides 3.42.2). Secondly, Cleon‘s bad 
manners, accusations and, ultimately, anti-pluralism, might ―deprive the city of its 
advisers‖ (Thucydides. 3.42.4).  Antagonistic rhetoric and divisive accusations of 
conspiracy and corruption directed against his opponents, seem to be Cleon‘s 
favourite discourse. Aristophanes in the Knights has Cleon crying out 
‗Conspirators, conspirators!‘ whenever he sees the chorus of upper-class members. 
Posing himself as an anti-establishment figure and using aggressive rhetorical 
tactics (‗he was the first person to use bawling and abuse on the platform, and to 
gird up his cloak before making a public speech, all other persons speaking in 
orderly fashion‘ according to Aristotle,  Ath. Pol. 28.3) Cleon was thought to have 
done the most to corrupt the people by such impetuous outbursts (cf. Aristophanes, 
Knights l. 137). 
Cleon‘s unmediated affiliation with the Demos, allegedly acting as their 
champion, is evident in the following passage relating to the negotiations about 
truce with Spartan envoys (Thucydides 4.22.1-2): 
 
‘[the] envoys made no reply but asked that commissioners might be chosen 
with whom they might confer on each point, and quietly talk the matter over 
and try to come to some agreement. Hereupon Cleon violently assailed them, 
saying that he knew from the first that they had no right intentions, and that it 
was clear enough now by their refusing to speak before the people, and 
wanting to confer in secret with a committee of two or three. No! if they meant 
anything honest let them say it out before all.’ 
 
As happens in most crises, the Peloponnesian war raised passions and led to 
divisions among the people. Extreme voices and manners, such as Cleophon‘s, who 
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according to Aristotle, Ath. Pol. (34.1) prevented the conclusion of peace by 
completely deceiving the demos, ‗coming into the assembly, drunk and wearing a 
corset, and protesting that he would not allow it unless the Lacedaemonians 
surrendered all the cities‘, escalated the tensions between the different groups. The 
moderate Nicias, during the heated debate on the Athenian expedition to Syracuse 
in 415 BCE, endorsed and fuelled this multilevel division while attacking the 
ambitious Alcibiades and his followers: 
 
‗And if there be any man here, overjoyed at being chosen to command, who 
urges you to make the expedition, merely for ends of his own […] do not 
allow such an one to maintain his private splendour at his country's risk […] 
this is a matter of importance, and not for a young man to decide or hastily to 
take in hand. When I see such persons now sitting here at the side of that 
same individual and summoned by him, alarm seizes me; and I, in my turn, 
summon any of the older men that may have such a person sitting next him, 
not to let himself be shamed down, for fear of being thought a coward if he do 
not vote for war.‘ (Thucydides 6.12.2-13.1) 
 
The gradual consolidation of new, divergent demands due to the ongoing war, 
interpellated antagonistic groups (mainly a pro-war and an anti-war one) with the 
result that emotions and tensions were heightened and the ground for populist 
tactics was paved. The nature of Athenian politics which provided for power to 
ultimately lie with the demos could provoke irresponsible leadership and populist 
manipulation. This was acknowledged in the so-called ‗constitutional debate‘ in 
the Histories of Herodotus (3.81.1-2): 
 
‘Nothing is more foolish and violent than a useless mob; for men fleeing the 
insolence of a tyrant to fall victim to the insolence of the unguided populace is 
by no means to be tolerated. Whatever the one does, he does with knowledge, 
but for the other knowledge is impossible; how can they have knowledge who 
have not learned or seen for themselves what is best, but always rush 
headlong and drive blindly onward, like a river in flood?’ 
 
In Euripides‘ Suppliants (423 BCE), in the debate between Theseus and the 
Theban herald, the latter, critical of the ignorant masses who can be easily swayed, 
observes that:  
 
‗the city from which I come is ruled by one man only, not by the mob; no one 
there puffs up the citizens with specious words, and for his own advantage 
twists them this way or that [...]. Besides, how would the people, if it cannot 
form true judgments, be able rightly to direct the state?‘ 
 
This is part and parcel of the observation in Euripides‘ Orestes (408 BCE) 
that ‗whenever a man with a pleasing trick of speech, but of unsound principles, 
persuades the mob, it is a serious evil to the state‘‖ (line 910). The exemplary case 
of Athenian populism and, I would suggest, its culmination as ideology per se, 
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comes from the aftermath of the Battle of Arginusae (406 BCE) and the 
euphemistically called ‗Trial of the Generals‘1. In that event, the Athenian 
Assembly, following a series of neglects of the normal institutional legal 
procedures, decided with a single vote to execute all the winning generals without 
trial (unconstitutionally, according to Athenian perceptions, notwithstanding the 
anachronism of the term), for failing to collect the bodies of the dead (and, 
possibly, of the survivors of the shipwrecks) from the sea due to a storm 
(Xenophon, Hell. 1.6.35; Diodorus Siculus 13.100.1-6). The generals‘ speeches, in 
the first debate which was convened in order for them to give account to the 
Athenian people in the Assembly, were shorter than what the law provided 
(Xenophon, Hell. 1.7.5)
2
. The Council (Boule) was then instructed to bring a 
proposal as to what sort of trial the generals should have.  
Xenophon and the subsequent developments leave no doubt as to the illegality 
of the Council‘s proposal and the motives of its initiators. Callixenus, being bribed 
by the people who wanted the generals executed, introduced a motion whereby the 
fate of all generals would be tried by a single vote, collectively, and since they had 
already spoken before the Assembly at the earlier debate, the requirement of 
having a speech in their defence has putatively been fulfilled. Voices in the 
Assembly against the legality of this measure were silenced by the threat of 
applying the same measure (execution without trial) to any disagreeing parties. 
The response was a monument to undiluted populism: 
 
‗And some of the people applauded this act, but the greater number cried out 
that it was monstrous if the people were to be prevented from doing whatever 
they wished‘ (ηὸ δὲ πλῆθος ἐβόα δεινὸν εἶναι εἰ μή ηις ἐάζει ηὸν δῆμον πράηηειν 
ὃ ἂν βούληηαι.). (Xenophon, Hell.1.7.12) 
 
Some of the orators endorsed this view, pandering the people, escalating and 
capitalising the people‘s fury: 
 
 ‗Indeed, when Lyciscus thereupon moved that these men should be judged by 
the very same vote as the generals, unless they withdrew the summons, the 
mob broke out again with shouts of approval (ἐπεθορύβηζε πάλιν ὁ ὄχλος), 
and they were compelled to withdraw the summonses‘. (Xenophon, Hell. 
1.7.12-14) 
 
Socrates happened to be the official responsible for putting the measure to the 
vote on that day
3
. He refused to do so declaring that he would do nothing that was 
contrary to the law. The atmosphere of this debate is clearly described in the 
Apology (32b-c): 
                                                          
1
Andrewes (1974). 
2
One can speculate that the cause for this was the uproar (thorubos) caused by - and against - their 
speeches by the masses. The mere endorsement of thorubos as a legitimate way for the people of 
expressing their opinion and silencing the speaker is a counter-productive, anti-pluralist and 
ultimately, I would argue, populist phenomenon. Contra Tacon (2001). 
3
Cf. Plato, Gorgias. 473e-474a; Xenophon, Memorabilia. 1.1.18, 4.4.2. 
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‗I, men of Athens, never held any other office in the state, but I was a 
bouleutes; and it happened that my tribe held the presidency when you wished 
to judge collectively, not severally, the ten generals who had failed to gather 
up the slain after the naval battle; this was illegal, as you all agreed 
afterwards. At that time I was the only one of the prytaneis who opposed 
doing anything contrary to the laws, and although the orators were ready to 
impeach and arrest me, and though you urged them with shouts to do so, I 
thought I must run the risk to the end with law and justice on my side, rather 
than join with you when your wishes were unjust, through fear of 
imprisonment or death.‘ 
 
The aforementioned incidents from the ‗Trial of the Generals‘ did not emerge 
accidentally. Instead, there was a well-thought, coordinated plan to arouse the 
people‘s emotions, mobilise them, and unite them under a common demand: the 
punishment of those responsible. A critical mass of followers was gathered by 
Theramenes, the leader of those who demanded the execution of the generals. 
They were instructed to dress in black and shave their heads as if they were the 
grieving kinsmen of those lost after the battle. People‘s fury was escalating, and 
the only thing now required was its capitalisation. Even a man got up in the 
Assembly, claiming that he was a survivor of the shipwrecks and was instructed 
by those who were drowning, if he got away safely, to report to the people of 
Athens that the generals did nothing to rescue the men who had fought bravely for 
the country (Xenophon, Hell. 1.7.11). The cynical exploitation of dramatic events 
aiming at the utilisation of people‘s emotions is often linked to populism, since it 
is the channelling of the will of the people which eventually decides the course of 
events
1
.  
 
 
Legal and Extra-Legal Responses to Athenian Populism 
 
If the ideology of populism - namely the belief that the People could 
unrestrictedly and unaccountably, with complete impunity, pass any measures 
whatsoever, despite their inexpediency or, even worse, illegality - was close to 
degenerate the Athenian democracy, the two oligarchic coups (411/0 BCE and 
404/3 BCE) and the Athenian defeat in the Peloponnesian war, revealed the 
necessity of countering this phenomenon. The Athenian responses were 
multifarious, ranging from the political and legal arenas to the ideological 
battlefield. Some of the measures were introduced throughout the course of 
Athenian democracy and only further evolved, matured, or directed against the 
phenomenon of undiluted populism. Others were probably designed and 
implemented on purpose after the restoration of democracy in 403 BCE. While 
                                                          
1
It is not uncommon for populist propaganda, especially in times of crisis, to use graphic 
images to interpellate a group feeling the same emotions of anger and indignation and direct it 
against a common enemy-perpetrator. In the years of the Greek economic crisis, it is not rare 
for such tactics to be employed, with many examples (of sometimes ‗fake‘ news) referring to 
instances and inflated numbers of suicides due to destitution or to ‗fake news‘.  
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references will be made to the collective outcome of such measures, the main 
focus of this chapter will be on the rhetorical efforts, especially in the popular 
courts, which would allow success in this ideological brade de fer. 
One of the features which makes an audience more susceptible to populism is 
their marginalisation, the belief that they belong to an ‗underdog culture‘ which 
differentiates them from and pits them against the establishment or the elite
1
. This 
is the main reason of the populists‘ divisive and antagonistic rhetoric, in an effort 
to create a common, visible enemy for the ‗underdogs‘, display to them their 
common demands and, thus, interpellate them as a group with a shared identity 
and set of beliefs. This is also the main reason as to why populism, being a protest 
movement, rarely becomes the ‗Establishment‘; however, when this happens, 
populists tend to behave similarly to the ‗professional politicians‘ they once 
reprimanded. The seed of Athenian populism, growing in the fertile ground of 
Athenian democracy, gradually emancipated and mobilised (mainly politically) 
quasi-marginalised groups, brought them to the forefront and became the 
dominant ideology.  
Despite the numerous and sophisticated procedures for holding officials into 
account (e.g. dokimasiai; euthunai; graphe paranomon; graphe nomon me 
epitedion theinai), the Demos, the ultimate decision-maker in the Assembly and 
judge in the popular Courts, remained unaccountable
2
. The oaths, prayers and 
curses in the Assembly before its convocation and the Heliastic oath taken by all 
6,000 judges (Athenian male citizens over the age of 30) in any given year, were 
proactive measures with uncertain reliability
3
. Yet, these measures contributed to 
the interpellation of the Athenian people under a noble objective: their adherence 
to the rule of law and their pride in its protection. A counter ideology was 
emerging to unite the, so far, (at times) reactionary people, under a common 
demand and objective: to make the Athenian system different from those of other 
city-states and link the democracy to the rule of law rather than the rule of the 
masses. This effort, though premature, was evident during the Trial of the 
Generals when Euryptolemus, arguing for a trial in accordance with the law, said: 
 
‗Let no such act be yours, men of Athens, but guard the laws, which are your 
own and above all else have made you supremely great, and do not try to do 
anything without their sanction.‘ (Xenophon, Hell. 1.2.29) 
 
In an effort to place appropriate constitutional limits, the Athenians ordered a 
revision of the law-code (in the aftermath of the oligarchic coup in 411 BCE)
4
 
which paved the way for the subsequent hierarchy of norms and distinction 
                                                          
1
Spruyt, Keppens & Van Droogenbroeck (2016). 
2
On the laws and procedures in Athenian law, see Harrison (1968-1971); MacDowell (1986). 
3The Heliastic oath, among other things, provided that: ‗I will cast my vote in consonance with the 
laws and with the decrees passed by the Assembly and by the Council, but, if there is no law, in 
consonance with my sense of what is most just, without favour or enmity. I will vote only on the 
matters raised in the charge, and I will listen impartially to accusers and defenders alike.‘ On the 
Heliastic oath see Harris (2013) Ch. 3: ‗The Judicial Oath‘; Johnstone (1999) at 33-45; Adamidis 
(2016) at 92 n. 66; at 177 and 194 n/ 34.  
4
See more on this issue in Adamidis (2016) at 50-51 n.92. 
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between laws (of general application and permanent nature) and decrees 
(temporary, of individual application). The law-making process in the fourth 
century was now initiated by the Assembly but was entrusted to the board of 
Nomothetai (law-givers)
1
. Numerous law-court speeches survive from cases 
triggered by the legal procedures protecting the constitution and scrutinising the 
constitutionality and expediency of proposed laws and decrees. At a later date, 
showcasing how the Athenian democracy continued evolving into a regime based 
on the rule of law, there was the establishment of the board of Nomofulakes 
(guardians of the Laws) (c. 330s BCE) to overview the office-holders‘ conformity 
with the laws. 
The emergence of the rule of law as ideology, culminating during the fourth 
century (contrary to what Athenians of the late fifth century had experienced) is 
also evident in the writings of the period. Aristotle straightforwardly provides that 
‗[t]he rule of law is preferable to that of a single citizen.‘ (Aristotle, Politics. 1287a 
16–20) while Hyperides in his funeral speech, linking democracy with the rule of 
law and contrasting it with authoritarianism, claims that ‗For men to be happy they 
must be ruled by the voice of law, not the threats of a man‘ (Hyperides, Epit. 25). 
Aeschines also links democracy (against oligarchy) with the rule of law:  
 
‗You are well aware, men of Athens, that there are three kinds of constitution 
in the whole world, dictatorship (tyrannis), oligarchy, and democracy, and 
dictatorships and oligarchies are governed by the temperament of those in 
power, whereas democratic cities are governed by the established laws.‘ 
(Aeschines 3.6) 
 
The lawbreaker is now perceived as an enemy of the law and, as a result, an 
enemy of the state democracy (and the People). Demosthenes, as the accuser of a 
person who putatively committed the offence of hubris, calls the numerous jurors 
in session to rescue themselves and the laws: 
 
‗If I prove that the insults of Meidias touch, not me only, but you and the laws 
and the whole body of citizens, to come at once to my rescue and to your 
own.‘ (βοηθῆσαι καὶ ἐμοὶ καὶ ὑμῖν αὐτοῖς.) (Demosthenes 21.7) 
 
People are now united under a noble objective. Their real strength, and the 
strength of the democratic constitution, derive not from the unlimited power of 
decision-making afforded to the Demos but to the power of the people to uphold 
and protect the rule of law:  
 
‗Oligarchs and all who run a constitution based on inequality must be on 
guard against people who attempt to overthrow the constitution by force; but 
you, and all who have a constitution based on equality and law, must watch 
out for people whose words and way of life contravene the laws. For your 
                                                          
1
For the difference between laws and decrees in the fourth century see Hansen (1978), Hansen 
(1979), and Hansen  (1991) at 161-177; Rhodes (1987). 
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real strength is when you are ruled by law and are not subverted by men who 
break them.‘ (Aeschines 1.4-5) 
 
Everyone is equal before the law and this is the basic premise of this new 
ideology. Ordinary people and office-holders are equally ruled by law: 
 
‗For where we have laws expressly drafted for the case, surely punishment 
should fall alike on those who disobey them and on those who order an 
infringement of them.‘ (Lysias 22.10) 
 
Yet, there is a crucial point which needs to be stressed. The ‗People‘ apply the 
law, they are the guardians of the law, they are not identified with it, they are not 
representing the law themselves: 
 
‗laws were laid down by you before the particular offences were committed, 
when the future wrongdoer and his victim were equally unknown. What is the 
effect of these laws? They ensure for every citizen the opportunity of obtaining 
redress if he is wronged. Therefore, when you punish a man who breaks the 
laws, you are not delivering him over to his accusers; you are strengthening 
the arm of the law in your own interests.‘ (Demosthenes 21.30-1)1 
 
The hegemonic position of the ‗rule of law‘ ideology in the law-court 
speeches is primarily evident in the rhetoric of litigants. Regardless of the revision 
stages before their publication, forensic speeches had to be appealing to the minds 
and values of the Athenian laymen jurors
2
. Hence, we may safely assume that 
references to the dominance of the ‗rule of law‘ ideology were positively accepted 
by the audience. The ‗participant personality‘ of the ancient Athenians3 - meaning 
that their ideas and values were largely shared with the community they found 
themselves in and they had strong incentives to show adherence to these norms - 
combined with the endorsement and respect they show for the rule of law in their 
speeches, prove that this principle was now advancing to become the guiding one 
in regulating their behaviour. The character evidence which litigants generously 
provide in their speeches corroborates the above point. The alignment of ethical 
norms with state laws allowed litigants to point to their adherence to both, with 
their rule, finally, being indisputable
4
. 
 
 
                                                          
1Contrast this approach of the People as ‗guardians of the law‘ with the modern populist 
‗identification‘ of themselves with the law so as to become inviolable: ―The ‗People‘ deserve 
only respect […] This government can only be the voice of the ‗People‘[…] We are flesh of 
the flesh of the ‗People‘[…] We are every word of this country‘s Constitution.‖ Alexis Tsipras 
in a speech in the Hellenic Parliament (Feb 8, 2015). 
2
For more on the revision of speeches see Adamidis (2016) at 14 and 19 n. 52. 
3
Adamidis (2016) Ch. 5; Gill (1998). 
4
Adamidis (2017). 
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Conclusions 
 
This chapter has offered a description of populism as an ideology. This is the 
first time that populism is seen as a freestanding, rather than a ‗thin‘ ideology. 
Populist ideology in Athens of the late fifth century, inductively approached, 
offered the main set of ideas which ultimately supported the democratic regime. Its 
various manifestations (as a style, discourse, strategy and political logic) 
corroborate and advance the findings of modern political theory. Whether or not 
originally being a movement of the ‗underdogs‘, the (mainly) top-down 
interpellation of the demos as a unique group with a distinct identity, made it the 
ruling class of the city. Crisis, in the form of the Peloponnesian war, contributed to 
the emergence of a new type of leaders, developing innovative tactics and 
techniques to approach and sometimes manipulate the people.   
The populist ideology of the new ruling class, namely the mass of Athenian 
citizens, which provided for the largely unaccountable and unlimited power of the 
demos, proved to be dangerous for the running of the Athenian city state. The 
response was an emerging ideology of the rule of law, providing for safeguarding 
structures and rules to secure a smooth implementation of democracy, preventing 
its degeneration into mob rule. The introduction of new legal procedures and 
provisions was part of this ideological reform and actually paved the way for the 
gradual dominance of the ‗rule of law‘ ideology. This could be a lesson to be 
learnt by the history of Athenian laws regarding modern day populism; building a 
legal and extra-legal bulwark against it in the form of a strong counter ideology, 
capable of uniting the people under a noble objective, could be a solution.  
Nevertheless, the least that this chapter has achieved, through the application of 
populism to the Athenian setting, is a further proof of the resilient and 
chameleonic nature of the concept of populism. More research needs to be done on 
the field, yet classical Athens is definitely worth looking at for this purpose. 
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The Jurisdiction in the Hungarian Cartel Law:  
Historical Background
1
 
 
Norbert Varga 
  
Abstract 
 
The practical validation of the Cartel Law in Hungary can be 
reconstructed based on judicial practice. The existing memorials, 
essentially, only contain the verdicts of the courts of the first and second 
instances, and there are only a small number of archive sources which 
describe the factum in its entirety. Due to this, only the information found 
in the verdicts‘ dispositional and justification portions can aid us in the 
examination of the rules of Procedural Law. All in all, it can be stated, by 
taking archival sources into account that the peremptory majority of cartel 
cases were jurisdictional legal actions. The specialised nature of the 
procedural rules can be viewed as unique in the history of legal action in 
Hungary, for the civil courts reached verdicts by mainly employing the 
rules of Bp., according to Statute 68400/1914. I. M. Apart from the 
problems in the field of Substantive Law, we can observe the process of the 
lawsuits and the procedural acts, especially the act of verification. We can 
observe what data and information did the courthouses used in order to 
reach their resolutions. I would like to present the regulation of the 
Hungarian cartel law special attention to the legal cases. 
 
Keywords: Cartel Law; Hungary; Procedural Law; Archival Sources. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The rules and cases of the so-called legal actions of general interest in 
connection to the cartels were introduced by the 20
th
 Act of 1931. According to 
the technical definition, the procedural law, as a specified aspect of Cartel Act, 
regulated the formal law so that the common good and the economy could 
benefit from it.
2
 The methodology of the cartel supervision offices belonged to 
this area of law, and it was practiced by the government, the specific ministries, 
the Royal Hungarian Legal Board, the Cartel Committee and the Price 
Analysing Committee from the executive branch, and the regular, elected and 
                                                          
1
Updated and modified footnotes and references from Varga, N. (2016). ‗The Procedure and 
Operation of the Cartel Court‘ in Klára Gellén & Márta Görög (eds.) (2016) Lege et Fide: Ünnepi 
tanulmányok Szabó Imre 65. Születésnapjára (pp. 660-669). Szeged:  Iurisperitus Bt. and Varga, N. 
(2017). ‗The Cartel Policy in the Cartel Law Special Attention to the First Cartel Act in Hungary‘ in 
Klára Gellén (ed.) (2017) Honori et Virttuti: Ünnepi tanulmányok Bobvos Pál 65. Születésnapjára 
(pp. 463-468). Szeged: Iurisperitus Bt. The research was supported by GVH. 
2
Harasztosi (1936) ar 510.     
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Cartel Court from the judicial branch.
1
 In this essay, I basically would like to 
describe the dispositions in connection to the procedural law of the Cartel Court, 
and with that, to analyse the existing legal precedents. 
The Cartel Court has been introduced after the law came into effect, and it 
was reasoned by the statement of the Secretary of Agriculture as follows. The 
―measures which must be taken against a cartel should be objected to the 
consideration of a judge most of the times, so […] the judicature of the Cartel Act 
could best be assured by a separate cartel court‖.2 
Should an agreement or a statement fall under Paragraph No. 1 of the 
aforementioned Act, then, according to the statement of the assigned secretary, the 
Royal Hungarian Legal Board could file a case at the Cartel Court.
3
 The problem 
of the definition of cartels by the courts arose in legal proceedings in connection to 
the agreements. To be more exact, the problem was that what acts can be 
considered to be under the effects of Cartel Act.
4
 
The aforementioned understanding of the act became interpretable by 
practice. The Cartel Court examined an agreement that considered the acquisition, 
resale, sale price and conditions of firewood, coal, charcoal and forge coal, and 
also contained rules on its accounts and mutual buyer protection. The Cartel Court 
interpreted Paragraph No. 1 of the Cartel Act, and determined that the intention of 
the respondent was not to regulate the actions on one occasion but ―defined the 
respondents‘ behaviour in the terms of business for a longer time period‖. The 
point of the agreement was to regulate the economic competition ―in connection to 
the commerce and formation of prices of these merchandises, between two 
subjects of free trade‖.5 In its verdict, the Cartel Court stated that ―such an 
agreement is under the effects of Paragraph No. 1 of the Cartel Act, with no 
consideration of its personal, economic or geographic field‖.6 
The definition of common good and the interests of public economics was 
one of the most notable problems of the legal institutions which regulated cartels. 
The works of Ferenc Harasztosi Károly should be highlighted among other literary 
sources, which stated that ―the state must establish a public law system for cartels, 
which ensures that the cartel disagreements of economic life are taking place 
within a framework which ensures that they do not endanger the interests of public 
economy and of common good‖.7 
                                                          
1
A karteltörvény és a Kartelbizottság teljesíteni fogják hivatásukat. Kartel Szemle, Vol. 1(1): 1. 
Összhangot kell teremteni a Kartelbizottság és az Árelemző Bizottság munkája között. Kartel 
Szemle, Vol. 1(1): 1-2. 
2
Magyar Nemzeti Levéltár (Hungarian National Archive) (hereinafter MNL) K-184. 1933. 41. 
30061/35309. Kelemen (1931) at 32-34. A Kurián ma megalakult a kartelbíróság. Budapesti 
Hírlap, 6 Marc 1932. 17., Stipta (2016) at 53-64. 
3
MNL. K-184. 1933. 41. 31960/92488.,  MNL. K-184. 1933. 41. 30061/35309. 
4
MNL. K-184. 1937. 41. 86293/86293. See: MNL. K-184. 1937. 41. 86293/86293. 
5
Cartel Court P. IV. 5261/1932. See: Ranschburg (1935) at 35; A Kartelbíróság újabb ítélete.. A 
Kartel. Vol. 3. No. 1.  A Kartel. Vol. 3. No. 2. 6-7., MNL. K-184. 1933. 41. 31960/92488., Szabó 
(2016) at 64-84. 
6
Cartel Court P. IV. 5261/1932 in Ranschburg (1935) at 35. See: Curia P. IV. 3065/1933-22. 
Ranschburg (1935)  36-37., P. IV. 920/1933/9 in: Ibid 35. 
7
Harasztosi (1936) at 512.  
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In this matter, we have to stress the first statement of principle of the Cartel 
Court (on the matter of business isolation, boycott or exclusion).
1
 This statement – 
by referring to Paragraph No. 6 of the Cartel Act – established that it is against the 
common good and economic conditions ―exclusion not only gives a party 
economically reasoned disadvantages, but in fact capable of destroying its 
complete economic existence‖.2 In connection to this, the Cartel Court also 
examined the cartel contracts containing the stipulations of isolation. The Cartel 
Court only agreed to enforce this if it had ―reasons especially significant and 
relevant to the public‖.3 According to the Cartel Court, ―the emphasis is not so 
much on private, but general interests‖.4 The committee referred to the 
justification of the 5
th
 act of 1923: ―The categorical imperatives of morals must 
also be validated during conflicts in the fields of commerce and industry, if one 
does not want to set individual selfishness loose on the trade‖.5 In connection to 
both fair competition and cartel regulations, one must always keep the interests of 
common good in mind.
6
 The Curia also stated in Mandate No. IV. P. 4936/1927 
that any contract which is against general interests and good morals shall be 
considered null and void.
7
 
One could file a legal action to the Cartel Court if an agreement or an 
application of a regulation, or a cartel which was formed because of it, was against 
proper ethics or common good.
8
 A secretary could ask for several things in such 
actions: the court should disband a cartel formed by such an application or 
regulation, and make a pecuniary offence if it keeps on functioning. The secretary 
could also ask for forbidding the execution of the agreement or the regulation and 
for a fine if the participants continue to pursue their goals.
9
 Filing a legal action 
introduced by the cartel court could be done by any office or individual by 
contacting the Secretary of Trade and providing ample evidence.
10
 Before filing 
the legal action, the secretary could ask for a second opinion from the Cartel 
Committee, but it was not compulsory. However, if a public office or authority 
filed the claim, the secretary usually turned to the Cartel Committee for their 
opinion. 
The administrative offices only practiced initiative rights during proceedings, 
and after this, taking measures were assigned to the court. The offices could 
participate in the legal action as a party to the dispute. All in all, it was in 
connection to the consideration of court independence and the guarantees of 
judicial proceedings, not to mention the respect of basic rights.
11
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MNL. K-184. 1933. 41. 31960/92488. 
2
Ranschburg (1935) at 47. MNL. K-184. 1933. 41. 31960/92488. 
3
MNL. K-184. 1933. 41. 31960/92488. 
4
MNL. K-184. 1933. 41. 31960/92488. 
5
MNL. K-184. 1933. 41. 31960/92488. 
6Szegő (1936) at 34-36. 
7
MNL. K-184. 1933. 41. 31960/92488. 
8
Dobrovics (1937) at 126; Szente (1931) at 11-12. 
9
Ranschburg (1931) at 100. 
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Ranschburg (1931) at 100; Harasztosi (1936) at 513. 
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In a lawsuit based on a legal action of general interest, the court could disband 
of the cartel, to shut down its operations, to forbid the fulfilment of an agreement 
or a regulation, or force them to cease a certain action or behaviour. The Act 
clearly stated what legal arrangements were within the jurisdiction of the 
government. This meant that in order to enforce these decrees, one did not need a 
court order. The secretary could enact these measures if the agreement or 
regulation enforced upon the cartel endangered economy or general interests, 
especially if it regulated the circulation of goods production or price formation in 
such a way that the interests of the customers, the entrepreneurs or the 
manufacturers were harmed. 
It was within the jurisdiction of the ministry to examine the case, and, if was 
deemed necessary, it could propose to register the data, to make inquiries and 
submit official documents. With the participation of a commissioned, emissary, it 
could examine the business conductions and business management, and by 
looking at the business records and other documents of a cartel in question. It 
could also question the members and the employees. In case the ministry opted for 
the suspension of the operations of a cartel, then it could try to reach a peaceful 
solution by holding a hearing for the concerned parties. If this method was not 
fruitful, then it could propose to the government to withdraw tax and customs 
discounts, and the exclusion from public contracts. These arrangements fell under 
the topic of industrial codes and transport rates, and this is how the government 
intended to stop the cartel from continuing such actions that were against general 
interests.
1
 Based on the suggestion of the Secretary of Commerce, the government 
could introduce these arrangements if none of the specified conditions dictated by 
the Act were present.
2
 
In cases where the ministry filed for the cancellation of an official permit 
without which the cartel could not continue its intended activities, then they had to 
turn to the court. The ministry could make a suggestion to the government to 
modify or nullify the customs items written down in the customs tariff. There is an 
archived example for the latter. The Alkaloida Chemical Factory Inc. wrote an 
official letter to the Hungarian Royal Central Customs Directory in 12
th
 December, 
1933, which stated that ―for preparations, and in exchange for the exported amount 
of morphine intended for transformation, the morphine derivate and their salts‖ be 
imported customs-free‖.3 Because of the emerged economic conditions, if 
everything else failed, the ministry could turn to the Cartel Court.
4
 After briefly 
describing the rules of conduct, the procedural law – mostly civil law – rules in 
connection to the cartels will be described in a much detailed fashion, and the legal 
practice related to this and still available will also be presented. 
 
 
                                                          
1
MNL. K-184. 1933. 41. 30061/35309. 
2
Harasztosi (1936) at 513. 
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MNL. K-184. 1933. 41. 30061/92818. 
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The Lawsuits 
 
The concept of a lawsuit of general interest was understood as a legal action 
started based on a claim filed by the Legal Board on the order of the secretary of 
commerce, which the possible purposes of disbanding a cartel or to forbid them to 
continue their operations; the suspension of the ongoing legal action, without 
taking into account whether it is held by an orderly or a court of arbitration; to 
determine whether or not the actions of a cartel are against the law; the annulment 
of the verdicts made by the specialised courts.
1
 
The question arose that in which cases can one pass a lawsuit of general 
interest. It can be stated that the general opinion was that if there was a chance that 
the state should intervene. The aforementioned Paragraph No. 6 of the Cartel Act 
determined these. This is not a laxative list, because the act mentioned above lists 
other cases for filing a statement in order to start a lawsuit of general interest in 
Paragraph No. 7. A statement could be claimed if the cartel‘s operations were 
against the law, public morals or general decrees. Most of these types of cases 
were of private interest, and were held earlier by orderly courts or courts of 
arbitration of the chamber since they broke the law of fair trade. Among many 
others, some of these cases were lawsuits filed because of boycott or sale under 
price.
2
 It is questionable whether these cases could become lawsuits of general 
interest since the law was broken, or the acts in question also harm general 
interests. This is a significant matter, for in cases where competition laws were 
broken and no general interests were harmed, orderly courts had the jurisdiction.  
In my opinion – based on the understanding of the normative text, in order to 
a lawsuit of general interest to be filed to the Cartel Court, not only the law and 
public morals had to be broken, but also general interests.
3
 
I agree with the statement of Nándor Raschburg, according to which even the 
name of the lawsuit of general interest excludes the opportunity for a private 
proposal. The legal action was proposed by the Secretary of Trade at the Royal 
Hungarian Legal Board. 
This also referred to that not only the law and public morals had to be harmed, 
but also the general interests. The statement had to be filed to the Legal Board 
based on this. In the conviction, the Cartel Court‘s verdict had to determine the 
harm that came to not only the law and public morals, but to the general interest, 
as well.
4
 
The evasion of the Cartel Act was the purpose of the so-called ―coal cartel‖, 
where the coal merchants and the mines, the coal merchants and the medium 
vendors, and the MÁK and the Salgó reached an agreement. This contract resulted 
in a monopolistic situation in the coal supplies of Budapest, for ten wholesale 
merchants took on the obligation to purchase 37.500 carriages of coal from two 
mines, which was almost the complete coal needs of Budapest for a whole year. 
The merchants were not allowed to sell any other coal. Because of this, any mines 
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and merchants who were not involved in this contract got into a difficult position. 
Not to mention that if we look at the situation from the point of view of the 
consumers, they were forced to buy briquette. The purpose of the cartel was to sell 
the so-called powdered coal which was pent up.
1
 According to the viewpoint of 
the Cartel Committee, several elements of the cartel contract endangered common 
good and the interests of public economy, and as such, it falls under the effect of 
Paragraph No. 6 of the Cartel Act, and because of this, they requested a rise in 
prices, the elimination of the uncertain economic situation, the decrease of 
unemployment, stopping the cartel from gaining any advantages in the field of 
public services, and the annulment of the disadvantaged position of the mines 
outside the cartel.
2
 
 
 
The Jurisdiction and Procedure of the Cartel Court 
 
Lawsuits of general interest, temporary measures, lay on pecuniary fines per 
orderly punishment, forbiddance, nullification of the verdicts of elected courts, and 
the suspension of execution of the regulations of elected courts were within the 
jurisdiction of the Cartel Court.
3
 
The Cartel Court could only order the dissolution and the ban from ongoing 
operation of a cartel, if a cartel‘s operations were against general interests and 
there was no other way of terminating it. The law gave the secretary the right to 
ask for a termination directly from the court, without authorizing any other means. 
However, the rights related to the termination could mean constraining basic 
rights, especially the right to fusion. But the constitutional rights could only be 
limited in special cases and with legal authority. Any other case would make the 
court‘s actions illegitimate, and it would have been measured by the arbitrary legal 
practice. 
With the dissolution of the cartel, the court generally forbade the cartel and its 
members to keep on their operation. The dissolution of the cartel did not mean that 
the members would not keep up its operation by acting in unison. This meant that 
the only way that the verdict would come into effect if the court forbade the cartel 
to practice their operation. 
There were cases where in spite of the fact that the cartel was dissolved, but it 
kept on operating. The law did not forbid this per se, but in practice, what this 
meant is as it follows. The verdict of the court was only valid for the dissolution 
and the forbiddance of the operation of the cartel involved in the lawsuit. If a new 
cartel was formed based on a new treaty, then the former verdict did not came into 
effect there. A new legal action had to be taken against the operation of the new 
cartel, and new proof was needed that its operation is against general interests. 
However, in urgent cases, the secretary could place temporary solutions into 
effect. 
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In cases where the misconducts of the cartel could be nullified by the 
fulfilment of an agreement or a decree, then this became the court‘s order. This 
was also the decision where the nullification for the statement of claim was filed. 
In spite of all this, if the statement only asked for the nullification of the agreement 
or the decree, then the court could not state the dissolution in its verdict. In these 
cases, the court would have overruled the statement of claim, which is against 1
st
 
Act of 1911 (Judicial Procedure Code, JPC from here on out). They only 
petitioned for the nullification of the operations or behaviour, if the behaviour of 
the cartel could not be demonstrably correlated to an agreement.
1
 
The structure of the Cartel Court was regulated by the Cartel Act itself 
(Paragraph No. 8). This court was a separate institution, which was established, 
interestingly enough, within the Supreme Court, the topmost institution within the 
ordinary judicial system with a president, two appointed judges and two lay 
judges. Its head was the president of the Supreme Court, or an individual 
appointed by the Supreme Court: the vice president or one of the presiding judges 
of the Supreme Court. The two judges were invited by the presiding judge 
appointed by the Supreme Court and the president of the acting council from the 
two appointed judges. The two lay judges were selected by the president of the 
acting council from those ten specialists which were selected every three years 
from the list assembled by the Secretary of Justice and the Secretary of 
Commerce, containing thirty names. The reason behind this was ensuring 
competency.
2
 
Lawsuits of general interests had to be delivered for all participants concerned. 
In cases where representatives were announced or appointed, then the statements 
had to be delivered to this individual. In these legal actions, any participants could 
participate separately, and accompanied by their legal representatives. 
In order to ensure a professional opinion, the court could meet with the Cartel 
Committee ex officio. If it proved to be necessary, the Cartel Committee could do 
the same with the Price Analysation Council.
3
 For example, they followed this 
procedure in the case of the so-called tin box cartel, in order for the matter to be 
properly examined. The Cartel Committee called upon the Price Analysation 
Council in order to proceed with the run-down of the prices of some ―cartelised 
commodities‖. For example, hemp, string and canvas belonged to this group. 
There were some agricultural tools on the list, as well, for example, spits, hacks 
and shovels.
4
 
The Cartel Committee took the report of the Price Analysation Council into 
account in connection to the price of wool and cloth. They also elaborated upon 
the fact that what business policies should the concerned parties follow in order to 
increase the price of Hungarian fleece. They collected their suggestions on 
appendix sheet 92157/1933, which, among others, listed such suggestions like 
increasing the influence of the state.
5
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The Cartel Court took the examination results of the Price Analysation 
Council into account in the suit of Alkaloida.
1
 They wished to determine the price 
of narcotine by moderating.
2
 The Committee formed a specialised group while 
determining the prices. This group reached a decision after the acquisition of the 
necessary data and conducting hearings for the concerned parties.
3
 In the case of 
the so-called ―oil cartel‖, they criticised the price and quality determined by the 
Committee. Quality assurance methods had to be established, as well.
4
 
In connection to the work of the Price Analysation Committee, a registry can 
be found amongst the archived materials, with a short description of price 
reduction for each and every commodity. This report specifically mentions white 
oils (paraffin, gasoline, diesel oil), lubricating oil, agricultural tools (i.e. axles, 
horseshoes, shovels), ironmongeries, machine lubricants, textbooks, linseed oil, 
pesticides, textile, cement.
5
 
As I previously mentioned, the Secretary of Trade could give an order to the 
Legal Board to start a lawsuit of general interest. The plaintiff of these lawsuits 
was the Royal Legal Director, who always stood for the interests of the state and 
the general population. No single individual could become the plaintiff in such 
lawsuits.
6
 
It is also noteworthy that the outline of the Cartel Act would have given an 
opportunity for a competitor outside the cartel (a so-called outsider) to file a claim 
for a lawsuit of general interest. However, the counterargument was brought 
forward that outsiders would most likely try to secure their private interests by a 
lawsuit of general interest, and it would be ―a direct harassment of the cartel, 
would learn and publish their business secrets, and their ultimate goal would be to 
enforce a bigger and bigger contingent for themselves, and also to join the cartel, 
and after that, would nullify the lawsuit which was started by them being the 
plaintiff‖.7 But there were reasons for the outsiders to become plaintiffs, stating 
that this would have helped the detection of cartel abuses. The lawsuits filed 
against cartels could have been much more successful if these were started by 
outsiders. However, private and general interests were separated within the law 
proposal, so in the proposition submitted to the parliament, outsiders were not 
granted the right to become plaintiffs. Legislation accepted this viewpoint.
8
 
This meant that no interest of private law could be enforced in lawsuits of 
general interests. ―The legal action of private law – public action – can only serve 
to protect and avoid the endangerment of the law, public morals, general interests, 
and by that, economy and the welfare of the public, and in order to do so, it shall 
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not be used to serve personal interests‖.1 In cases where individuals suffered 
private wrongs due to the operation of cartels, then a civil lawsuit, and not a 
lawsuit of general interest was necessary. If, apart from his complaint, the 
operation of the cartel endangered general interests, the individual had the 
opportunity to draw the attention of the supervision and the ministry to this fact. 
After this, the ministry had to take the necessary legal actions.
2
 
The respondent of a lawsuit of general interest could be all of the concerned 
parties. In a case when a cartel was operating as a legal entity, then the respondent 
mostly became the cartel itself via a representative. The members of a cartel could 
also be included in the lawsuit as concerned parties. 
If a cartel did not have a separate legal entity on its own, the legal action was 
taken against its members. In cases where a cartel had a sales office or 
administrative organisation functioning as a legal entity, or all of its transactions 
were fulfilled by the cooperation of a bank, then it was practical to include these in 
the lawsuit, as well, for most of the debatable legal actions were made under the 
names of these legal entities. This is why it became justified that the enforcement 
to discard the ban or actions could be carried into effect directly against these, as 
well.
3
 
There is a specific example for these in the contract in the case of the ―bakery 
cartel‖, where Paragraph No. 30 elaborates upon the legal entity‘s jurisdiction and 
tasks. A bank was delegated to fulfil these tasks, and it did so by using its own 
name but by keeping the interests of the members of the contract in mind, so ―is 
legally bound in their name, and in case of becoming a plaintiff or a respondent, 
could act on its own, and practice all rights that is present for all concerned parties 
as individuals‖.4 
The large headcount of the cartels could significantly make summoning more 
difficult, and could slow down the legal action. So if a cartel had a registered legal 
representative, the statement of claim had to be delivered to that individual. If 
there was no such person, then the head of the Cartel Court appointed a 
representative. If the representative accepted the statement of claim, it meant that 
all of the cartel members received and noted it. It was the obligation of the 
representative to notify each member of the cartel on the contents, who could 
participate in the lawsuit with separate legal advisors. 
The proceedings of the Cartel Court were held with the basic principle that 
nobody with private interests can participate in them. As I mentioned above, the 
concerned parties were represented by attorneys in the legal action. In cases of 
general interests, the action at law could only be filed against all participants, 
which, in these cases, meant all members of the cartel.
5
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Execution 
 
In the verdict – in case of amerce – the court always forbade a cartel or one of 
its members from continuing their operation, or the enforcement of an agreement 
or regulation by a pecuniary fine. This is how a cartel was forced to discontinue its 
operations. The verdict did not state the size of the fine, the executive branch was 
tasked to establish that. The execution was asked by the Legal Board. The 
application had to be filed to the Cartel Court, and certify that the cartel or its 
members fulfilled their obligations as stated in the verdict. The Cartel Court 
determined the fine after a hearing with the amerced participant. During this, they 
had to take the wealth intended to be gained from the action and the financial 
status of the participant into account. The warrant which enacted the fine was a 
legal document also carrying executive powers, which were obligated by a judicial 
executive. Not obeying the interdiction could result in the repeated infliction of the 
fine.
1
 
 
 
The Cartel Policy in the Cartel Case Law 
        
A very specific area of Cartel Law was the Cartel Policy Law, which was in 
close connection to the state‘s power to oversee cartels, which meant nothing more 
or less than the protection of economy and public welfare. This procedure included 
the ordinary fining procedures.
2
 
According to the Act XX of 1931, only those could be punished by ordinary 
fines who failed to introduce the Cartel Settlement or the order, and did not 
provide ample reason for this omission, who did not obey the appeal for the 
examination of the case of the Secretary of Economy, all in all, failed to fulfil the 
duty to provide data, or obstructed the fulfilment of the appeal.
3
 Those who carried 
out appeals or settlements which they were forbidden to do so by the Cartel Court, 
or manifest behaviour or carry out acts forbidden by the Cartel Court are contained 
within the same framework.  
In the first two cases, the assigned courthouses were required to see the case 
through, which started the procedure according to the request of the legal director 
of the treasury based on the proposal of the secretary. In the third case, the Cartel 
Court was privy to the case, for it could establish a fining ex officio. The Cartel 
Court was assigned to the case if the fine was established repeatedly but 
unsuccessfully for a second and third time according to the motion of the Secretary 
of Economy, or in another lawsuit of general interest according to the motion of 
the legal director, if they wished to suggest proscription from trade or industry 
permanently, or for a pre-established period of time.
4
 
According to Harasztosi, none of his cases in fining procedures only the 
lawsuits concerning ordinary fines had any actual significance, especially if the 
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presentation of a document was forgotten or was filed in late; or in cases filed for 
omission of compulsory data presentation. In cases filed for the failure to oblige 
presentation duties, the matter of penalty fell under the rights of the assigned 
secretary. The conformations filed to the secretary had no such effect which 
vindicates the affair, the contestants could not achieve more with it than saving 
themselves from paying the ordinary fine.
1
 
In fining procedures started at courts of justice, the court had to use the rules 
in in cases of trade delinquencies. This order of 68,400/1914. I. M. had to be taken 
into account.
2
 
In a case of ordinary fining procedures, no imprisonment could be ordered as 
a main rule, for the fine levied due to the failure to present a document could be 
transformed into custodial sentences. There were specific cases where the fine 
could not be collected, but even then the Act had to specifically allow this 
transformation.
3
  
The legal director asked for the actuation of the procedure, and presented the 
Mihály Schwarz, Mihály Menzer and Ignácz Ádler, timber merchants from 
Kiskunhalas, made an agreement in 1933 according to Pharagraph No. 1 of the 
Cartel Procedural Law concerning timber, terracotta bricks and pottery products. 
They introduced the cartel contract to the Secretary of Trade on the 12
th
 April, 
1933, however, the list of pre-determined prices, which should have been one of 
the appendices of the contract, was only presented on the 4
th
 May, 1933. In this 
case, the participants were late, and didn‘t even provide a justification for this.  
According to this, the Secretary of Trade ordered the legal directorate to actuate a 
case due to the failure to present a document. According to decree No. 68400/ 
1914. I. M., the legal directorate asked the Royal Court of Kalocsa to actuate a 
case against the aforementioned companies.
4
 
The fining procedures was heard out by one of the orderly judges of the court 
of justice, who, as the presenter of the case and put the examination and trial aside 
to direct the attention of the complainants that the justifying statement had to be 
presented within 15 days after the appeal to do so was received. After this, the 
court decided on the appropriate penalty or the annulment of the case by takin the 
presented documents and the officially imparted information. The warrant 
established during the closed hearing was delivered to both the complainants and 
the royal legal directorate. According to this, the aforementioned decree presented 
role of public accuser to the royal prosecutor, but based on legal practices, this 
position was fulfilled the legal director in such cases.
5
  
In the aforementioned lawsuit actuated by the Court of Kalocsa, the 
participants were asked to provide a document in proof.
6
 According to this, the 
complainants provided the document in proof, with which they wished to verify 
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that they did not fail their duty to present documents, established in the Act.
1
 
According to their document of proof, their opinion is that there was no sin of 
omission, for they didn‘t establish the appendix of the contract when they signed 
the contract, and after it was signed, they introduced it to the Secretary for 
inspection within the deadline.
2
 
Within 8 days after the delivery, they could turn to the assigned High Court 
against the decision. This affected the decision by having a postponing effect. Any 
individual who was thwarted in validating his or her individual rights in a lawsuit 
of the first or second degree, could file a document of proof. However, one could 
not file a document of proof because of an omission, the application for the 
document of proof had to be filed for the court of justice within 30 days of the 
established day of the trial or the expiration date of the failed legal remedy.
3
 
The formulaic rules of the application were under the effect of Paragraphs 
464-466 of the Criminal Code of Procedure. It had to be filed at the courthouse 
where the complainant failed to keep to the deadline. This application had to 
contain the reason for the delay and the justification information and data, with the 
evidences that the court needed also had to be enclosed. If the matter was of the 
omission of an act of legal remedy, then the appointed court of the first degree 
turned the application over to the assigned higher court. In cases where the court 
made place for the document of proof, than, at the same time, also acted for the 
substitution of the omitted documents. The Court of Appeal had the power to 
come to an absolute decision in the case.
4
 
In the lawsuit filed against the companies Nagykovácsi Lime Factory 
Corporation and the Lime and Grout Sales Corporation, the complainants 
presented in their document of proof that the debated agreement was not made on 
the 20
th
 March, 1933, for on this date, they only signed the draft of the contract. 
The court did not accept the statement presented in the document, and fined the 
complainants for breaking Paragraph No. 14 of the Cartel Procedural Law.
5
 
To find out the bearings of a case, the court could order an examination, if 
deemed necessary. In this case, the court selected an investigator from its own 
apparatus of judges or notaries. The duty of the investigator was to describe the 
bearings of the case, and based on this, the court of justice could order the 
termination or the continuation of said legal action. In order to do so, the 
investigator interrogated the complainant, and acquired all documents and 
evidences necessary to clarify the bearings of the case.
6
 
The rules of Bp. were deemed valid during the interrogation of witnesses and 
experts.
7
 The court or the investigator could absolve any business associate from 
clarifying any circumstance which was not deemed vital to the examination or the 
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case, yet would result in business secrets that are not necessary for the trial to 
come to light. If the investigator deemed it necessary, he could ask for a court 
order for an audit. This procedure was only valid if it was deemed necessary to 
ascertain the omission or act under investigation. If the procedural step could only 
be fulfilled by the means of writ, it was necessary to turn to the assigned County 
Court. The court of justice could order the investigator to continue or terminate the 
investigation.
1
 
To uphold common welfare, the legal directorate could oversee the inspection, 
and because of this, it could examine the investigation documents, and could file a 
proposal to the investigator to continue or terminate the investigation, or could file 
a proposal to the court of justice to debate the investigator‘s regulations. The latter 
two was within the complainant‘s rights, as well, who could select a defence 
attorney even during the investigation, whose rights were also determined by the 
Bp. The defence attorney could only be one of the practicing legal experts, one 
who was registered at one of the Bar Associations.
2
 
The complainant had no right to intervene or propose during the examination 
or the rest of the procedure, could not form a statement or get legal remedy. 
However, he or she was free to introduce any circumstance to the investigator, the 
court of justice or Court of Appeal which could move the examination of the 
omission or illegal activity forward or assists the verification. If he was not 
selected to appear as witness, he could press for this, and the court of justice and 
the Court of Appeal was obliged to enact this, with the added burden of nullifying. 
After the examination was finished, the investigator sent the documents to the 
court of justice. Based on these documents, the court could order the termination 
or the continuation of the legal action. The court stated the termination of a legal 
procedure in a warrant. In any other case, a term had to be set in order to continue 
the case orally. In cases when the act or malpractice fell under the effect of 
criminal law, the legal action had to be transferred to a Criminal Court.
3
 
A case was filed against the Chinoin Pharmaceutical and Chemical Factory 
Corporation for breaking Paragraphs No. 2 and 14 of the Cartel Procedural Law, 
and thus committing cartel malpractice, and it took place at the court of justice of 
Budapest, where the court of the second degree reached a warrant, specified as No. 
35779/2, but was turned to a higher court by the legal directorate, yet it was 
rejected by the Court of Appeal, and in their warrant, they pointed out Paragraph 
No. 1 of the 5
th
 Act of 1878, according to which an act can only be considered a 
crime or a delinquency if the Act considers it as such.
4
 In such cases, Criminal 
Courts should proceed. 
The court could order the legal action to move forward, if the bearings of the 
case were clear. Before this, the complainant was asked to make a statement with a 
15-day deadline.
5
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In the warrant ordaining the trial, the act or malpractice encumbering the 
complainant had to be stated, with the exact place of a specific provision under the 
law.  
At the same time, the court of law was assigned with the task to provide a 
warrant to appear to all contestants, witnesses, and experts. They could issue a 
warrant to appear for even those participants who were announced after the 
beginning of the trial by any of the contestants. The complainant had to be warned 
that if he or she chooses not to appear, this non-attendance does not obstruct the 
continuation and discussion of the case, he was free to hire a legal representative 
and take place in the case.
1
 The arrival of the subpoena and the beginning of the 
trial had to be at least 15 days apart. During trials, if the complainant was a natural 
person, he or she could not be apprehended, committed into custody or put in 
detention awaiting trial. This was a significant difference between this and a 
criminal legal action.
2
 
The beginning of the trial was marked by reading out the warrant which 
ordained it, and after that, the judge summarised the case. The trial could be held 
even if the contestants failed to appear. The witnesses and experts could be 
ordered to step forward, and, in order to do so, the trial could be interrupted for a 
few hours. 
After this, the president could interrogate the present complainant in 
connection to the act or malpractice, and the members of the judicial board, the 
president of the legal department and the defence attorney could ask their 
questions.
3
 After these, verification was recorded. 
After verification was finished, the president of the legal department 
introduced his proposal to the court, followed by the defence attorney and, finally, 
the complainant. There was no place for any other discussion in this section of the 
legal action. In cases where the contestants failed to appear, the judge introduced 
and described the evidence.
4
 
The publicity of the trial was under the rules written down in Bp. The court 
could order the exclusion of the public in order to preserve business secrets. The 
rules written down in Bp. were also valid in connection to the development of the 
trial and maintaining order.
5
 
During the fining procedure filed against the Textile Factory of Győr 
Corporation, the Textile Industry of Soroksár Corporation, and Mózes Freudinger 
and Sons corporation, the royal court of Budapest considered the minutes of the 
18
th
 February, 1931 as evidence, and according to this, they determined that the 
complainants were present on the general assembly on the raw material agreement, 
and these individuals ―report their inclusion to the raw material agreement, since 
up to that point, their inclusion was based on gentlemen‘s agreement‖.6 The court 
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considered this unwritten gentlemen‘s agreement to fall under Act No. 1 of the 
Cartel Procedural Law. 
The court judged the circular letter on the same merit, when it stated that it is 
a regulation in itself that should have been presented to the Secretary of Trade, 
―for it obviously serves the purpose that the individuals who wrote it down and 
signed it could sell their merchandise on a higher price, and this, limit the 
economic competition in connection to the formation of prices‖.1 
The court considered the fact that the agreement formed by Rezső Vágó 
Corporation and the Hungarian Timber Corporation was not presented to the court 
in time for it only fell under the effect of Paragraph No. 1 of the Cartel Procedural 
Law after the P. IV. 5261/1932 verdict of the Cartel Court as an extenuating 
circumstance. The court stated that ―the decrees of the Cartel Procedural Law are 
not only valid for cartel contracts, but also establish the duty to present any sort of 
agreement which, in connection to merchandise, establishes any sort of limitation 
or regulation duty to the economic competition, both in the matters of circulation 
or price formation, so, even a delivery contract can fall under the regulations of 
Act No. 20 of 1931
2
 
After the trial was finished, the court of justice could either terminate the 
proceedings or could determine that the complainant was guilty and described the 
appropriate punishment in its warrant. In both cases, the order needed reasoning. 
The proposal of the legal director did not bind the court in any way. The fine had 
to be executed with a 15-day deadline.
3
 
The legal director established a similar procedure against the Sándor Angyalfi 
Asphalt and Tar Industry Corporation, János Biehn, Grozit Asphalt and Tar 
Chemical Products Corporation, Tivadar Helvey, DSc, Manó Kallós Ferenc Kollár 
and Co. Hungarian Asphalt Corporation, Posnánszky and Strelitz and Hungarian 
Cover Panel Factory purchaser and sales cooperative due to cartel elision
4
  The 
royal court of Budapest stated in its warrant that the complainants are guilty, for 
the agreement which elongated the contract that expired on the 28
th
 February, 
1934, was only presented after the deadline, so, belatedly.
5
 The court stated that 
―according to Paragraph No. 2 of the 20th Act of 1931, any agreement which 
modifies or regulates the economic competition, modifies and elongates he 
original, or any necessarily written agreement that falls under Paragraph No. 1 of 
the Cartel Procedural Law should be presented within 15 days after the 
establishment of the agreement. According to this mandate, it is not enough to just 
report the agreement, but a written form of the agreement had to be filed for the 
Royal Secretary of Trade of Hungary for registration.‖6 
In another case, the court of justice of Budapest terminated the procedure 
against the complainants, for it turned out that the agreement was presented before 
                                                          
1
Cg. 33989/6/1932. In 920/1933 BFL. 
2Cg. 34592/4 In 4913/1933 BFL. Lőw (1935) 355 
3
Harasztosi (1936) at 552. See: 13. P. 46341/3/1933. I: 2746/1934 BFL; Lőw (1935) 353. 
4
Cg. 35891/3. sz. BFL. 11543/1934 
5
Cg. 35891/3. sz. BFL. 11543/1934 
6
Cg. 35891/3. sz. BFL. 11543/1934, Dobrovics (1934/c) 14. 
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the deadline, since the court established that the formation of a cartel agreement is, 
by definition, the moment when every participant signed the contract.
1
 
 
 
Summary 
 
To sum it all up, according to the sources available in archives, most cartel 
cases were judicial proceedings. It can be stated that the special nature of the 
rules of these proceedings were unique in the Hungarian Code of Civil 
Procedures, for the civil courthouses made their decisions in a case of civil law 
by using the rules of the Code of Criminal Action. After the turn of the century, 
the economic changes started processes in both the field of legal life and legal 
sciences, and as a result of this, a demand arose to legally codify any rules in 
connection to cartels. The foundations of these were found in private law, 
especially in the regulations of the commercial law, which could be further 
elaborated upon and lead to a development of the regulations on the annulment 
of contracts in connection to dishonourable business competition. Beyond the 
creation of the technical legal regulations, the establishment of certain 
judicatory institutions was inevitable in order to enforce these. This is how the 
Cartel Court and the Cartel Committee became one of the most decisive legal 
institutions in economic life up until the middle of the 20
th 
century. 
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Development of the Hungarian ‘Work Made for 
Hire’ Provisions 
 
 Dénes Legeza 
  
Abstract 
 
The legal situation of the works created under employment was not clear 
in the past. What rights do the employer and the employee have? Does the 
author still have any moral rights? Is the company entitled to grant licence 
to a third person? These are just a few among the many questions which 
concern the copyright qualification of the works created under employment. 
After clarification of the differences between copyright and author‘s right 
systems, the study examines the development of the regulation of this legal 
field from the Prussian origins, introduces the achievements of judicial 
practice and jurisprudence, the ambitions for codification in the sixties, 
towards to the regulation in force in Hungary. 
 
Keywords: Work made for Hire; Copyright History; Authorship; Copyright 
and Employment; Publishing Right. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
European countries have different provisions regarding rights in works 
made by an employee in the course of employment. In the Netherlands, for 
example, the rights of literary, scientific or artistic works consisted out of a 
labour of an employee, belong to the employer unless the employer and the 
employee agreed otherwise,
1
 and in the United Kingdom the employer is the 
first owner
2
 of any copyright in a literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work 
including a film made by employee in the work of his employment. At the 
same time, besides the inalienable moral rights, the French dualistic author‘s 
right approach permits the transfer of economic rights
3
 while the German 
monistic approach
4
 makes the granting of economic rights, which are needed 
for business
5
 purposes, only as a possibility. The common principle which we 
                                                          
1Article 7 of the Dutch Copyright Act states that ‗Where labour which is carried out in the service of 
another consists in the making of certain literary, scientific or artistic works, the person in whose 
service the works were created is taken to be the maker, unless the parties have agreed otherwise.‘ 
(Translation M.M.M. van Eechoud); see Seignette (2012). 
211 CDPA 1988, article 11: ‗(1) The author of a work is the first owner of any copyright in it, 
subject to the following provisions. (2) Where a literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work, or a 
film, is made by an employee in the course of his employment, his employer is the first owner of 
any copyright in the work subject to any agreement to the contrary.‘ 
3
Article L111-3 CPI 1992; see Lucas, Lucas & Lucas-Schloetter (2012). 
4
Articles 29, 31, 39 UrhG 1965. 
5
Klagge & Czychowski (2014) at 181. 
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find is that all the legal regulations are by default, while the parties may agree 
on any terms they wish. In this study instead of making an international 
comparative analysis, each solution will be presented through the development 
of the Hungarian work made for hire provisions.
1
 
 
 
Differences between Copyright and Author’s Right Systems 
 
In spite of the fact that the copying of manuscripts was usual in the antiquity, 
the first real copyright act was codified in the 18
th
 century. Copyright legislations 
developed in parallel in different countries, which resulted in different approaches. 
Continental legislation put the author in the centre (szerzői jog, urcheberrecht, 
droit d‘auteur), while in common law countries the focus was put on the act of 
copying (copyright). 
Due to the cross-border trade of books countries concluded bilateral 
agreements on copyright from the early 19
th
 century. However, the first 
international copyright agreement, the Berne Convention for the Protection of 
Literary and Artistic Works was adopted only in 1886. Even the title of the Berne 
Convention, which mentions the protection of the works and not of the authors, 
shows that it was hard to harmonise the different approaches. 
 
Copyright System 
 
In a copyright system not only natural persons but also legal persons (other 
than ―flesh-and-blood authors‖2) are entitled to authorship. The best known 
example is ‗the works made for hire‘ doctrine in the United States, where ―the 
employer or other person for whom the work was prepared is considered the 
author.‖3 On the other hand, the United Kingdom Copyright, Designs and Patents 
Act 1988 makes a distinction between the author (the person who creates the work 
and some legal entities such as producers) and the first ownership of copyright.
4
 
The UK concept of authorship in a copyright system is much wider than in 
continental jurisdictions. 
The ownership of rights is transferable,
5
 and that covers mainly economic 
rights in the United States. While the economic rights are fully transferable,
6
 moral 
rights are not transferable but may be subject to a waiver or consent by the 
rightholder
7
 in the United Kingdom. 
 
                                                          
1
This study is based on Legeza (2014). 
2
Goldstein & Hugenholtz (2012) at 21. 
3
§201(b) U.S. Copyright Act. 
4
Article 9(1) CDPA 1988. 
5
§201(d) U.S. Copyright Act. 
6CDPA 1988, Article 90: ―Copyright is transmissible by assignment, by testamentary disposition or 
by operation of law, as personal or moveable property.‖ 
7
CDPA 1988, Article 87. 
49 
 
Author‘s Right Systems 
 
The French dualistic approach can be characterised by the separation of 
economic rights and moral rights. The former serves the financial 
acknowledgement, the latter the recognition of authorship. Copyright laws 
originally stipulated the exploitation of works (such as reproduction and 
dissemination), but the perpetual and inalienable (or unwaivable) moral rights 
were crystallised in France only at the beginning of the 20
th
 century. As a main 
rule, the creator of a work is the author and he/she may exercise their economic 
rights by the transfer thereof.
1
 
The other main European traditional civil law approach, known as the 
monistic approach, is followed in Germany, Austria and Hungary. The main 
principle of this approach is the unity of the copyright, which means that the 
creator-author is the source of the copyright who may dispose of his/her economic 
and moral rights. The moral rights are also inalienable, and the economic rights, 
too, cannot be transferred with some exceptions. The exploitation of the work is 
granted by a licensing agreement. As György Boytha presented in his study, the 
moral and economic rights are closely connected and complement each other: 
 
―in the case of the first publication of a writing, where the rights of 
divulgation and reproduction are necessarily exercised by one and the same 
act of authorization. The right to authorize adaptation also inevitably involves 
both economic and moral aspects. The right of withdrawal of the work, again, 
is inseparably linked with economic consequences to the author, and so on.‖2 
 
If a country‘s legislation contains both of these groups of rights, the 
exploitation of the work could lead to difficulties when they are exercised by 
different persons. In certain circumstances the legislator lifts the veil of the 
author‘s moral rights, and provides the licensee (user) with the right to perform 
the necessary changes of the work.
3
 
 
Two Systems in one Country 
 
The copyright legislation had an idiosyncratic development in Hungary. The 
first draft bills and the Copyright Acts followed the dualistic approach (if we can 
speak of dualism at all in the absence of moral rights in the 19
th
 century) until 
1970, and then the monistic approach. Although the current Hungarian Copyright 
Act represents monistic approach, the provisions of the works made by an 
employee are strongly dualistic, namely the employer becomes the legal successor 
of the employee‘s economic rights, and the limitation of the moral rights (to stay 
anonymous) are granted by the Act. 
The subject matter of this kind of research is of great importance nowadays. If 
we want to digitalise a journal and make it available on the internet, to colourise an 
                                                          
1
Goldstein & Hugenholtz (2012) at 265. 
2
Boytha (1983) at 383. 
3
Article 50 HCA 1999; Article 39(2) UrhG 1965. 
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old black and white film, to demolish a building or make it accessible for disabled, 
we have to know who the owner of the copyright is. The existing legislation is 
applicable to the subject matter and the term of copyright protection and 
infringement as well in Hungary. But the applicable law for licence agreements is 
that which was in force when the agreement in question was signed. The orphan 
works regime or the collective management organisations may authorise certain 
uses of works, but the problem of publishing or adaptation of a literary work in the 
absence of right holder, for instance, has not been solved in many countries.
1
 
 
 
‘Creator as Author’ Doctrine 
 
After the differences between copyright and author‘s right regimes have been 
presented, authorship will be analysed. The authorship is central to the works 
made within the scope of employment ‗quandary‘2 because if the law permits the 
employer to become the author or the initial owner of the copyright, further 
transfer is unnecessary.
3
 If the employer may be a derivative (non-initial) right 
holder only, the rights must be transferred. 
Although the term ‗author‘ is not defined by the Berne Convention and none 
of its provisions defines that only a natural person or both natural and legal 
persons can be an author, some scholars are in opinion that the term of protection - 
life plus 50 years
4
 (except anonymous works or works written under a pseudonym), 
the phrase ‗death‘5 and the term ―moral‖ rights prove that the Berne Convention 
protects mainly natural persons. Article 7
bis
 which provides the calculation of the 
term of protection in joint authorship says: ‗The term of protection] shall be 
calculated from the death of the last surviving author‖ (emphasis added). 
As a matter of fact, Article 14
bis
 of the Berne Convention
6
 has a special 
provision for cinematographic works. In the first place it provides copyright 
                                                          
1
See Mezei (2014). 
2
Jacobs (1993) at 34. 
3
Pogácsás (2014) at 151-156. 
4
Berne Convention, article 7. 
5
Berne Convention, articles 6bis, 7, 7bis. 
6Ibid, ―(1) without prejudice to the copyright in any work which may have been adapted or 
reproduced, a cinematographic work shall be protected as an original work. The owner of copyright 
in a cinematographic work shall enjoy the same rights as the author of an original work, including 
the rights referred to in the preceding Article. (2) (a) Ownership of copyright in a cinematographic 
work shall be a matter for legislation in the country where protection is claimed. (b) However, in the 
countries of the Union which, by legislation, include among the owners of copyright in a 
cinematographic work authors who have brought contributions to the making of the work, such 
authors, if they have undertaken to bring such contributions, may not, in the absence of any contrary 
or special stipulation, object to the reproduction, distribution, public performance, communication to 
the public by wire, broadcasting or any other communication to the public, or to the subtitling or 
dubbing of texts, of the work. [...] (3) Unless the national legislation provides to the contrary, the 
provisions of paragraph (2)(b) above shall not be applicable to authors of scenarios, dialogues and 
musical works created for the making of the cinematographic work, or to the principal director 
thereof. However, those countries of the Union whose legislation does not contain rules providing 
for the application of the said paragraph (2)(b) to such director shall notify the Director General by 
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protections to the owner of the copyright in a cinematographic work, who can be 
defined by a national legislator, and differentiates the owner of the copyright from 
the other authors, who have brought contributions to the making of the work. 
Section (3) makes it clear that these contributors can be natural persons such as the 
author of the screenplay or the principal director. From this point of view, the 
Berne Convention entitles legislators to widen the concept of the ―author‖ 
regarding cinematic works, and does not preclude the legal persons from being 
authors.
1
 
Apart from the Berne Convention, the European Union regulated the concept 
of author and of ownership in some directives, which can serve as a stronghold. 
The relating provisions will be analysed below. 
The Software Directive makes a distinction with regard to the circumstances 
of software creation. In a ‗general relationship‘ which can be a non-employment 
relationship, a natural person (or a group of natural persons) and—if where the 
legislation of the Member State permits—a legal person can be the author or the 
right holder of software.
2
 By contrast, in an employment relationship where the 
software is created by an employee, unless the parties agreed otherwise, the 
employer exclusively shall be entitled to exercise all economic rights in the 
program.
3
 It necessarily follows that in an employment relationship as lex 
specialis, the legislation of the Member State cannot permit that a legal person 
(employers usually are legal persons) be the initial right holder of a computer 
program. Hence the copyright is not vested in the employer by operation of law as 
the employer obtains only a grant. 
The original Software Directive was adopted in 1991, and the Database 
Directive of 1996 has the same provisions, except for the employment rules. The 
original European legislator probably changed his intent for harmonising the 
employment relationship in copyright. Article 2(3) of the Software Directive can 
be found in recital 29 of the Database Directive.
4
 The European Communities 
stepped back, and left the question of databases created by employees to the 
discretion of the Member States. 
Taking the opportunity given by the Berne Convention, the European Union 
as national legislator defined the copyright owner of the cinematographic work in 
several directives: 
 
―[f]or the purposes of [the given] Directive, the principal director of a 
cinematographic or audio visual work shall be considered as its author or 
                                                                                                                                                         
means of a written declaration, which will be immediately communicated by him to all the other 
countries of the Union.‖ 
1
See Grad-Gyenge (2016). 
2
Software Directive Article 2(1) 
3
Software Directive. Article 2(3). 
4
Database Directive (29) Whereas the arrangements applicable to databases created by employees 
are left to the discretion of the Member States; whereas, therefore nothing in this Directive prevents 
Member States from stipulating in their legislation that where a database is created by an employee 
in the execution of his duties or following the instructions given by his employer, the employer 
exclusively shall be entitled to exercise all economic rights in the database so created, unless 
otherwise provided by contract. 
52 
 
one of its authors. Member States may provide for others to be considered as 
its co-authors.‖1 
 
 
Development of the Hungarian Work Made for Hire Provisions 
 
Until 1875 neither publishing nor copyright law was regulated in Hungary. 
Since 1844, at least five copyright bills had been drafted, yet none of them were 
adopted.
2
 Only one regulation of the Provisional Rules of Legislation
3
 protected 
intellectual creations as a whole:  
 
―creations of intellect are to be taken as property, which is protected by 
law‖.4  
 
The Commercial Code of 1875 regulated publishing as a commercial 
transaction. The assignment of copyright ownership existed, although there were 
no works made in the course of employment per se. 
The Prussian-German and Austrian legislation always had a significant effect 
on Hungarian jurisprudence.
5
 Strictly speaking the first few copyright bills were 
translation of the Prussian Copyright Act of 1837 and the German Copyright Act 
of 1870, and the provisions of publishing contract in the Commercial Code of 
1875 were adopted mostly from the General state laws for the Prussian States 
(ALR). Article 1021 of the ALR provides that  
 
―[t]he abovementioned restrictions of the publishing right in favour of the 
author shall not apply if the bookseller has entrusted a writer with the task of 
preparing a work based on an idea that he, the bookseller, had conceived, 
and if the writer takes on this task without making any specific reservation in 
written form; or where the bookseller has engaged several authors to work 
together on the execution of such an idea.‖6  
 
This regulation shows that the Prussian laws regulated the situation when a 
work was made for hire or commissioned. Moreover, the Code determined that 
―[I]n such cases the full publishing right belongs to the bookseller from the very 
start, and the author(s) cannot claim any right to subsequent impressions and 
editions beyond what has been explicitly reserved for them in the written 
                                                          
1
Article 1(5) of Satellite Directive; Article 2(2) of Rental Directive; Article 2(1) of Term Directive. 
Grad-Gyenge (2016) at 26-28. 
2
Balogh (1991); Legeza (2018) at 44-64;, Mezei (2004) 
3
These rules were approved by both chambers of the Parliament but were not formally enacted. The 
Provisional Rules of Legislation entered into force on 23 July 1861 and their majority were in force 
until 1 May 1960. 
4
Homoki-Nagy (2014). 
5
Homoki-Nagy (2013) at 90-92; Homoki-Nagy (2018); Balogh (1997). 
6
Article 1021 of Prussian Statute Book. (Translated by Friedemann Kawohl). 
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contract.‖1 The bookseller (publisher) became the first owner of the copyright in 
such cases. 
The General Civil Code of Austria (ABGB; Allgemeines Bürgerliches 
Gesetzbuch) uses similar solution when states that 
 
―[I]f an author undertakes the composition of a work according to a plan 
given to him by the publisher; he can only claim the remuneration agreed 
upon. The publisher has for the future the entire free right of publication.‖2 
 
Later, the Prussian Copyright Act of 1837 left the provisions of commissioned 
works. In contrast, the Austrian Copyright Act of 1846, which was in force in 
Hungary between 1853 and 1860 (and until 1884 in Transylvania) adopted the 
concept of legal persons‘ authorship.3 The Austrian Copyright Act provides as a 
main rule that literary and artistic works belongs to their authors. But it has three 
other ancillary provisions when the copyright owner differs from the initial author: 
 
a) the commissioner of a work who at his own expense has entrusted someone 
else with its elaboration and execution according to a given plan; 
b) the publisher or entrepreneur of a work which is made up of independent 
contributions from various contributors; 
c) the publisher of an anonymous or pseudonymous work (§.14, a, b).4 
 
It is not known why, but the Hungarian legislator did not follow the Prussian-
German, nor the Austrian solutions and until now, the creator as author doctrine is 
dominant. 
 
The Scope of Copyright and Publishing Law 
 
Following a dualistic approach, Hungarian Copyright Act of 1884 (HCA 
1884) and the superseding Copyright Act of 1921 (HCA 1921) made possible the 
entire assignment of copyright as property right. Within the meaning of the act, 
copyright can be wholly or partly assigned by contract or passed by inheritance. 
Hence, if the parties had stipulated that in a contract, then the author‘s rights were 
partially or fully passed according to the contractual consensus. The first two 
Hungarian copyright acts did not contain any further provisions applicable to 
works made in the course of employment. However, some cases related to this 
issue can be found in the academic references and jurisprudence. 
Géza Kenedi writes about employed journalists who were bound to their 
publishers in terms of employment on the one hand, and a copyright relationship 
on the other,
5
 hence general private law regulations applied to the former, while 
provisions of the Commercial Code affected the latter. According to Kenedi, an 
                                                          
1
Idem.  
2
Article 1170 ABGB. (Translated by Joseph M. de Winiwarter). 
3
Mezei (2004) 
4
Article 1 of Austrian Copyright Act (1846). (Translated by Friedemann Kawohl). 
5
Kenedi (1908) at 88–89. 
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employed journalist‘s duties were to write and translate articles in return for 
remuneration. Unless the parties agreed otherwise or the copyright was transferred 
according to the Commercial Code, the author was discharged of the exclusive 
publishing contract only after all copies of the newspaper were sold.
1
 Beside 
literary works, this act also applied for technical inventions and art as a 
commercial transaction. Furthermore, it included reproduction and distribution as 
well.
2
 
The Commercial Code did not determine the form of the valid contract, nor 
must that consideration (royalty) be specified. Therefore, several regulations of the 
Code could replace contractual provisions of the parties,
3
 for instance in case of 
doubt, a contract entitled the publisher only to a single publication of the work, 
and translation and its publication were not implied to the contract. Besides that, 
the publishing contract was exclusive, which means that the author could not use 
his/ her work. Finally, the parties were able to limit the territorial (like translation), 
temporal and quantitative (number of copies) scope of use contractually.
4
 
In the period of the HCA 1884 and the HCA 1921, the authors generally 
assigned the copyright only partly. Several decisions of the Royal Curia
5
 support 
the rule that there was no presumption that the author assigned the publishing 
rights for the full term of protection (judgement C. 1122/1906),
6
 and if nevertheless 
the publishing rights had been assigned, the author still retained the moral rights 
(judgement P. I. 348/1932)
7
 and the right of adaptation (judgement P. I. 
3896/1929).
8
 With regard to new types of use, the judgement P. I. 1112/1932 
declared that  
 
―in the case of a copyright assignment or publishing transaction, it 
generally had to be assumed that the will of the contracting parties had 
been aimed at the assignment of only those rights which had been known 
to the parties at the time of contracting and only at the possible 
exploitation of these rights which had been apparent to the parties at the 
time of contracting. However, rights, which the parties could not even 
have thought of at the time of contracting, cannot be deemed assigned—
unless it can be inferred from the content of the contract and the existing 
circumstances that the parties could have stipulated to the contrary.‖9 
 
Later on it has been demonstrated that the scope of the assigned moral and 
economic rights is an important element of the regulation pertaining to works 
made in the course of employment. 
                                                          
1Article 515 of Kereskedelmi törvényről szóló 1875. évi XXXVII. törvénycikk. 
2
Ibid. Article 517. 
3
Apáthy (1873) at 579. 
4
Nagy (1913) at 479–483. 
5
The Royal Curia was the Supreme Court between 1868 and 1949 in Hungary. 
6
Nagy (1913) at 482. 
7
Szladits (1935) at 522. 
8
Szladits (1935) at 528. 
9
Szladits (1935) at 522–523. 
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According to judge Dezső Alföldy, who synthesised in his book the judicial 
practice of the 1930s, the Royal Curia took it upon itself to supplement insufficient 
legislation with interpretation of the law.
1
 In the jurisprudence, the exploitation 
rights of authors are only assigned in the case of cinematographic works to the 
film studio by a production agreement. The rights of writers and composers 
participating in the filmmaking process can only be assigned in a separate contract 
(e.g. the agreement for adaptation for screen). 
In the case of other works, according to the Royal Curia, the circumstances of 
the given situation should help decide to what extent the copyright was 
contractually assigned to the employer (judgement P. I. 1684/1934).
2
 Thus, the 
scope of assignment was defined by the circumstances of the case and the 
presumable will of the contracting parties and not by a service or other similar 
relationship such as that between an author and the editor of an anthology for 
instance. As to newspapers, employed journalists were free to publish their own 
articles as collected works, since the employer or commissioner did not have 
exclusive rights.
3
 
According to a later commentator, Róbert Palágyi, the agreement of the 
parties was the norm with regard to work made in the course of employment. 
 
―In principle, the right of exploitation outside the business activities of the 
employer remained with the author.‖4 
 
This confirmed the view that the parties could dispose of their rights freely 
and the employer could only use the work for his / her intended purpose. 
 
Demand for Regulation 
 
Based on the above, it can be seen that up to the years following World War 
II, neither academic references, nor legislation dealt with the necessity to regulate 
copyright issues arising between the employee and the employer.
5
 The demand for 
regulation of works made in the course of employment emerged in the 1950s. In a 
society, where the work of laborious people is placed on a pedestal, it is necessary 
to regulate the legal standing of works made in the course of employment. As a 
first step, the provisions of the Commercial Code were supplemented with a 
ministerial decree in 1951,
6
 which required publishing contracts to include 
royalties and made them valid up to four years (until 1996, then eight years until 
1999), limiting the freedom of contract. 
 
 
                                                          
1
Alföldy (1936) at 172; Varga (2014) at 288-289.; Varga (2016) at 171-172. 
2
Térfy (1936) at 251. 
3
Alföldy (1936) at 23. 
4
Palágyi was the Legal counsel of the Association of Hungarian Lyricists, Composers and Music 
Publishers collective management organization (nowadays Artisjus). Palágyi (1959) at 105–106. 
5About the employee‘s invention see Papp (2015) at 158-169. 
6Az írói művek kiadásáról szóló 98/1951. (IV. 21.) MT rendelet. 
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The Keynote Study of János Batta 
 
The article of János Batta appeared in the law journal Magyar Jog in July 
of 1956.
1
 Batta presented the Royal Curia‘s already cited decision about the 
inalienable nature of moral rights
2
 and two further decisions of the Hungarian 
Supreme Court
3
 about the remuneration of employees (BH1956. 875.).
4
 
In the first case, a professor had to submit his lecture notes to his institution in 
accordance with its bylaws. For these notes, he was not entitled to any additional 
remuneration such as royalties on top of his wage. Nevertheless, the notes were 
used by other schools as well, from whom the teacher could have claimed 
royalties. In the second case, the employed photographer took pictures for 
advertising purposes. In this case, the employee‘s task was to take photos of 
the employer‘s products, and therefore, it was self-evident that the pictures 
would be handed over to third parties. The photographer was aware of the 
purpose of the pictures at the time of the shooting, and consequently, he could 
not claim further royalties (BH1956. 959).
5
 
In these two decisions, the dividing line between the copyrights of the 
employee and the employer was very sharply demarcated. 
 After reviewing the decisions, Batta defined four principles: moral rights 
are inalienable, the property rights of works made in the course of employment 
are assigned to the employer, the employer only gains economic rights falling 
within his/her sphere of interests, finally the employed author can only allow 
the use of his/her work to third parties with the employer‘s approval.6 
 
The Debate of 1962 
 
The Hungarian Lawyers‘ Association organised a debate on the 13th of 
February 1962 with the participation of Hungarian civil and labour law 
specialists.
7
 
In the view of Aurél Benárd, it is necessary to regulate the relationship 
between the author and the employer in socialist law, as more and more people 
create in employment.
8
 Legislation of the time had to address the questions of 
whether copyright was to be assigned exclusively to the employer, if not, how 
particular rights could be divided, and whether the employee was eligible for 
further remuneration on top of his/her wages. According to Benárd, the answer to 
the first and third question is that moral rights had to be ensured for the employee 
as moral incentive,  
 
                                                          
1
Batta (1956) at 210–212. 
2
The Supreme Court kept in force the decision of the Royal Curia on moral rights. Az LB Elvi 
Tanácsának 1423/1952. (VI.20.) döntése. 
3
Called Supreme Court of the (People‘s) Republic of Hungary between 1949-(1989)-2012 
4
Gézcy (1956) at 210. 
5
Gézcy (1956) at 210. 
6
Batta (1956) at 212. 
7
Hágelmayer (1962) at 136–138. 
8
Benárd (1962) at 111. 
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―strictly speaking remuneration for works made in the course of employment 
must not be determined, since that would mean double compensation.‖1 
 
He considered it self-evident that the employer‘s rights prevailed only within 
his/her standard business activities, only the author can give permission for the use 
of the work to third parties, and only he can decide about the assignment of the 
economic rights. In spite of the fact that in principle the author‘s moral rights were 
not infringed, in everyday life, both the right of divulgation and the right of 
integrity were infringed according to Benárd. In his opinion, it is not the employee, 
but the supervisor who decides whether a work is completed or not. In the same 
manner, the employer had the author, or if he/she was not willing, somebody else, 
make necessary changes to the work. Notwithstanding the above, the right of 
paternity enabled the relationship between the work and the author, or on the 
contrary, he/she could request anonymity in case he/she found the work to be 
distorted.
2
 In his point of view, the law should provide for how a work could be 
used outside the employer‘s sphere of interests similarly to inventions made in the 
course of employment.
3
 He concluded his lecture with the problematic aspects of 
remuneration on top of regular wages: ―As a matter of fact, why do we pay for 
further use? Since the author does not do anything!‖ In connection with this, he 
explained that wages compensate the employee for the work done and for the 
future use of the work. Nevertheless, if the work was used further and in other 
forms, then the original remuneration was not in balance with the work done. ―The 
author‘s work satisfies societal needs, and therefore, he is given remuneration 
from society.‖4 
During the debate, Róbert Palágyi suggested that the scope of the employer‘s 
rights should be limited to 2-4 years, after which the copyright would be 
reassigned to the author. Many participants agreed with the introductory lecture in 
that the author was entitled to remuneration if ―the work outgrew the confines of 
the employment.‖5 
The participants concurred with Benárd‘s closing thoughts ―that a regulatory 
system should be formed, which encouraged members of society to create, and 
thus furthered the development of science, art and literature with the most suitable 
and most effective methods.‖6 
 
The Codification of the HCA 1969 
 
The third Hungarian Copyright Act III of 1969 (hereinafter HCA 1969) 
and its ministerial decree
7
 regulated the legal standing of works made in the 
                                                          
1
Benárd (1962) at at 112. 
2
Benárd (1962) 112–113. 
3
Benárd (1962) at 114. 
4
Benárd (1962) at 115. 
5
Hágelmayer (1962) at 137. 
6
Benárd (1962) at 115. 
7
Article 14 HCA 1969; Article 11-12 Decree of the HCA 1969. 
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course of employment. The following is the examination how the individual 
issues, which emerged in the study and during the debate above, were codified. 
 
Partial Limitation of Moral Rights 
 
The ministerial justification of the bill boldly declared that the author‘s 
moral rights should not be infringed in the course of employment –  
 
―The decrees pertaining to the use of works made in the course of 
employment shall not affect the moral rights of the author, thus the author 
shall have the right to claim authorship of the work, the right of paternity, the 
right for anonymity, or the right for protection against unauthorised use or 
distortion.‖1  
 
According to the law, the author determined whether the work was 
completed or not, and he/she consented to the publication of the work by 
handing it over. After the handover, the employer has the right to dispose of the 
work when the decision about publication and adaptation as well is theirs. 
 
Scope of Employment 
 
It was possible to apply the special decrees pertaining to employment only 
under strict conditions. These decrees applied to works made in the course of 
employment only if the creation of the work was an employment duty of the 
author documented in written form—which could have been workplace 
regulations or direct written instructions—and if the employer was qualified in 
his/her business activities for the use of the work. The onus of proof was on the 
employer, since the employee-author was in a doubly exposed position. 
 
Remuneration on Top of Wages 
 
In the judicial practice referenced during the debate, it emerged that double 
compensation could occur in the use of works made by employees and this should 
not be a goal to be followed. The HCA 1969 declared that a work made by an 
employee could be beneficial for the employer as well as society, thus it would be 
exploitation if the employee was not eligible for further remuneration. The act 
allows for supplementary remuneration for the author in the case of use outside the 
business activities of the employer. To put it simply: if the employer‘s tasks did 
not cover contracting the right to use to third parties, the author was eligible for 
60-80% of the royalties, or 10-30% in the case of software; if the employer‘s tasks 
did cover contracting the right to use to third parties, the author was eligible for a 
maximum of 60%, or 10% respectively. If the author was authorised and 
contracted the right to use to a third party, then he/she was eligible for the whole 
amount of the royalties. 
                                                          
1Indokolás a szerzői jogról szóló törvényjavaslathoz (1979) at 351. 
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The Supreme Court had to decide whether one of the dictionary editors of 
the Research Institute for Linguistics (BH1968. 10)
1
 or one of the members of 
the design team of a construction company (BH 1974. 11)
2
 was entitled to 
royalties on top of his/her wages. The Court dismissed the claim in both cases, 
since the Institute published the volume in the dictionary case, and the 
construction company dealt with construction besides design. The employers 
used the works within their usual business activities in both cases. 
 
Relationship between Civil Law and Labour Law 
 
It is also important to regulate the relationship between copyright law and 
labour law. Article 3 of the HCA 1969 solved this issue by stating that the 
Labour Code was decisive in questions pertaining to labour law in the absence 
of special copyright regulations. Thus the coordinative civil law relationship 
was decisive in copyright law as opposed to the superior-subordinate labour 
law relationship. 
 
The Allocation of Rights 
 
The legislature divided the author‘s economic rights between the employer 
and the employee. The employer gained the right to use them only partially, since 
the work could only be used within his/her usual business activities. However, it 
was possible to interpret usual business activities in a way that the employer was 
qualified to use the work in another work made in the scope of his/her business 
activities. The employee was authorised to allow the use of the work outside the 
employer‘s usual business activities, although the act demanded the employer‘s 
consent for that, which the employer could only deny on reasonable grounds. 
The scope of this particular law was limited by further decrees defining the 
length of time according to work type after which the copyright was completely 
reassigned to the author. Moreover, the decrees defined the length of licensing 
contracts (e.g. publishing contract) as well in a mandatory or dispositive way.  
Mandatory regulations can help decide if the economic rights of authors 
formerly employed at state-owned companies, institutes or public institutions can 
still not be assigned to their former employers, i.e. use of works handed over 
before the 1
st
 of September 1999 can only be requested from the author. On the 
other hand, employers had surely not gained rights to use in cases that were not 
regulated by the copyright laws of the time. 
Hungarian regulations do not mention the relationship between works carried 
out in the course of employment and time of protection. The main message of this 
being that the post mortem auctoris principle was asserted (i.e. time of protection 
lasted 50 years after the death of the author, later it was increased to 70 years) 
despite the scope of copyright assignment.
3
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Bardócz (1972) at 24–25. 
2
Benedek (1977) at 31–33. 
3
It was not a work made for hire type of protection term like used in the United States. 
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The Provisions of the HCA 1999 
 
The prevailing copyright law has expanded the special provisions described to 
include other works made in similar legal relations,
1
 and further strengthened the 
rights of the employer.  
 
―Unless otherwise agreed, the delivery of the work to the employer shall 
imply the transfer of the economic rights upon the employer as the legal 
successor to the author, provided that the creation of the work is the 
author‘s duty under an employment contract.‖2 
and 
―In case of works made in the course of employment, the employer gains 
not only the right to use, but becomes the owner of all economic rights, 
unlike in the previous copyright regulations.‖3  
 
It is the employer‘s duty to reach an agreement with the employee in writing 
concerning work tasks and remuneration, since the Labour Code
4
 declares that the 
employment contract has to be in written form. The written form is not only 
important to exactly clarify the economic and moral rights, but also because of the 
power difference between the two parties in the course of employment.
5
 The 
written agreement makes it possible for the parties to agree that certain economic 
rights remain with the employed author contrary to the main regulation. 
The new rights of the employer should be interpreted restrictively. In case the 
employer gives permission to third parties for use or assigns economic rights 
connected to the work, the author is entitled to equitable remuneration.
6
 
Nevertheless, it is allowed to depart from this remuneration if it turns out from the 
collective agreement, internal regulation or company profile that the completed 
works are from the beginning meant to be passed on to a third party for further 
use. In such a case the salary already contains the appropriate remuneration.
7
 In 
case of a dispute between the parties, the employer may demand the work to be 
handed over not on the basis of copyright, but of labour law.
8
 According to judicial 
practice, the employer is authorised to change this work without the author‘s 
consent, thus the work can be modified by a colleague or it can be used in other 
                                                          
1Article 30(7) HCA 1999 ―The provisions relating to a work created as duty under an employment 
contract shall be applied mutatis mutandis if the work has been created by a person employed as a 
public or civil servant, a person belonging to the professional staff of the armed forces and police 
forces and being in active service, or a co-operative member employed under legal relations similar 
to those of employment relations.‖ 
2
Article 30(1).  
3
SZJSZT–18/2004. 
4Article 44, 23(1), 45(1) A munka törvénykönyvéről szóló 2012. évi I. törvény. 
5HCA 1999 Article 30(6): ―Legal statements made with regard to the work created by way of 
fulfilment of the author‘s duty under an employment contract shall be laid down in writing.‖ 
6HCA 1999 Article 30(3): ―The author shall be entitled to fair remuneration if the employer 
authorises another person to use the work or assigns the economic rights relating to the work to 
another person.‖ 
7
SZJSZT–09/2001.; SZJSZT–14/2002. 
8
SZJSZT-09/2001. 
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works (BH1997. 19). In case the author does not agree with the modifications or 
does not consent to the changes to the work, he/she may only request anonymity, 
as otherwise the author‘s right of paternity remains intact. 
An important element of the regulation is that the author is still entitled to 
remuneration resulting from economic rights enforced by collective management 
organisations, such as private copy levy, reprographic levy, right of cable 
retransmission, public lending right and resale right. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
This article tried to illustrate that several legislature approaches for work 
made in employment relation can coexist and each of them is good in its own way. 
The first approach is based on the freedom of contract, but in the absence of a 
contract only judicial practice can show the contracting patterns. The second 
approach protects the author‘s interests; hence the copyright is temporarily divided 
between the employer and the employee. The current Hungarian Copyright Act of 
1999 has regard to the employer‘s investment and the employer owns the most of 
the economic rights. This regulation bridges the problem of moral rights ensuring 
the rights of divulgation and integrity to the employer and seemingly maintains the 
right of paternity (or anonymity) to the employee.  
This article presented the background of the changes of copyright regulations. 
The right clearance for making available works made in employment is still very 
difficult. One should be careful not to have frequent change of legislature 
approaches, as they may makes the mass use of works difficult. 
 
  
References 
 
Alföldy, D. (1936). A magyar szerzői jog [The Hungarian Copyright Law]. A kiadói 
szerződések feltételeiről és a szerzői díjakról szóló 1/1970. (III. 20.) MM rendelet 
[Decree on the terms of publishing contracts and royalties]. 
Apáthy, I. (1873). A magyar kereskedelmi törvénykönyv tervezete [Draft Bill of the 
Hungarian Commercial Code]. Pest: Franklin. 
Balogh, E. (1991). A Szemere-féle szerzői jogi törvényjavaslat [The Copyright Bill of 
Szemere]. In Ruszoly, J. (Ed.) Szemere Bertalan és kora 1. Miskolc: Szemere Bertalan 
Alapítvány. 149–172. 
Balogh, J. (1997). Az osztrák magánjog hatása a magyarországi kodifikációra a XIX. 
században [The Effect of the Austrian Civil Law to the Hungarian Codification in the 
19
th
 Century]. Publicationes Universitatis Miskolciensis. Sectio juridica et politica. 
(14) 55–68. 
Bardócz, B. (Ed.). (1972). Polgári Jogi Döntvénytár - Bírósági Határozatok 1968-1970. 
[Civil Law Case Book] (Vol. 4, pp. 24–25). Budapest: Közgazdasági és Jogi 
Könyvkiadó. 
Batta, J. (1956). Munkaviszonyban álló szerzők szerzői joga [Copyright law of the authors 
in employment relationship]. Magyar Jog, (7). 
Benárd, A. (1962). Munkaviszony és szerzői jog [Employment relationship and copyright]. 
Magyar Jog, (3). 
62 
 
Benedek, K. (Ed.). (1977). Polgári Jogi Döntvénytár - Bírósági Határozatok 1973-1975. 
[Civil Law Case Book] (Vol. 6, pp. 31–33). Budapest: Közgazdasági és Jogi 
Könyvkiadó. 
Boytha, G. (1983). Whose right is Copyright? GRUR, (6-7.), 379–385. 
Gézcy, K. (1956). Döntvénytár – Bírósági határozatok 1953. október – 1955. december 
[Case Book]. Budapest: Közgazdasági és Jogi Könyvkiadó. 
Goldstein, P., & Hugenholtz, P. B. (2012). International Copyright: Principles, Law, and 
Practice (3rd ed.). Oxford University Press. 
Grad-Gyenge, A. (2016). Film és szerzői jog: a megfilmesítési szerződés. [Movie and 
Copyright: Film Adaptation Contract]. Budapest: Nemzeti Média- és Hírközlési 
Hatóság.  
Hágelmayer, I. (1962). Vitaülés a munkaviszony és a szerzői jog problémaköréből [Debate 
on the problem of employment relationship and copyright]. Magyar Jog, (3). 
Homoki-Nagy, M. (2013). Gondolatok a magyar kodifikáció történeti hátteréről 
[Reflections on the Historical Background of the Hungarian Codification]. In: Hajdú, 
J. (Ed.). 90 éves a szegedi jogászképzés [90 year of Legal Education in Szeged]. 
Szeged: SZTE ÁJK. 83–92. 
Homoki-Nagy, M. (2014). „Az ész szüleményeinek védelme‖ a magyar jogtörténetben: 
Szerzői és szabadalmi jog, elsőség és etika a tudományban [―Protection of Intellectual 
creations‖ in the Hungarian Legal History: Copyright and Patent Law, Priority and 
Ethics in Science]. In: Újszászi, I. (Ed.). Szent-Györgyi Albert szellemi öröksége 
[Intellectual Heritage of Albert Szent-Györgyi]. Szeged: Szegedi Egyetemi Kiadó. 
72–88. 
Homoki-Nagy, M. (2018). A magyar magánjog fejlődését befolyásoló jogforrások a 
neoabszolutizmus idején [Legal Sources Affecting the Development of Private Law 
in Hungary at the Time of Neoabsolutism]. In Homoki-Nagy, M. et al. (Eds). Ünnepi 
kötet dr. Nagy Ferenc egyetemi tanár 70. születésnapjára. [Festschrift for Professor 
Ferenc Nagy for his 70th Birthday]. Szeged: SZTE ÁJK. 433–443. 
Jacobs, R. A. (1993). Work-For-Hire and the Moral Right Dilemma in the European 
Community: A U.S Perspective. Boston College International and Comparative Law 
Review, 16(1). 
Kenedi, G. (1908). A magyar szerzői jog [The Hungarian Copyright Law]. Budapest: 
Athenaeum. 
 Klagge, J., & Czychowski, C. (2014). How does Europe deal with the question of how to 
transfer rights from the author to the exploiter? The European perspective on the 
work made for hire doctrine. Les Nouvelles, (9), 178–183. 
Legeza, D. (2014). Egy paragrafus margójára - adalékok a munkaviszonyban létrehozott 
művek szabályozásához [Comment on a paragraph: Additional Information on the 
Hungarian Regulation of Works Created within the Scope of Employment]. 
Iparjogvédelmi És Szerzői Jogi Szemle, 9(2), 107–124. 
Legeza, D. (2018). A kiadói szerződés története Magyarországon – A reformkortól 1952-
ig. [History of Publishing Contract – from the Reform Era until 1952]. Szeged: 
Iurisperitus. 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/323572071_A_kiadoi_szerzodes_tortenete
_-_A_reformkortol_1952-ig_History_of_Publishing_Contract_-
_from_the_Reform_Era_until_1952_in_Hungarian  
Lucas, A., Lucas, H.-J., & Lucas-Schloetter, A. (2012). L‘auteur salarié ou fonctionnaire. 
In A. Lucas, H.-J. Lucas, & A. Lucas-Schloetter, Traité de la propriété littéraire et 
artistique (pp. 173–190). LexisNexis. 
63 
 
Mezei, P. (2004). A szerzői jog története a törvényi szabályozásig (1884:XVI. tc.) [A 
Development of Hungarian Copyright Law Until the Creation of the First Copyright 
Act (1793-1884)]. Jogelméleti Szemle. (3) 9. 
Mezei, P. (2014). The New Orphan Works Regulation of Hungary. International Review 
of Intellectual Property and Competition Law, 45(8), 940–952. 
Nagy, F. (1913). A magyar kereskedelmi jog kézikönyve különös tekintettel a bírói 
gyakorlatra és a külföldi törvényhozásokra [Handbook of the Hungarian commercial 
law especially with regard to judicial practice and foreign legislation]. Budapest: 
Athenaeum. 
Palágyi, R. (1959). A magyar szerzői jog zsebkönyve [Pocketbook of the Hungarian 
Copyright Law] (2nd ed.). Budapest: Közgazdasági és Jogi Könyvkiadó. 
Papp, L. (2015). A szabadalmi jogvédelem történeti perspektívái [Historical Perspectives 
of Patent Protection]. Budapest: Gondolat. 
Pogácsás, A. (2014). A szerző jelentősége és művével való kapcsolata [The Importance of 
the Author and the Relationship with his Work]. Iustum Aequum Salutare X. 149–
162. 
Seignette, J. (2012). Authorship, Copyright Ownership and Works made on Commission 
and under Employment. In P. B. Hugenholtz, A. Quadvlieg, & D. Visser (Eds.), A 
Century of Dutch Copyright Law (pp. 115–140). Amsterdam: deLex B.V. 
 SZJSZT–09/2001. Bankjegy-, illetve pénzérme-kép szerzői jogi védelme, felhasználása; a 
szerzői jogok jogosultja [Expert opinion of the Hungarian Copyright Expert Board 
on Copyright protection and exploitation of the design of banknote or coin; the 
copyright holder]. http://www.sztnh.gov.hu/sites/default/files/SZJSZT_szakveleme 
nyek_pdf/szjszt_szakv_2001_009.pdf 
SZJSZT-14/2002. Könyvtárak állománygyarapítási tanácsadójának jogi védelme; 
internetes felhasználási jogának gyakorlása [Expert opinion of the Hungarian 
Copyright Expert Board on Protection of the ‘Advisor for Library Acquisition‘ and 
exercise of the making available right]. http://www.sztnh.gov.hu/sites/default/files/ 
SZJSZT_szakvelemenyek_pdf/szjszt_szakv_2002_014.pdf 
SZJSZT-18/2004. Hírszolgálat egyes anyagainak szerzői, illetve kapcsolódó jogi védelme 
és a vonatkozó szerződések [Expert opinion of the Hungarian Copyright Expert 
Board on Copyright and related rights protection of certain materials of news service 
and contracts concerned]. http://www.sztnh.gov.hu/sites/default/files/SZJSZT_szak 
velemenyek_pdf/szjszt_szakv_2004_018.pdf 
Szladits, K. (Ed.). (1935). A magyar bírói gyakorlat [The Hungarian judicial practice] 
(Vol. 1). Budapest: Grill Károly Könyvkiadó. 
Térfy, B. (Ed.). (1936). Grill-féle új döntvénytár 1934-35 [New Case Book of Grills 1934-
35] (Vol. XXVIII). Budapest: Grill Károly Könyvkiadó. 
 Varga, N. (2014). The Practice of Leading Cases in the Hungarian High Court (Curia) 
with Special Attention to the Civil Procedure Act of 1911. In Badó, A. & Detlev, W. 
B. (Eds). Rechtsentwicklungen aus europäischer Perspektive im 21. Jahrhundert / 
European Perspectives on Legal Developments in the 21st Century. Potsdam: 
Universitätsverlag Potsdam. 281–289. 
Varga, N. (2016). A Kúria döntvényalkotási joga 1912 és 1930 között [Precedential 
Practice of the Hungarian Supreme Court between 1912 and 1930]. In Schweitzer, G. 
& Szabó, I. (Eds.). A közjogi provizórium (1920-1944) időszakának alkotmányos 
berendezkedése [Constitutional Arrangement of the Public Law Transitional Period 
between 1920 and 1944]. Budapest: Pázmány Press. 171–190. 
  
 
64 
 
Legislation and other Legal Instruments 
 
A kiadói szerződések feltételeiről és a szerzői díjakról szóló 1/1970. (III. 20.) MM rendelet 
[Decree on the terms of publishing contracts and royalties]. 
A munka törvénykönyvéről szóló 2012. évi I. törvény [Hungarian Labour Code of 2012]. 
A munka törvénykönyvéről szóló 2012. évi I. törvény [Hungarian Labour Code of 
2012].Budapest: Grill Károly Könyvkiadó. 
Allgemeines Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch. [The General Civil Code of Austria 1811]. 
Allgemeines Landrecht für die Preussischen Staaten. [Prussian Statute Book 1794.] 
Az írói művek kiadásáról szóló 98/1951. (IV. 21.) MT rendelet [Decree on the publishing 
of literary works]. 
Az LB Elvi Tanácsának 1423/1952. (VI.20.) döntése [Decision of the Doctrinal Council of 
the Supreme Court]. 
Berne Convention. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works 
(Paris Text 1971). 
Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. [CDPA 1988] 
Council Directive 93/83/EEC of 27 September 1993 on the coordination of certain rules 
concerning copyright and rights related to copyright applicable to satellite 
broadcasting and cable retransmission, OJ L 248, 06/10/1993, 15–21. 
Directive 2006/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 
2006 on rental right and lending right and on certain rights related to copyright in the 
field of intellectual property (codified version), OJ L 376, 27.12.2006, 28–35. 
Directive 2006/116/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 
2006 on the term of protection of copyright and certain related rights (codified 
version), OJ L 372, 27.12.2006, 12–18. 
Directive 2009/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on 
the legal protection of computer programs (Codified version), OJ L 111, 5.5.2009, 
16–22. 
Directive 96/9/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 1996 on the 
legal protection of databases, OJ L 077, 27/03/1996, 20–28. 
Gesetz über Urheberrecht und verwandte Schutzrechte 16. September 1965 [UrhG 1965; 
German Copyright Act of 1965]. 
Gesetz zum Schutze des literarischen und artistischen Eigenthumes gegen unbefugte 
Veröffentlichung, Nachdruck und Nachbildung [vom 19. Oktober 1846] [Austrian 
Copyright Act 1846] 
Indokolás a szerzői jogról szóló törvényjavaslathoz [Ministerial justification of the bill on 
Copyright Law] (1979). In Az 1967. évi március 19-ére összehívott Országgyűlés 
irományai (1967.III.19—1971.II.10.) [Parliamentary documents]. Budapest: Hiteles 
kiadás. 
Kereskedelmi törvényről szóló 1875. évi XXXVII. törvénycikk [Hungarian Commercial 
Code of 1875]. 
Loi no 92-597 du 1er juillet 1992 relative au code de la propriété intellectuelle [CPI 1992]. 
Szerzői jogról szóló 1884. évi XVI. törvény [Hungarian Copyright Act of 1884]. 
Szerzői jogról szóló 1921. évi LIV. törvény [Hungarian Copyright Act of 1921]. 
Szerzői jogról szóló 1969. évi III. törvény [Hungarian Copyright Act of 1969]. 
Szerzői jogról szóló 1999. évi LXXVI. törvény [Hungarian Copyright Act of 1999]. 
U.S. Copyright Act. 
Wet van 23 September 1912, houdende nieuwe regeling van het auteursrecht [Dutch 
Copyright Act]. 
 
65 
 
The Establishment of the Districts in Hungary 
after the Austro-Hungarian Compromise
1
 
 
Máté Pétervári 
 
Abstract  
 
After the Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867, Hungary regained 
independence and consequently bourgeois reform of the state started on the 
basis of the April Acts of 1848. The legislator wanted to create an 
administrative system which would be able to carry out the acts and decrees 
on the local levels. The majority in the National Assembly (Hungarian 
Parliament) achieved this goal by implementing the Act 42 of 1870 and Act 
18 of 1871. The need for modernising the administrative system resulted in 
reshaping of feudal territorial division, thus redrawing of the districts‘ 
territories was also put on the agenda during the implementation of the Act. 
The districts were the lowest levels of the counties‘ organizations. The paper 
is based on the examination of the archive material of the Hungarian Royal 
Ministry of the Interior (Hungarian National Archives, Documents of Ministry 
of the Interior K150 117, 118 bundles) which implied the drafts of the 
Hungarian counties about the public administration organization and the 
controlling of the Hungarian Royal Ministry of the Interior. The attribute of 
the new Hungarian district system on the basis of the Act 42 of 1870 is 
presented in this paper. 
 
Keywords: Kingdom of Hungary; District Administrator; Austro-Hungarian 
Monarchy; Public Administration: Dualism. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The institution history of district level accompanied the development of 
Hungarian constitutional history, since the Noble Judges (szolgabíró) appeared 
simultaneously in the 13
th
 century with the formation of Noble County (nemesi 
vármegye).
2
 The office remained until the middle of 20
th
 century, but it adjusted 
the social needs.
3
 Its territory of competence was the ―district‖ (járás) from the 
16
th
 century,
4
 which was an administrative level below the counties until 1 January 
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1984. In 1971, the political decision-making removed the district councils, thus 
this local level were deprived of the representative organ.
1
 The district level lost 
the authority of public administration in 1983, as the offices of district (járási 
hivatal) were abolished.
2
 For this reason, Hungary remained without local level 
under counties from 1984. 
After the democratic transformation, the Hungarian government strove for 
establishment of small regions (kistérség) as needed for joining the European 
Union, but this attempt achieved only some partial results
3
. Finally, the legislator 
leaned on the historical traditions in compliance with the Fundamental Law of 
Hungary, and the districts became again the part of the Hungarian public 
administration system from 1 January 2013, on the basis of Act XCIII of 2012 and 
Government Decree No. 218/2012 of 13 August 2012.
4
 The government moved 
the big part of public administration competence from the self-governments to the 
district level, which has given a special topicality of the historical research of 
districts.
5
 The districts served its purpose of LAU 1 in Classification of Territorial 
Units for Statistics (NUTS) in the European Union nomenclature. The aim of this 
paper is working up of a contemporary legal historical subject. According to István 
Stipta, the contemporary legal historical subject means a prevailing legal 
institution, which had age-olds traditions.
6
 
The main subject of my paper is the provisions of the Act XLII of 1870, 
which realised bourgeois reorganisation, modernisation of the feudal (before 1848) 
district system thorough working up of narrower interval. This legal regulation 
completed the modernisation of this administrative unit; therefore its examination 
is reasonable. The new information complemented some research achievements 
which were concerned with the Municipality Act perfectly, since numerous 
scholarly works dealt with the making of Act XLII of 1870,
7
 the functioning of the 
counties (vármegyei törvényhatóságok)
8
 and the cities with municipal rank 
(törvényhatósági jogú városok).
9
 
The district system had to be reorganised in the same way like the counties 
after the Austro-Hungarian Compromise, because the Act IV of 1869 ordered the 
separation of jurisdiction and public administration,
10
 and it was necessary to 
the execution organization into the public law construction of the Compromise.
11
 
Two provisions concerning the districts (§61 and §91) could be found only in the 
Act XLII of 1870 on the municipality, but these did not provide detailed 
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regulation.
1
 I analysed the execution and the practical implementation of these 
provisions. The execution of the act was the authority of the counties. The counties 
were middle-level public administration units with rights of self-government. 
These organs had to create their public administration organization, and they were 
obliged to send the drafts to the Ministry of Interior with the purpose of 
confirmation. The councillors of Ministry of Interior controlled the conformities of 
the drafts with the legal regulation. In cases they criticised some provisions, they 
sent them back to the general assembly of the county for modification.
2
 
Having examined these documents in the National Archives of Hungary I 
worked up the drafts of 26 municipalities which were submitted by the counties to 
the Ministry of Interior.
3
  I examined counties from different part of the country, 
and dealt with municipalities with diverse population, including the counties of 
Transylvania, privileged regions (kiváltságos kerületek) and Székely seats. The 
municipalities of Transylvania constitute the basis of research due to reannexation 
by Hungary in 1868.
4
 I do not examine the district organization in the Croatian 
territory, because the Hungarian-Croatian Compromise of 1868 formed 
independent administration of internal affairs in Croatia, since the internal affairs, 
the judicial matters, the education and the religion, were left to the Croatian 
autonomous government.
5
 Nor I deal with the Military Border.
6
 In my opinion it is 
possible to reach an appropriate conclusion in this way on the district organization 
which was formed by the Act XLII of 1870 in Hungary. 
 
 
The Creation of the Municipality Act 
 
The National Assembly passed the April Acts on 11 April 1848, thanks to 
the Hungarian Revolution of 1848. These acts established the principle of 
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equality before the law and the foundations of the modern state. But Hungary 
lost the War of Independence against the Habsburg emperor and the Russian 
troops. As a result, Hungary lost its autonomy, and the monarch of Habsburg 
treated the Hungarian state as a province on the basis of ‖Verwirkungstheorie‖.1 
The Emperor practised his powers in an absolutistic manner, therefore this 
period of Hungarian history was named neo-absolutism. Franz Joseph I of 
Austria created unified public administration organization in the entire empire 
due to the modernization of the Habsburg Empire.
2
 For this reason, the 
Hungarian independent administrative system became the part of the imperial 
government in 1853.
3
 However, the era of neo-absolutism ended in 1860 when 
the Habsburg emperor issued the October Diploma, which restored the 
Hungarian public administration to the status prior to 1848.
4
 
In 1867, Franz Joseph I and the Hungarian political elite under direction of 
Ferenc Deák reached the Austro-Hungarian Compromise. The Kingdom of 
Hungary became the part of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, which was a 
―real union‖.5 The monarch was common in the member states, and Hungary 
handled the external affairs, the military affairs and the financial matters of 
both fields in common with the other member state.
6
 
The National Assembly became again independent. As a result, Hungary 
was able to create a modern Hungarian public administration from the feudal 
system. The re-establishment of the public administration was one of the most 
important goals of the Hungarian central government,
7
 but it was established 
only with the Act XLII of 1870 (Municipality Act).
8
 This act codified the 
Hungarian public administration for the first time. 
The Act XLII of 1870 created the municipalities as unified public 
administration units. Municipalities (törvényhatóság), which were the big cities 
and the counties, represented the middle level of public administration in 
Hungary.
9
 Such municipality exercised the right of self-government and conveyed 
the state government. In addition, they had the right to discuss questions of public 
interest.
10
 The right of self-government included free decision making in own 
affairs. The municipality elected its own officials, determined its budget and levied 
taxes in order to cover the expenses.
11
 
Furthermore, the municipality executed the acts and the government decrees 
by its own official functionary. In addition, the municipality had a petition right, 
which constituted a legal basis to raise before the ministry its opposition 
against a decree the municipality regards as unlawful or impractical before it 
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comes into force. The rights of the municipality are vested in the municipal board 
(törvényhatósági bizottság). Half of the members of the municipal board consisted 
of those who paid the highest  taxes while the other half consists of  the elected 
representatives.
1
 The head of the municipality was the Lord Lieutenant (főispán), 
who was appointed by the king upon the advice of the Minister of the Interior. The 
minister controlled the self-government of the municipality and defended the 
interests of the state administration.
2
 Moreover, he controlled the work of the 
municipality‘s officers at least annually, but these officers were elected by the 
municipal board.
3
 However, the deputy-lieutenant (alispán) led the public 
administration in the county, and carried out the decrees of government; 
consequently. He served a mission of state administration. In addition to these 
tasks, he was empowered to instruct the officers of the municipality.
4
 Along with 
other officers of the municipality, he was elected by the municipal board. 
 
 
The District Level on the Basis of Act XLII of 1870 
 
The Act XLII of 1870 established the local executive organs in Hungary, on 
the basis of feudal tradition, so the counties (megyék) and the districts (járások) 
remained part of public administration. The districts were public administration 
units between the counties and the communities. The top officer of the district was 
the district administrator (szolgabíró).
5
 The English terminology of this position is 
questionable, because it was formed in the 13th century and was transformed 
radically by the Municipality Act. The Latin name was iudex nobelium 
(―Stuhlrichter‖ in German). The English version of this term before 1848 was ―the 
Noble Judge‖,6 but it had no meaning after 1872, as these officers lost their 
jurisdiction competences. In my opinion the equivalent term is the ―district 
administrator‖ because that expresses exercising public administration authority 
after 1870. 
The territory of the county divided into districts, which were headed by the 
district administrators, who supervised the communities of his district. His 
superior was the deputy-lieutenant, who had to power to instruct him. Moreover, 
the district administrator was the delegate of the district. The district administrator 
was elected by the municipal board and was independent of the central power. 
The aim of the central government was the creation of legal terminology, 
which was absent in some branches of law in Hungary.
7
 The other aim of this act 
was the unification of the Hungarian public administration system; therefore the 
Ministry of the  Interior corrected the divergences from the terms of legal norm. 
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This administration level was denominated permanent as ―district‖.1 Arad County 
and Fejér County referred to the administration units as ―circle‖ (kerület).2 Bereg 
County named the territories of the district administrator ―parts‖ (szakasz).3 These 
wrong denominations were corrected by the councillors of the Royal Ministry of 
the Interior, but the different denominations were corrected just as ―not so 
important issue‖. The unified terminology was also an aim of councillors of 
Ministry of Interior in connection of the offices of the district administrators, but 
they intervened more efficient in this issue on the occasion of confirmation. Bars, 
Sáros, Gömör and Kis-Hont, Veszprém Counties planned, that the heads of the 
districts would be the ―chief district administrators‖.4 This solution was the old 
custom in these counties. This was important because these counties established 
the chief district administrator in addition to the deputy district administrator. The 
counties wanted to give the two of then different powers. For example, Sáros 
county wished entrust recruitments of the soldiers only with the chief district 
administrator.
5
 The Ministry of the Interior rejected these drafts.   
Moreover, the councillors of Ministry of the Interior focused their attention on 
the establishment of the unified organizational structure. They transformed 
successfully the district system into one level organization. The Ministry of the 
Interior refused to divide the districts into additional subunits.
6
   
We can observe the same aim to the unification in connection of formation of 
offices of district administrators, but the councillors required of the counties to 
unify in this issue on the occasion of confirmation more accurate. The majority of 
the municipalities employed the district administrator clerk (szolgabírói írnok), 
who was appointed by the district administrator, and assisted to the work of the 
district administrator pursuant to the Act XLII of 1870. However, a part of the 
municipality considered this solution unsatisfactory; therefore they established a 
new position, the district administrator assistant (szolgabírósegéd) with the 
consent of the Ministry of the Interior.
7
 Such position was more acceptable and 
favourable than the district administrator clerk. However, the counties wanted to 
empower the municipal board  to elect the district administrator assistant, but the 
Ministry of the Interior dismissed this proposal, because, according to their 
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opinion, the Lord Lieutenant had the power to appoint this official.
1
 The Ministry 
reduced the number of the elected officials in this way, because the general 
assembly elected the deputy-noble judges (alszolgabíró) in the feudal era.
2
 
The legislator regulated the establishment of the districts in the Municipal Act. 
The territories of the districts were formed by the general assemblies of the 
counties with the consent of the Ministry of the Interior, in the Kingdom of 
Hungary. The Municipality Act provided that the general assemblies must 
establish the districts considering the election districts of the country. The election 
districts were organised by the general assemblies according to Act V of 1848 
(Voting Act), too. The legislator established a legal ground to the counties with the 
intention to determine the districts‘ territory divisions since the size of the election 
of districts were fixed in 30 000 inhabitants, after a short parliamentary debate.
3
 
The interpretation of this provision of Act XLII of 1870 were different in 
Transylvania, because the elections there were regulated by Act VII of 1848 on 
Union of Hungary and Transylvania was included in this area, and the election 
districts did not adjust to the population of the Transylvania‘s municipality.4 
The archive materials, which I have examined, proved the fact that in this 
case, the majority of the counties acted contrary to the provisions of the Act.
5
 The 
municipalities refused to pay attention to the election districts because they 
believed that the organization, which is suitable for the voting, was impractical to 
discharge the duties of administration. The counties argument was that the election 
districts resorted just one time in three years, while the public administration 
required a regular and daily connection between the population and the district 
officers.
6
 The municipalities divided the territory typically on the basis of natural 
endowments and district courts.
7
 It happened so due to the irregular district 
organization. In the counties, which I explored, the biggest district was the Békés 
District with 52 159 inhabitants,
8
 but the smallest district was the Peselnek District 
with 5450 inhabitants.
9
 
The Act XLII of 1870 did not define the seats of the districts in Hungary. It 
only provided that the external officers had to reside in the area of the district. For 
this reason, the majority of the district did not even establish their centre during the 
implementation of the Act. As an exception, the counties of Csongrád, Pozsony, 
Hont and Békés, the region of Fogaras and the Nagy-Kikinda Circle did set up the 
                                                          
1
MNL BM K150 117. 17731Sz/1871.-Arad County; 118. 28726/1871.; 31986/1871.-Hont County. 
2
Puky (1828) at 62-64; Récs (1861) at 482. 
3
Ruszoly (1986) at 219; Ruszoly (1996) at.291-293. 
4
Pap (2014) at 242-244. 
5
MNL BM K150 117. 17731/1871; 17731Sz/1871.; 32702/1871.-Arad County; 20171/1871.-
Aranyosszék; 21068/1871.-Csongrád County; 21272/1871.-Doboka County; 22026/1871.-Felső-
Fehér County; 21800/1871.-Region of Fogaras; 20826/1871.-Sáros County; 22226/1871.-Krassó 
County; 28525/1871.-Trencsén County; 21799/1871.-Bars County; 21161/1871-Békés County;  
21798/1871.-Zala County; 118. 22592/1871.-Bereg County; 23816/1871.-Gömör and Kis-Hont 
County; 26616/1871.-Pozsony County; 28391/1871.-Szabolcs County. 
6
MNL BM K150 117. 28525/1871.-Trencsén County; 22226/1871.-Krassó County; 21799/1871.-
Bars County. 
7
Pétervári (2018b) at 239-240. 
8
MNL BM K150 117. 28287/1871. 
9
MNL BM K150 117. 22026/1871. 
72 
 
centres of their districts.
1
 
The Act IV of 1869 of the Kingdom of Hungary separated the jurisdiction and 
the public administration on all levels. The district level of administration was 
established as independent from the judicial organization. The heads of the 
districts carried out judicial duties during six centuries,
2
 which was a big change. 
The district administrator became just a worker of the public administration. He 
supervised the communities, and executed the acts, the decrees and the statutes of 
the municipality. But the general assemblies of the counties got the power and 
authority to specify the authority of their district administrator. The most important 
authority of the district administrator was the recruitment of the soldiers, 
quartering of the soldiers and the administration in connection of the army.
3
 He 
coordinated the public work, which was imposed on the inhabitants.
4
 They 
repaired the ways and the bridges in the framework of public work. The district 
administrator administrated and recovered the public work. He took part in the 
collection of the back taxes.
5
 Another important duty was the maintenance of the 
public security and public order.
6
 
The unification of salaries and working conditions of district administrators 
was not the main intention of the Ministry, hence the councillors did not strive to 
form a class of civil servants in the counties like in the neoabsolutism. His 
mandate changed from three years to six years. The salaries of district 
administrators were left by the counties on the former level due to the straitened 
financial sources, thus it created a wage differential contrary to the judges, who 
were paid by the central government. The district administrator was a recognised 
office among the officials of the counties. Their salaries showed deviation between 
wide frames, and the public administration officials were not well-paid positions. 
The salaries of judges were competitive with the similar positions in this period. 
The Ministry of the Interior did not attempt to unify the daily allowances, the 
travelling fees or the duration of holiday of the officials. It corrected them sporadic 
which resulted with unreasonable financial demands. 
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21800/1871.-Fogaras vidék; 118. 22592/1871.-Bereg vármegye; 32032/1871.-Gömör és Kis-Hont 
vármegye; 22187/1871.-Közép-Szolnok vármegye; 22336/1871.-Veszprém vármegye; 233. 28463/ 
1873.-Moson vármegye. 
6
MNL BM K150 118. 22592/1871.-Bereg vármegye; 22187/1871.-Közép-Szolnok vármegye; 
30937/1871.-Moson vármegye; 22336/1871.-Veszprém vármegye; 117. 21272/1871.-Doboka 
vármegye; 22026/1871.-Felső-Fehér vármegye; 20826/1871.-Sáros vármegye. 
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The salary of the district administrator was decided upon and financed by the 
counties according to the Municipal Act. This issue caused problems, because the 
counties had divergent area, population and tax-payer ability. For this reason, the 
government was unable to carry out this provision of the Act, which regulated that 
the counties finance the expenses of the public administration.
1
 In the future the 
state would have to pay also the salaries of the public servants of counties. 
 
 
Summary 
 
The Royal Interior of Ministry realised the unification of the district 
administration level in Hungary. The division of labour in the Ministry made 
this work easier because the drafts of the counties in the same subject were 
examined by same councillors on every occasion. All drafts in connection of 
districts were confirmed by László Torkos,
2
 thus he was the public servant who 
formed the unified concepts for the examined administration level. 
I would like to present in my paper that a short provision of the act can 
have some questions in store, which we can recognise from the archive 
material. The realization of this part of Municipal Act was successful because 
the cooperation of the Royal Ministry of Interior with the counties enabled the 
establishment of a unified district level under the middle level in the whole 
territory of the country, instead of the particular, feudal public administration. 
This was an important condition of the modern administration at this period. 
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The Eventualmaxime in the Hungarian Civil 
Procedure - A Historical Perspective 
 
Kristóf Szivós 
  
Abstract 
 
The Hungarian Parliament adopted the new Code of Civil Procedure on 
22 November 2016. During the codification proceedings, the gravity of the 
Hungarian traditions and the achievements of European legal development 
were emphasised. One of the most notable features of the new Code is the 
application of the structure of ‗divided litigation‘, which means that the 
proceedings before the courts of first instance are divided into two parts: the 
preparatory stage and the main hearing stage. One of the main principles of 
the preparation is the Eventualmaxime, which had not been applied as a main 
rule since 1911, and since 1952 it has not been applied at all. This essay 
introduces the historical basics of this legal institution. It examines the 
theoretical features including analysing the definition. It highlights the 
reasons behind the necessity of the Eventualmaxime as well. The second part 
will introduce the presence of this principle in the Code of 1868, where it 
became the main directive principle in the ordinary procedure before the 
regional courts. It will also point out that it was not applied in the 
proceedings before local courts. During the codification in the late 19
th
 
century, the Eventualmaxime was revaluated, and as a result it was not 
applied as a main rule in the Code of 1911. The final part, will focus on those 
regulations where the Code of 1911 applied this principle to intensify the 
efficiency of civil litigation. 
 
Keywords: Eventualmaxime; civil litigation; Code of 1868; Code of 1911; 
Hungary 
 
 
Theoretical Basics of the Eventualmaxime 
 
The Definition of the Eventualmaxime 
 
The ius commune (in German: gemeines Recht) had two characteristic 
features: dividing the proceedings into stages and the application of the 
Eventualmaxime.
1
 
The Eventualmaxime is ‗that rule of the civil litigation which determines the 
sequence of actions of the parties in such a way that the party is obliged – under 
the burden of praeclusio – to propose all his pleas, statements and proofs together 
                                                          
1
Oberhammer & Domej (2005) at 108. 
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in the same term or deadline. It is called Eventualmaxime as the parties should 
propose those facts and proofs that are only needed accidentally (in eventum).‘1 
 
Determination of the Sequence of the Parties‘ Actions 
 
The civil procedure is a chain of actions. The relations between procedural acts 
can be different, and they consist of two groups. On one hand, there are several 
procedural acts which assume other previously made acts. For example, the written 
statement of defence presumes the statement of claim; a judgment presumes the 
closure of the hearing; the proposition of proofs presumes the previously made 
statements. In this case, there is a natural order which determines the sequence of 
procedural acts (successive address),
2
 so as a main rule, the Eventualmaxime is not 
needed. 
On the other hand, there are procedural acts which only have a common aim,
3
 
so they are not interdependent.
4
 For example: several witnesses, reasons serving as 
a ground for the termination of the procedure. An important feature of the 
Eventualmaxime is that it only obliges the parties, since the parties bear the burden 
of presenting the relevant facts of the case and submitting the respective supporting 
evidence.
5
 
 
 
Propose all Statements and Proofs Together 
 
When the written procedure served as the main rule in the civil proceeding, 
the parties had the opportunity to protract the proceedings by addressing those 
procedural acts successively which were not interdependent. It meant that the 
principle of free action provided the base of protraction, which had to be 
impeded.
6
 The main device was the Eventualmaxime, which obliged the parties to 
make all not-interdependent statements (or even those ones which presume 
another one) to be included in the same document.
7
 ―When this principle applies in 
its pure form the parties shall make their allegations at the earliest possible time, as 
a rule in the initial statement of claim or of defence‖.8 
 
In Eventum 
 
The Eventualmaxime forces the party to propose those facts and proofs, which 
are only needed after the opponent has stated his defence.
9
 This feature of the 
Eventualmaxime effects only the proof submission. For instance, in his joinder of 
                                                          
1
Fodor (1900) at 370. 
2
Ziskay (1872) at 353. 
3
Ibid. 
4
Magyary (1924) at 261; Bacsó (1917) at 98. 
5
Herczegh (1871) at 13-20.  
6
Mariska (1868) at 211; Magyary (1924) at 263. 
7
Magyary (1898) at 101. 
8
Oberhammer (2004) at 226. 
9
Czoboly (2014) at 141; Kovács (1928) at 589. 
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claims, the plaintiff states the defendant scraped his car and the defendant‘s dog bit 
him. He backed up the proofs as well. The defendant, however, confessed he had 
scraped the plaintiff‘s car, but denied the other claim. In this situation, the 
evidence taking for the first claim is unnecessary since a statement of fact may be 
accepted by the court as the truth if it does not have any doubt regarding its 
veracity and if it is acknowledged by the party with opposing interests.
1
 
In eventum is inseparable from advancement, since the Eventualmaxime 
orders the parties to make all statements and proofs without knowing the reaction 
of the other party. Therefore, one of the most important traits of the 
Eventualmaxime is the cumulation of proofs, which results in a vast number of 
documents.
2
 
     
Preclusion 
 
The Principles of Set and Free Action in Litigation 
 
Preclusion is derived from the Latin verb praecludo meaning ―to exclude‖. 
It is important to differentiate between the principles of set and free actions in 
the civil procedure. The Eventualmaxime was used to be called the principle of 
set action.
3
 In contrast, the principle of free actions bears that the party may 
propose his statements and proofs anytime during a procedure.
4
 The principle 
of free action helps the court to issue an adequate verdict.
5
 
The principle of free action was applied even in the appellate proceeding. 
In contrast, in Austria, Franz Klein attempted to speed up appellate proceedings 
by forcing the parties to present the relevant factual information at first 
instance. However, they wanted to avoid the Eventualmaxime as well.
6
 
 
Types of Preclusion 
 
The previous differentiation means that there are two types of preclusions 
as well. One is related to the Eventualmaxime and depends only on deadlines 
and terms, which means the parties shall not validly perform a procedural act 
they omitted to perform, and any belated procedural act shall be ineffective.
7
 
The consequences of the omission may only be remedied by an excuse.
8
 
Preclusion is necessarily the sanction of the Eventualmaxime. Without this 
sanction, the Eventualmaxime would be rather lex imperfecta, since the only 
tool to impede protraction would be the fine, what has no real preventive force 
for the parties. 
                                                          
1
See section 266 subsection 1 of Act CXXX of 2016. 
2
Herczegh (1891) at 26; Haendel (1932) at 12. 
3
Bacsó (1917) at 98. 
4
Its classical rule was Section 221. of the Act I of 1911. 
5
Bacsó (1934) at 21. 
6
Lewisch (2005) at 579. For the Austrian Eventualmaxime, see furthermore van Rhee (2008) at 
11-12. 
7
Section 149 subsection (1) of the Act CXXX of 2016. 
8
Section 150 subsection (1) of the Act CXXX of 2016. 
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The second is connected to the principle of free actions depends on the 
discretion of the court. Should a party make his statements in the litigation 
later, even though he had the opportunity to do so earlier, the court has the 
right to exclude his statements if it aimed the protraction of the proceeding.
1
 
This right is part of the case management (in German: materielle Prozessleitung). 
To sum up, the subjective preclusion excludes only those actions which 
were proposed culpably late. The strict system of the Eventualmaxime does not 
know this differentiation.
2
  
 
 
The Eventualmaxime as a Main Rule in Hungary 
 
Structure of the Civil Procedure after the Compromise 
 
After the Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867, the legislation had good 
examples in Western Europe for the structure of the judicial system.
3
 As a result, 
its remake was executed immediately.
4
 However, it was impossible to reform the 
civil litigation this early, since the new structure of the judicial system was not 
stable enough to handle the modern civil proceedings. The legislation adopted 
temporarily the Act LIV of 1868. 
The Act separated the ordinary proceeding and the summary procedure. The 
former was a written procedure, where only documents could be the bases of the 
adjudication. The parties were allowed to propose certain number of documents 
during the process. However, it did not exclude hermeneutic elements form the 
procedure, since the oaths were oral
5
 and witnesses were also verbally 
interrogated.
6
 The litigation pertained to regional courts consisting of panels. 
The latter one was based on oral hearings and the proceedings belonged to 
district courts consisting of a single professional judge (so called sole judge). The 
simpler cases were usually dealt with summary procedure. 
The legislation got the Eventualmaxime through the ordinary proceeding 
consequently, since without this principle, the protraction of the procedure would 
have been inevitable.
7
 The parties had three opportunities to propose their 
statements and proofs (so altogether the adjudication was based on six documents). 
 
First Round of Documents 
 
The proceeding began with the statement of claim. The plaintiff was obliged 
to propose the legal basis and the facts entirely, in chronology and clearly, 
combined with the proofs.
8
 The address was ‗entire‘ if no facts were left out which 
                                                          
1
Section 222 of the Act I of 1911. 
2
Rosenberg, Schwab &. Gottwald (1993) at 447. 
3
Magyary (1942) at 10-11. 
4
See Act IV of 1869, Acts VIII, IX, XXXI and XXXII. of 1871. 
5
Section 240 of Act LIV of 1868. 
6
Section 201 of Act LIV of 1868. 
7
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8
 Section 64 of Act LIV of 1868. 
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could have influenced the adjudication of the claim. It was ‗chronological‘ if the 
progression was kept, in which the relevant fact occurred and ‗clear‘ if the court 
was able to understand it without further researches.
1
 I find it interesting that not 
every section of the statement of claim had the same importance. The courts did 
not reject the statement of claim if the proofs were not enclosed.
2
 
After the communication of the claim, the defendant had to propose his 
written statement of defence, in which had to address all pleas and proofs.
3
 The 
defendant‘s obligatory entering into the action needs to be stressed. It means that 
the defendant had to propose his formal defence and his defence on the merits 
together. If he proposed a formal defence only, and the court rejected it, thus he 
became the losing party (‗silent confessor‘).4 
 
The New Code regarding the Written Statement of Defence 
 
In the Code of 1952, the formal defence and the defence on the merits were 
alternative, meaning that the party could propose only the termination of the 
procedure, and the court decided about it in the first place (―primary role of the 
formal defence‖).5 The defendant was obliged to propose his defence on the merits 
merits if the formal defence was unsuccessful. However, the court had the right to 
force him to introduce more than his formal defence according the discretion of 
the court. 
Our new regulation also concusses the defendant to propose his formal 
defence and his defence on the merits together. However, it applies different 
measures. If a party fails to include a preparatory statement specified in the Code 
or requested by the court in the preparatory document, it shall be construed that the 
party does not dispute the respective statement of fact, statement of law, or 
evidence of the opposing party, and does not object the respective request or 
motion of the opposing party being granted, unless he earlier made a statement to 
the contrary, and he does not wish or cannot submit a statement of fact, statement 
of law, request, evidence, or motion to present evidence regarding the respective 
preparatory statement to support his action or statement of defence.
6
 
If the written statement of defence submitted by the defendant contains only a 
formal defence, the provisions laid down in section 203 (2) shall be applied. 
Moreover, should the party supplement his defence with defence on the merits 
later, the court shall impose a fine upon him.
7
 
As a main rule, the court has discretion to decide whether ―the party had 
the opportunity to do so earlier‖. However, this discretion is impossible regarding 
                                                          
1
Herczegh (1891) at 125. 
2
Fodor & Márkus (1894) at 167; Ministerial explanation to the bill on the Code of Civil Procedure 
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Section 133 of Act LIV of 1868 
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the defence on the merits, since the only way to propose it is in the written 
statement of defence. 
Sections 183 subsection (5) and 203 subsection (2) together result in the 
strengthening of the obligation to enter the litigation. It does not depend on the 
discretion and decision of the court, but on the Act itself.  
Obviously, the defendant does not propose the defence on the merits in all 
cases, since there are situations, when the pleas can be allocated without doubts. 
There will be, however, cases as well, when the defendants are uncertain, and 
―make sure‖ that they propose a full defence, even though their primary defence 
tends to the termination of the procedure. 
 
The Second and Third Rounds of Documents 
 
The second round of documents was called reply document on the plaintiff‘s 
side and rejoinder on the defendant‘s. It is important to highlight the importance of 
the statement of claim and the written document of defence, since only those 
statements and proofs were allowed to be proposed which weakened the opposite 
party‘s previous statements. To sum up, the first round of documents marked the 
content of further documents.
 1 
The Act of 1868 knew a third round of documents 
with final statements, where the same rule had to be applied as in the second 
round. 
Apart from this, the Act recognized the difference between the appropriate 
statements and inappropriate statements which meant the statement and proofs that 
could have been proposed in the first round of documents (e.g. add another legal 
basis to the claim).
2
 These were excluded from the proceeding. Appropriate 
statements were allowed if their aim was to weaken the opponent‘s position. 
 
The Second Round of Documents in the New Code of Civil Procedure 
 
In the new Code of Civil Procedure, after the submission of a written 
statement of defence against the claim, and depending on the circumstances of the 
case, the court has discretion whether to order further preparations to be made in 
writing before scheduling a preparatory hearing, schedule a preparatory hearing, or 
proceed without ordering further preparations to be made in writing or scheduling 
a preparatory hearing.
3
 
If the court orders further preparations to be made in writing, the written 
statement of defence shall be served on the plaintiff, and the plaintiff shall be 
called upon to submit a reply document within an appropriate deadline.
 4
 
Since the party is allowed to propose the reply document or the rejoinder if he 
was requested by the court or is allowed by an Act to do,
5
 the main measure that 
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their content shall be ―in line with the invitation of the court.‖ Apart from it, the 
party may also make a preparatory statement without a specific request.
1
 
At first glance, it seems that our new regulation does not know the distinction 
between appropriate and inappropriate preparatory statements. This would make 
the Eventualmaxime obsolete, since there would be no point applying it if the 
parties had full freedom in proposing anything. In my opinion, however, it does 
know a similar distinction as well, but with a different system of consequences. 
Adding completely new statement and proofs is appropriate. Adding 
additional information which could have been proposed in the statement of claim 
(which was inappropriate after 1868) is also allowed, but it is considered to be an 
amendment of the action. One of the new features of the Code is the redefinition of 
the amendment of the action. It now means that a party, in comparison to the 
statements of fact, statements of law, legal arguments and requests made or 
presented earlier concerning his claim, including any counter-claim or set-off, 
invokes a different or additional fact, raises or invokes a different or additional 
legal argument or right to be enforced, or modifies the amount or content of his 
requests or any part thereof, or submits any other request.
2
 
The statement containing the amendment of the action shall be made with a 
content that meets the requirements of the statement of claim. The court shall 
reject the statement containing the amendment of the action if the action submitted 
therein would give rise to the statement of claim being rejected under the Code. 
The rules pertaining to the rejection of the statement of claim shall apply to the 
issue of a notice to remedy deficiencies.
3
 
Similarly, if the defendant proposes a statement which could have been 
proposed in the written statement of defence is an amendment of the statement of 
defence. It means that a party, in comparison to the statements of fact, statements 
of law and legal arguments made or presented earlier concerning his statement of 
defence, including any statement of defence made against a counter-claim or set-
off, invokes a different or additional fact, a different or additional complaint based 
on substantive law or legal argument, or withdraws his statement acknowledging 
or not contesting, in whole or in part, another statement of fact, statement of law or 
request, including the subsequent contestation of a statement of fact, statement of 
law or request that had been regarded as uncontested or unopposed.
4
 
Considering the legal consequences, there is a significant difference between 
the two amendments. If the amendment of action is deficient, it must be rejected. 
However, the deficiency of the amendment of the defence results in the application 
of the general rule of Section 203 paragraph 2. 
 
Evasion of the Written Procedure – The ―Judicial Information‖ 
 
The trial court consisted of three judges as a main rule: the chairman, the 
rapporteur (who presented the case to the council) and the third member. In the 
                                                          
1
Section 201 subsections (1)-(2) of Act CXXX of 2016. 
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3
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written procedure, only the rapporteur knew the whole case, and the parties did 
not have the opportunity to present their point of view in an oral hearing. 
As a result, a new legal institute appeared - the so called judicial information. 
It meant that the parties or their representatives visited the members of the council 
(except for the rapporteur who obviously knew the case
1
) privately and 
represented their case in orally. This was, of course, morally reprehensible, and 
was banned in our procedural reforms of 1911 and 1912.
2
 
 
 
Application of the Eventualmaxime in the Summary Procedure and in the 
Act I of 1911 
 
Prelude – The Summary Procedure 
 
Even the Act LIV of 1868 regulated the summary procedure, which took 
place before local courts. It was based on oral hearings, which knew the 
Eventualmaxime only as an exceptional rule. 
The Act XVIII of 1893 on the summary procedure was considered to be a 
transition between the procedural orders of 1868 and 1911. Basically, it provided 
an opportunity to the courts to experience the procedure, which was based on oral 
hearings until the Parliament adopted the modern Code of Civil Procedure of 
1911. The ministerial explanation also highlighted that ―the adoption of the new 
legislative acts would suit the right judicial policy if the transition did not interfere 
with the order of jurisdiction (or minimised the interference to the lowest possible 
measure). The more definite the difference between the current and the new 
system, the greater the interference would be, which includes the interference in 
the judicial system itself as well.‖3 
Oral hearings do not need the Eventualmaxime, since the statement of a party 
is followed by the opponent‘s immediate counter-statement, and the judge is able 
to control the process of the procedure with his materielle Prozessleitung. 
 
The Act I of 1911 – Raising the Pleas Together 
 
The Eventualmaxime was criticised in the 19
th
 century because ―it demolishes 
the healthy law and the truth, whose consequence was that the people hated the 
jurisdiction.‖4 The Code guaranteed the greatest liberty to the party with the 
(almost complete) abolishment of the Eventualmaxime and the unity of the 
hearing.
5
 
                                                          
1
Fodor (1905) at 428; Fodor (1910) at 165. 
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The Eventualmaxime affected the proposition of pleas in both acts, with 
almost completely same regulation. So the defendant had to propose his pleas 
together after the statement of claim. Its sanction was the preclusion, with two 
exception: on one hand, the exclusion did not refer to those pleas, which had to be 
taken into consideration ex officio. On the other land, the defendant could perform 
the omitted pleas under the general rule of an excuse. In this case, the reason for 
the omission and the circumstances substantiating the absence of any fault 
regarding omission had to be presented in the request for excuse.
1 
 
 
 
Summary 
 
This essay presented the emergence of the Eventualmaxime in the Hungarian 
legal history. It argued that in the written proceedings, this principle was the main 
rule since without it, the protraction was inevitable. Oral hearings, however, did 
not require this principle since the judge controlled the process with case 
management (materielle Prozessleitung). Some parts of this essay compared the 
old regulation with the new one. As a result, the most crucial points are 
highlighted below: 
1. The Eventualmaxime always forms a strict and rigid system. It affects the 
defendant‘s written statement of defence the most. Being similar to the regulation 
of 1868, our new Code also forces the defendant into the litigation. However, the 
measures are different. While the Code of 1868 had direct measure, since if the 
formal defence was irrational, and the defendant did not propose the defence on 
the merits, he became a losing party immediately, the Code of 2016 applies 
indirect measures. If there is no defence on the merits, the defendant will face a 
system of consequences. He is not excluded from proposition, but the court shall 
impose a fine. 
If the plaintiff‘s statement of claim is void, needs to be rejected with the 
possibility of proposing it again without any consequences, since the rejection does 
not result in res iudicata. This system of regulation regarding both parties raises 
the question: are the parties in the litigation equal? 
2. The system of the 1868 Code was a written procedure completely. As it 
was mentioned before, our new Code guarantees discretion to the court to decide 
the way of preparation. However, if the court chose the written preparation, it is 
not possible to close the preparatory stage based on written documents only, so in 
this case, the preparatory hearing of the party is compulsory. The Act guarantees 
more opportunities for the parties to propose their statements in the preparatory 
hearing, which is incorrect theoretically and it makes the Eventualmaxime 
obsolete. 
The Eventualmaxime fulfils its aim in the written procedure and in those 
―mixed procedures‖, in which the parties are not allowed to add more statements 
in the oral hearing (so they are only allowed to repeat their written statements).
2
 To 
sum up: the written preparation (and the Eventualmaxime) could only be effective 
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if the parties are forbidden to propose more statements than they had in the 
written preparation. The following two examples are to support this claim: 
 
a) In the system of the Act LIV of 1868, only the written documents (and the 
Eventualmaxime) could be the base of the adjudication. In addition the 
amendment of the statement of claim (which we know today) was not 
allowed. The essay showed that the parties could not supplement their 
previously proposed statements, which they proposed in the statement of 
claim/written statement of defence, in the second round (reply document/ 
rejoinder), since these were ―inappropriate‖. 
b) In the Act I of 1911, when the defendant proposed his formal defence, the 
court decided about it separately (it was a partial judgment). After this 
judgment became binding, it was the obstacle which made it impossible 
for the defendant to proposes more pleas in the procedure. 
 
The basic theoretical feature of the Eventualmaxime from the examples 
that if the civil procedure applies this principle, the statements proposed this 
way shall be isolated from the other parts of the procedure (the court shall 
decide about them separately), and the parties shall not be allowed to propose 
new statements or to change them. The Eventualmaxime closes the documents,
1
 
with the exception of an excuse, which breaks this strict system. 
In the new Code, the legislation did not respect this basic theoretical 
feature, which is supported by two tokens. First, the parties have the right to 
propose new preparatory statements after the summary of the court.
2
 The unity 
guaranteed by the Eventualmaxime is split with more statements, since it is 
possible to supplement their written documents. Secondly, I find that rule 
questionable that before the order closing the preparatory stage is adopted, a 
party may change his preparatory statements without the consent of the 
opposing party.
3
 This rule may result in that the opponent will change his 
statement as well. Therefore, protraction becomes a threat, even though the 
main aim of our new regulation was the opposite. 
This system raises a question: why does our new regulation apply the 
Eventualmaxime and the written preparation as an unnecessary formalistic 
procedure if any statement could be proposed or changed in the oral hearing? 
The Eventualmaxime guarantees now the reasonable time for a single act, but 
not for the whole procedure. 
3. In his essay I tried to point out the most important problems in our new 
Code. It is really difficult to decide a procedural question in a theoretical way, 
since the law of civil procedure (and the procedural law itself) is the most 
practical discipline of jurisprudence. Several times, it is almost impossible to 
answer a question, forasmuch we must see the complete procedure entirely to 
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find the solution for a tiny problem. In conclusion, our legal practice shall decide 
whether the old-new regulation makes the civil procedure more effective or not. 
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Social Rights in the First Yugoslavia (1918-1941): 
Tradition, Model and Deviations 
 
Ivan Kosnica 
  
Abstract 
 
Following T.H. Marshall‘s conception on gradual development of citizenship 
rights and an argument about 20
th
 century as a century of social citizenship, 
the essay highlights development of social rights in the First Yugoslavia. In 
the beginning, the essay deals with various traditions of social rights on the 
Yugoslav territories before 1918. Then the essay elaborates thesis about 
normative model of social rights established in the rules of the first 
Constitution of 1921 and in laws that implemented constitutional principles. 
In addition, some deviations from that model are pointed out, namely lack of 
significant rules about social rights in the second Constitution of 1931, non-
adequate implementation of regulations on social rights in legal practice, as 
well as pointing out the important role of municipalities in providing social 
transfers for the poor in 1930s.   
 
Keywords: Kingdom of Serbs; Croats and Slovenes; Kingdom of Yugoslavia; 
Social Rights; Social Citizenship; Poor Relief.   
 
 
Introduction    
 
The essay aims to provide analysis of development of social rights in the 
Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes/Yugoslavia in the period from its 
formation on December 1 of 1918 until its occupation in 1941 during the Second 
World War.
1
 By social rights, we mean rights that an individual has towards the 
state concerning education, health care, social transfers, etc. The conception of 
social rights as an important dimension of citizenship is emphasised by T.H. 
Marshal in his classical study Citizenship and Social Class. According to Marshall, 
there are three dimensions of citizenship: civil, political, and social. By civil 
citizenship he means ―the rights necessary for individual freedom‖, namely, liberty 
of the person, freedom of speech, etc.
2
 By political citizenship he means ―the right 
to participate in the exercise of political power, as a member of a body invested 
with political authority or as an elector of the members of such a body‖.3 By social 
citizenship he means ―the whole range from the right to a modicum of economic 
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welfare and security to the right to share to the full in the social heritage and to live 
the life of a civilised being according to the standards prevailing in the society‖.1 
According to Cohen‘s interpretation of Marshall, social citizenship includes public 
education and health care, but also certain degree of social minimum for wide 
range of populations.
2
  
Intensive development of social rights on Yugoslav territories began after the 
Second World War.
3
 Nevertheless, various arrangements of social rights were 
present earlier and in this the first Yugoslav state partly copied western models.
4
 
Specific example of interference of state in the area of social rights is the first 
Constitution of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes of 1921, the so-called 
Vidovdan Constitution. The Constitution defined various social rights of citizens 
under influence of the German Weimar Constitution of 1919.
5
 Some authors even 
argue, after comparison of the text of the Vidovdan and Weimar Constitutions, that 
strictly speaking Vidovdan Constitution defines social rights in much wider 
manner.
6
 However, social problems and indications of not quite developed system 
of social rights in Yugoslav reality provokes us to shed light on development of 
social rights in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes/Yugoslavia.  
In doing so, we will first examine tradition of regulation of social rights in the 
period before 1918. In addition, we debate formation of the model of social rights 
in the first Constitution of 1921 and in adequate regulations. Further, we point out 
some deviations from the model of social rights, namely significant lack of rules 
on social rights in the Constitution of 1931, weak application or non-application of 
some rules in legal practice, and increased role of some municipalities in providing 
social transfers in 1930s.  
 
 
Social Rights on Yugoslavian Territories before 1918: Tradition   
 
Legal system of the First Yugoslav state was very complex. In the state, there 
were six legal areas: Slovenian-Dalmatian legal area, former Hungarian legal area, 
Croatian-Slavonian legal area, and legal area of Bosnia and Herzegovina, legal 
area of the former Kingdom of Serbia and legal area of the former Kingdom of 
Montenegro.
7
 Four of these legal areas, namely Slovenian-Dalmatian legal area, 
Croatian-Slavonian legal area, former Hungarian legal area and legal area of 
                                                          
1
Ibid.  
2
Cohen (2010) at 82. On connections of social citizenship and welfare state see also Stambolieva 
(2015) at 381. 
3
On development of social state in the second Yugoslavia (1945-1990) see Puljiz et al (2008) 19-30; 
In this, the second Yugoslav state partly followed processes of development of welfare state on the 
West although on different grounds having in mind that the Yugoslav state after 1945 was 
communist one. On development of social rights in France, Germany, UK but also USA after the 
Second World War see Fahrmeir (2007) 194-200. 
4
On development of social rights in USA, France, Germany and UK after the First World War see 
Fahrmeir (2007) at 155-162. 
5
Puljiz et al (2008) 14; Kandić (1969) at 322. 
6Kandić (1969) at 334. 
7Čulinović (1963) at 224-227. 
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Bosnia and Herzegovina, were shaped in the realm of the Austro-Hungarian 
Monarchy before 1918 albeit all of these legal areas had certain specificities 
concerning legal development. Slovenian-Dalmatian legal area belonged to the 
Austrian part of the Monarchy. Former Hungarian legal area belonged to the 
Kingdom of Hungary. Croatian-Slavonian legal area belonged to the Hungarian 
part of the Monarchy but enjoyed certain autonomy in the matters of social rights.
1
 
Bosnia and Herzegovina was de facto under Austro-Hungarian rule from 1878 
while de iure it became part of the Austro-Hungarian only in 1908.
2
 Other two 
legal areas, namely Serbian and Montenegrin legal areas enjoyed independent 
development until 1918.  
On Slovenian-Dalmatian legal area relevant was Austrian law on 
municipalities which regulated poor relief as an important right of local citizens 
(Heimatrecht).
3
 Additionally, Austria introduced systems of state social insurance 
and in this way strengthened position of central state.
4
 The law of 1867 on general 
rights of Austrian citizens‘ defined education as one of citizens‘ rights (§ 17).5 
Education in primary schools was obligatory for all children between six and 
twelve years old.
6
 On Hungarian legal area, there was also system of poor relief.
7
 
In addition, the state developed programs of social support of poor and 
unprotected population including children, and programs of protection of 
workers.
8
 The state followed developments in Austria and established systems of 
insurance of workers.
9
 Here there was also compulsory elementary education that 
was from 1908 free of charge.
10
 On Croatian-Slavonian legal area, one can also 
close connection of social rights with municipalities and the system of poor relief. 
Croatian law on regulation of local citizenship (zavičajnost) of 1880 in its first 
article states that every member of a municipality (zavičajnik) has the right on poor 
relief in the case of poverty.
11
 Furthermore, in the last decades of the Austro-
Hungarian Monarchy social rights emerged on this legal area because of validity 
of Hungarian-Croatian laws in common affairs on this area too. In addition, 
Croatian-Slavonian authorities in the sphere of autonomy developed its own 
legislation on social rights.
12
 Part of this was the right on elementary education 
                                                          
1
Austro-Hungarian Compromise (1867) defined Croatia-Slavonia as part of the lands of the 
Hungarian Crown. In 1868 reached Croatian-Hungarian compromise granted autonomy to Croatia-
Slavonia in internal administration, education, religion and judiciary. Internal administration 
included also health care and other social rights. About system of Compromises, see more in: Gross 
et al (1992) at 213-238.  
2Savić (2011) at 228. 
3
Kosnica (2018) at 88.  
4
Zimmermann (2011) at 90. 
5
Bernatzik (1911) at 422-427. 
6
An argument about obligatory education in primary schools in Istria as part of the Austrian half of 
the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy see in: Pastović (2016) 157-158. 
7
Zimmermann (2011) at 11-45. 
8
Zimmermann (2011) at 48-56, 69-89. 
9
Zimmermann (2011) at 90.  
10
Gyuris (2014) at 537. 
11Mutavdjić (1894) at 10.   
12
For example see Zakon o umirovljavanju i obskrbi zemaljskih urednika i službenika u kraljevinama 
Hrvatskoj i Slavoniji, njihovih udova i sirota [the Law on retirement and living costs allowance of 
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which should have been provided free of charge.
1
 On legal area of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, the most important regulation concerning rights of citizens was the 
Constitution of 1910. The constitution consisted of Land constitution (Zemaljski 
štatut) and other five fundamental laws that defined electoral rules, organization 
and work of the Sabor, etc.
2
 The Constitution regulated some important civil and 
political rights of citizens. Concerning social rights, the Constitution contained 
only one instructive provision about necessity of education of youth in public 
schools but not stylised in a way that would guarantee free and obligatory 
education (§ 13 par. 2).
3
 In Bosnia and Herzegovina, there were no specific laws 
about protection of workers but only one decree issued by the Provincial 
Government of 1909 on protection of artisans.
4
 In the Kingdom of Serbia, the 
Constitution of 1903 contained important rules concerning civil and political rights 
but practically did not regulate social rights. The only social right regulated in the 
Constitution of the Kingdom of Serbia of 1903 was the one about free of charge 
elementary education in state schools (§ 21 par. 2).
5
 In addition, the state in 1910 
after few unsuccessful attempts enacted the law that regulated basic protection and 
insurance of workers (Zakon o radnjama).
6
 In the Kingdom of Montenegro, 
constitutional regulation similarly did not contain obligation of state to provide 
citizens with social rights except the right on free of charge education in state 
elementary schools (§ 138).
7
 In Montenegro, there were no regulations about 
protection of workers.
8
 
This very short look at the development of social rights indicates hybridity of 
regulations and diversity of traditions in regulation of social rights. One can 
lapidary say that Slovenian-Dalmatian, former Hungarian and Croatian-Slavonian 
legal areas possessed stronger tradition of regulation of social rights. On the 
contrary, one can say that the weakest tradition of regulation of social rights was 
on Montenegrin legal areas. In a way, the most widespread social right on 
monitored legal areas was the right but at the same time obligation on elementary 
education. In addition, it is important to note that all legal areas suffer from 
significant lack of constitutional norms on social rights.  
                                                                                                                                                         
land officers and employees, and their wives and children, in the kingdom of Croatia and Slavonia]; 
On some social rights in Croatia-Slavonia see also Kosnica (2014) at 484-485.  
1
§ 17 Zakona o ustroju pučkih škola i preparandija za pučko učiteljstvo u kraljevinama Hrvatskoj i 
Slavoniji [The Law on organisation of public primary schools and schools for teachers in the 
kingdoms of Croatia and Slavonia] (1874); See § 5 Zakona o uređenju pučke nastave i obrazovanja 
pučkih učitelja u kraljevinama Hrvatskoj i Slavoniji [The Law on organisation of public primary 
schools and schools for teachers in the kingdoms of Croatia and Slavonia] (1888)  
2Imamović (2011) at 27-33.  
3
Ustav Bosne i Hercegovine iz 1910. godine [The Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina of 
1910].   
4Milenković (1981) at 113-114. 
5
Ustav za Kraljevinu Srbiju iz 1903. godine [The Constitution of the Kingdom of Serbia of 1903].  
6Milenković (1981) at 120-121; On debates about labor legislation in Serbia and enactment of the 
Law on companies of 1910 see more in: Kaclerović (1952) at 5-38. 
7Ustav Kneţevine Crne Gore iz 1905. godine [The Constitution of Montenegro of 1905].  
8Milenković (1981) at 120. 
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Normative Model of Social Rights Established in 1920s  
 
After formation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes on December 
1 of 1918 the authorities of the new state, following the principle of legal 
continuity, at first accepted existing regulations. However, at the same time the 
authorities took regulation of some social rights, namely protection of 
workers.
1
 On 28 June of 1921 the authorities enacted the first Constitution.
2
 
The constitution defined state as Unitarian and as a monarchy and contained 
significant rules about social rights.   
The Constitution defined the right and at the same time the obligation of 
citizens on elementary education provided by the state (§ 16 par. 6). The 
education in state elementary schools should have been free of charge (§ 16 
par. 9). The Constitution also contained specific provision about state protection of 
all citizens in choosing vocational schools (§ 22). In addition, the state committed 
to regulate financing of education of competent but poor children (§ 22). 
Another important part of the Constitution are rules which commit the state on 
improvement of health conditions, health of population, especially mothers and 
children (§ 27). The state also promised that it would provide poor citizens with 
free medical care and free medicaments (§ 27). The Constitution contained 
provision on protection of workers and in this, special protection for women 
workers and children workers (§ 23). It committed the state authorities to enact 
the law on protection of workers and about number of working hours (§ 23). In 
the Constitution, the authorities also promised enactment of the law about 
insurance of workers in cases of accidents, illness, unemployment, old age and 
death (§ 31). In addition, the authorities had to enact special law on regulation 
of agricultural insurance (§ 30). The Constitution provided state protection of 
sailors. This should include enactment of special law on protection of sailors in 
the case of illness, old age, etc. (§ 34). The Constitution contained rule about 
state protection of disabled persons, was orphans, war widows, poor and for 
work incapable parents of dead soldiers (§ 32).  
Conducted analysis of the text of the Constitution of 1921 enables us to 
detect four groups of social rights regulated by the Constitution. One of them is 
education, another is health care, and the third group is protection and 
insurance of workers, agricultural workers and sailors while the fourth group 
are rules about victims of war.  
After enactment of the Constitution, the authorities took significant efforts 
in regulation of social rights provided by the Constitution. Following earlier 
development on each of legal areas and tradition of free and obligatory elementary 
education on many of them, the authorities promoted the concept of free and 
obligatory elementary education.
3
  In 1922, the authorities enacted the law on 
protection of population from infectious diseases and providing free medical 
                                                          
1Milenković (1981) at 126-223. 
2
Ustav Kraljevine Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca [The Constitution of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and 
Slovenes].  
3Zakon o narodnim školama [the Law on national schools]; Krbek (1932) 381. 
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assistance.
1
 This law stated that in the institutions provided for protection of 
population from infectious diseases, medical assistance is free of charge (§ 2). 
Another law of 1922 provided free medical assistance in hospitals.
2
 The law of 
1930 on hospitals, although enacted after abolishment of the Constitution of 1921, 
followed this tradition and stated that every hospital had to have special policlinic 
provided for treatment of the poor.
3
 Very soon after enactment of the Vidovdan 
Constitution, the minister of social policy on October 25 of 1921 issued a 
regulation about hygiene and technical protection measures in companies.
4
 Next 
year the National Assembly accepted and the king approved the Law on protection 
of workers.
5
 The law contained important rules on limitation of working hours, 
daily rest, night work, working of expectant mothers, etc. Another important 
regulation was the Law on social security of workers of 1922.
6
 By this law, the 
authorities regulated protection of workers in cases of illness, situations when 
workers are unable to work anymore, old age, death and an accident (§ 1). 
However, the law did not regulate protection of workers in cases of unemployment 
(§ 2). The central government in Belgrade regulated that issue only in 1927 by the 
decree in which it provided financial help for jobless workers, excluding those 
working in agriculture and excluding workers who work for daily allowances.
7
 
The authorities further regulated rights of war volunteers in the Law on war 
volunteers of 1922.
8
 The law regulated material rights of volunteers unable to 
work, and members of their families (§ 4-17).  
Mentioned rules of the Constitution of 1921 and the following laws, 
indicate that the authorities, at least at the normative level, aimed to establish 
order that would guarantee important social rights to specific groups of 
population and in doing so, they installed the state as the central agent who will 
provide these rights. Such improvement of social rights in the new state was 
result of few important factors. One of them would be disastrous experience of 
the Great War. Another was communist threat from abroad but also within the 
state. Abroad it was the revolution in Russia in 1917, and formation of the 
communist Hungary in the neighbourhood in 1919.
9
 Internal pressure could 
have been results of the Communist Party on local elections during spring and 
summer of 1920 on which it achieved very good results and won in two biggest 
cities, Belgrade and Zagreb.
10
 Another pressure on political elite and the king 
                                                          
1
Zakon o osnivanju posebnih sanitetskih ustanova za ispitivanje i suzbijanje zaraznih bolesti i 
davanju besplatne lekarske pomoći [The law on formation of special ambulances for detection 
and suppression of infectious diseases and providing free medical assistance].  
2Zakon o besplatnoj lekarskoj pomoći u bolnici [The law on free medical assistance in hospital]. 
3
Krbek (1932) at 391. 
4Radničko zaštitno zakonodavstvo (1928)at 3-106. 
5Zakon o zaštiti radnika [The law on protection of workers]; Radničko zaštitno zakonodavstvo 
(1931) at 1-48.  
6
Zakon o osiguranju radnika [The law on social security of workers]. 
7
Kolar-Dimitrijević (2005) at 105.   
8
Zakon o dobrovoljcima [The law on war volunteers]. 
9
On influences of Russian revolution of 1917 and formation of the communist Hungary in 1919 
on social movements in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes see Čulinović (1961) at 184-
188. 
10Čulinović (1961) at 316. 
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could have been results of the Communist party on the elections for the 
Constitutional Assembly in November of 1920 on which it was the fourth party 
according to achieved votes, and the third party according to achieved mandates.
1
 
Therefore, the ruling elite partly saw the enactment of the Constitution and 
following regulations on social rights as an instrument that would suppress 
possible revolutionary treats.
2
   
 
 
Deviations  
 
Normative model of social rights established in 1920s suffered from some 
important deviations. First concerns long-term instability of constitutional norms. 
The Vidovdan Constitution lasted only until January 6 of 1929 when the king 
Aleksandar KaraĎorĎević abolished the Constitution and proclaimed dictatorship. 
For next almost three years, the king ruled without formal constitution. Although 
previous laws initially remained in force, in this period the system of social rights 
did not have any more support in constitutional norms. In addition, the next 
Constitution of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia of 1931 practically did not contain 
rules about social rights and in this way significantly retreated in comparison to the 
Constitution of 1921.
3
 The only rule concerning social rights in the Constitution of 
1931 was about free and compulsory elementary education in state schools (§ 16 
par. 2). An explanation for such diminishing of social rights can be the context of 
the Great Depression and lack of funds. 
Another argument that highlights deviation from the normative model of 
social rights established in 1920s is the one about significant discrepancy between 
constitutional principles and legislations and its implementation in legal practice.
4
 
Subject of such criticism can be the Law on social security of workers of 1922. 
This is due to weak implementation of the law in practice. The implementation of 
the law started only in 1937 and the authorities started to pay pensions only during 
the Second World War.
5
 There was also a limited protection of victims of war in 
practice.
6
  
Another argument concerns proclaimed role of the state in providing social 
transfers. As we have already mentioned, the central government issued a decree 
in 1927 about financial help for jobless workers.
7
 However, in parallel some cities 
developed social programs to support workers. One such a program for support of 
workers unable to work, their wives and orphans, was created by the authorities of 
the city of Zagreb in 1930. Its basic perquisite was that a worker should have 
worked in the city of Zagreb for at least ten years.
8
 Therefore, providing social 
transfers for workers was partly in domain of local authorities.  
                                                          
1
Banac (1988) at 363, 367. 
2
The same argument see in Puljiz et al (2008) at 14. 
3
Ustav Kraljevine Jugoslavije [The Constitution of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia].  
4
For this argument see Petrović (2011) at 124.   
5
Puljiz et al (2008) at 15. 
6Petrović (2011) at 123-124. 
7
Kolar-Dimitrijević (2005) at 105.   
8
Kolar- Dimitrijević (1983) at 182.  
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Additional argument that highlights important role of municipalities in care 
for the poor are, in part of the country, still valid rules on poor relief. These rules 
were valid on Slovenian-Dalmatian legal area, former Hungarian legal area and 
Croatian-Slavonian legal area. Although practical relevance of these rules was 
very limited during 1920 it still implied possible influence of municipalities on 
social transfers.
1
 The new regulations about municipalities (1933) and city 
municipalities (1934) accepted institution of poor relief and therefore regulated 
poor relief as an important right of local citizens (zavičajnici).2 Besides, 
municipalities had to support poor patients, if there were no other persons obliged 
to do it by the law provided that person was resident at least five years in a 
municipality.
3
 
 
 
Conclusion    
 
Elaborated tradition of development of social rights on the territories that 
became part of the first Yugoslavia indicates significant diversity in regulation of 
social rights. The diversity existed among legal areas that were part of the Austro-
Hungarian Monarchy but also among these legal areas and the legal areas of the 
Kingdom of Serbia and the Kingdom of Montenegro. Here especially indicative is 
significant lack of regulations about social rights on the legal area of former 
Kingdom of Montenegro. On the other hand, important common ground in 
regulation of social rights was regulations about right of citizens on elementary 
education.  
After formation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes in 1918, the 
authorities took significant efforts in providing social rights. The main reasons for 
such development were internal and external pressures, namely threat of 
communist revolution but also consequences of the war. Therefore, the political 
elite in the first Constitution of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes 
enacted numerous rules about social rights. In addition, the authorities enacted a 
number of laws by which they implemented constitutional principles. The 
proclaimed principles of social rights defined the state as the central agent in 
providing social rights. Established normative model of social rights represented 
significant improvement in comparison with inherited traditions. Although the 
level of improvement should be judged considering each of legal areas, for all 
legal areas the improvement was constitutional regulation of social rights.  
However, the established normative model of social rights suffered from 
significant deviations. The deviations are suspension of Vidovdan Constitution in 
1929 and lack of significant constitutional rules about social rights in the 
Constitution of 1931. Another deviation was not full implementation of model of 
social rights in legal reality. Finally, the analysis indicates still important role of 
municipalities in providing social support for workers and poor population which 
                                                          
1About limited use of poor relief in practice in 1920s see Mirković (1924) at 161. 
2
See § 22 of the Law on Municipalities of 1933 in Tolić (1933); on § 18 of the Law on city 
municipalities of 1934 see Zakon o gradskim opštinama (1934).   
3
Krbek (1940) at 30. 
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was not completely in accordance with proclaimed dominant position of central 
state in providing social rights.  
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Legal History of the Development of the Process of 
Forced Execution of Claims in Croatian Law 
 
Jelena Kasap 
Višnja Lachner 
 
Abstract 
 
Although modern legal science, both Croatian and comparative, recognises a 
specially defined legal institute for enforcing claims that is realised in the 
framework of a special procedure governed by the Enforcement Act, the 
historical context of the development of the mentioned institute, although 
undisputable, was not so uniform. It is well known in numerous legal-
historical researches that the emergence of the first forms of compulsory 
settling of the claims can be found in antique legal systems, but features 
inherent to that institute suitable for modern legal interpretation begin to be 
individualised in medieval law. When it comes to Croatian mediaeval law, it 
should be borne in mind that the determination of the mentioned institution 
cannot be interpreted by means of unique legal sources. For this reason, the 
subject of analysis in this research will be the provisions of the medieval 
statutes of our coastal cities and the customary law that was valid in the area 
of Slavonia and a smaller part of Croatia through the Werbőczi's Tripartitum. 
Bearing in mind that solutions used to enforce compulsory settlements in 
some research sources that we are dealing with in this research are marked 
by the common features (along with some variations) in the content of the 
research we are going to describe and critically analyse the provisions 
related to the composition and authority of the bodies that have conducted the 
procedure, the order of settlement and the consequences of not granting a 
claim in a special proceeding. The purpose of this research is to realise the 
filling of obvious gaps in Croatian legal-historical science when it comes to 
the development of enforcement proceedings. This will set the safe foundation 
for studying the institute in contemporary law. 
 
Keywords: Customary Law; Process of Forced Execution of Claims; 
Croatian Mediaeval Law; Enforcement Proceedings; Compulsory Settlements. 
 
 
Introductory Remarks 
 
The fundamental purpose of the relationships in the field of the law of 
obligations, the fulfilment of the obligations assumed, occurs at the time of the 
proper and orderly fulfilment of the obligatory performance. By completing the 
act, the debtor's obligation and the correlative subjective right of the creditor cease 
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to exist.
1
 Voluntary fulfilment of the obligatory performance is the most desirable 
way of terminating the legal relationship and as such it is in accordance with the 
principle of disposability according to which the mandatory relationships arise, 
change and cease by the will of the parties. In normal circumstances, which imply 
the willingness of parties to realise the content of legal relations in the course of 
which they are committed to certain activities, there are almost no problems with 
the termination of obligations upon their fulfilment. The problem arises if a debtor 
to whom an obligation was established either by the contract or by the court order 
refuses or is unable to fulfil the obligation. Since the period of antiquity, the 
fulfilment of the obligations incurred was sought to be solved through the use of 
an institute directed against the person or property of the debtor. Determined 
principles of personal enforcement of debtors in the case of non-fulfilment of 
obligations are also a feature of medieval law. Since Croatian medieval law in 
terms of rules of fulfilment of obligations largely reflects the reciprocal rules of 
Roman law, the following will be attempted to establishing the legal nature of 
compulsory settlement of claims in the statutes of Croatian medieval communes as 
well as Croatian-Hungarian law that was legally relevant in the continental 
Croatia. By the entry into force of the unique legislation in the area of Austro-
Hungary in the 19th century, a uniform regime of forced settlement of claims was 
achieved, the means of personal enforcement inherited from medieval law were 
abolished, and forcible settlement became a regular procedure under the 
jurisdiction of the courts. The aforementioned legal development of the institute of 
compulsory fulfilment of the claim will attempt to illustrate the systematic and 
comparative analysis of available legal resources that have greatly influenced the 
development of modern rules of enforcement law and procedure. 
 
 
Arrangement of the Problem of Enforcing the Claim in Antique Law 
 
It is recognised in numerous legal-historical studies that the emergence of the 
first forms of compulsory settlement of claims can be established in antique legal 
systems, i.e. from the very beginnings of civilization. Accordingly, the provisions 
governing the institute of debt slavery are already found in Hammurabi's law, 
which came into being in the 18th or 17th centuries BC.
2
 In addition to the fact 
that Hammurabi's law prescribed debt slavery, the mentioned institute also referred 
to the debtor‘s family, but with certain limitations. Namely, if the father of the 
family sold or pledged his wife, son or daughter, the duration of the debt slavery 
was limited to three years.
3
 So there was a common (solidarity) responsibility of 
family members for debt settlement.
4
 
Similar legislative solutions are also true of other major civilizations, and 
most of all in Egypt. At the time of the dynasty of Egyptian Pharaoh Bakenrenef 
                                                          
1Klarić & Vedriš (2014) at 456.  
2
See articles 115-117 of the Hammurabi‘s Law in Bartulović (2014) at 25.  
3Article 117 of the Hammurabi‘s Law in Bartulović (2014) at 25.  
4
A similar provision can be found in the English law applicable in Lombarda, where the debt 
settlement of one of the groups concerned all members. See Louis (1918) at 230.  
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(Bocchoris) (725-720) and perhaps much earlier, it was found that in the case of 
debt, the means of securing a debt was a debtor's property and not his body. Unlike 
Pharaoh Menes (around 3150 BC), who, as a means of securing a debt, determined 
pledging of the body and even the mummy of the debtor or his father, Pharaoh 
Bocchoris forbade debt bondage because the bodies of the subject belonged to the 
state.
1
 
Under the aforementioned provisions of Egyptian law, there was an Athenian 
law at the time of Solon, who abolished the traditional Athenian practice of debt 
slavery in the event of debt failures. Namely, to the archon of Solon, the fulfilment 
of the obligations was secured by a personal guarantee.
2
 By abolishing the debt 
slavery, (595/4 BC) Solon solved the socio-economic crisis and largely determined 
the new social order (social/"socialist").
3
 The proofs of the debt slavery can be 
seen in the oldest preserved European law, the so-called ‗The Gortyn Code‘ of the 
5th century BC. Pursuant to the provisions of the Code (Table 1, Column II), 
debtors slaves are those who have been assigned to a lender based on a court 
judgment (nenikamenos-addictus) and who have pledged their body for the debt 
(katameimenos-nexus).
4
 
The biblical books also contain provisions proving that there was an institute 
of debt bondage.
 5
 However, on the other hand, it is alleged that at least at the time 
when the Israelis came into contact with Egypt, debt servitude was not known. 
According to the Book of Exodus, it seems that slavery was known only in the 
case of a thief who had not returned the stolen property of his victim.
6
 In the Book 
of Exiles (Book of the Alliance - the Covenant Act) it is stated that the debt service 
was limited to six years.
7
 
 
 
Arranging the Problem of forced Settlement of the Claim in Roman Law 
 
The legal procedure governing the relationship between creditor and insolvent 
debtor existed in Roman law even before the time of Roman emperors. According 
to this system, creditors also had the power over the life and assets of the insolvent 
debtor.
8
 The main purpose and subject of this forced execution was the borrower 
as a person.
9
 However, such a mode of enforced execution of a person had 
developed into a system where debtors' assets had become the main object and 
subject of custody. This transition lasted several hundred years, and we can 
                                                          
1
Bartulović, Bodul, & Vuković (2013) at 913.   
2Kurtović (1987) at 100.  
3
Erent-Sunko (2007) at 1013. 
4―Do not punish the one who takes the man who pledged himself or was convicted for debt‖at 
http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:JJNP4bRYCQ0J:www.ius.bg.ac.rs/dr
akitic/gortinski_zakonik.doc+&cd=1&hl=hr&ct=clnk&gl=hr  
5
2 Kings 4, 1.  
6
Louis (1918) at 230.  
7
Louis (1918) at 230; Exodus 21, 1. 
8
Gratzer (2008) at 20.  
9
Cowell (1980) at 95. 
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distinguish at least two levels: a) Old Roman law under the XII Table; and b) 
weakening the creditor's authority through Lex Poetelia and Lex Iulia.
1
 
In the earlier legislative period, under the Code Table XII, it was customary 
for a future debtor to pledge himself, his family and property as a guarantee to 
repay the debt to the lender. There was a possibility prescribed for solving the 
problem of a debtor who could not fulfil his obligation to pay the debt
2
 with 
special legislation per manus injectio (so-called Verdict Order, circa 450 AD).
3
 
Namely, if the debtor could not fulfil his obligation to pay, he became the 
creditor's slave, and the creditor even had the right to kill him or cut him into 
pieces or even to sell him into a foreign country.
4
 Although it was not clear to 
what extent this law was implemented, the debtor always ended up in debt 
bondage and he and his family could be sold as slaves. So the borrower was 
understood as a thing (res) due to the principle of pact sunt servanda, i.e. for 
delinquent or contractual liability.
5
 
Over the time, the subject of the debt was becoming more and more the 
property of the debtor and less the body of the debtor. This form of development 
has been realised through the Lex Poetelia Act, 326 BC according to which it is 
determined that non-fulfilment of the obligation by the debtor becomes a criminal 
offense and that the unlimited right of the creditor to the life, property and family 
of the debtor is limited.
6
 Accordingly, this law has renounced the right to kill, 
abuse or sell debtors and their families to slavery.
7
 However, the debtor still had to 
pay the debt, with forced labour, and where the personal deprivation was replaced 
by debt forgiveness. If the debtor settled his debt, he regained his freedom. 
One step further from the personal enforcement of the debtor over his 
property as a custody case (property sanction) was the adoption of Lex Iulia 
(cessio bonorum).
8
 Under this law, the debtor had the opportunity to declare his 
inability to pay (insolvency) and voluntarily hand over his assets to creditors. 
Thus, Roman law separated the debtor as a person from his property and 
introduced the principle of equality between the creditors.
9
 
Accordingly, we can conclude that at the beginning of the development of the 
Roman law the obligation (obligatio) did not consist in the legal duty to carry out 
the act, whose failure to fulfilment resulted in the possibility of the lawsuit, but it 
was the obligatio (ligare – to tie) that indicated that the borrower was materially 
and physically bound and subjected to the creditor's authority until the performance 
of the obligation.
10
   
 
                                                          
1
Gratzer (2008) p. 20.  
2
Omar (2004) at 4 et seq. 
3Bartulović, Bodul, & Vuković (2013) at 914. 
4―He who cannot pay with his purse pay with his skin.― Brissaud (1912) at 564; Bartulović, Bodul 
& Vuković (2013) at 914. 
5
Cowell (1980) at 95 et seq.  
6
Gratzer (2008) at 20. 
7
Romac (2002) at 94. 
8
According to some interpreters the passage of this Law is attributed to Caesar and to the Augustus. 
9
Brunstad Jr. (2000) at 499. 
10Proso & Štambuk (2008) at 901. 
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Institute for Forced Settlement of Claims in Croatian Medieval Rights 
 
Since the study of the legal regulation of the institute of forcible settlement in 
the Croatian territory before the entry into force of the Allgemeines bürgerliches 
Gesetzbuch (ABGB) has an object that encompasses sources from different legal 
and political areas, it is important at the outset to distinguish their affiliation.
1
 The 
basic feature of the medieval Croatian legal system is the image of imbalance and 
legal insecurity since a certain legal issue is often difficult to interpret because 
sometimes the sources refer to it only indirectly or not at all. Therefore, in order to 
identify the essential features of the Forced Settlement Institute in the period under 
consideration, this research will attempt to carefully interpret the sources of the 
statutory rights of the Slavonian and coastal cities, as well as the sources of 
customary and feudal rights where the issues of the title remained outside the 
scope of the urban law regulation.  
Determining the basic features of the forced settlement of claims that are 
constant in Croatian law requires access to an analysis of that legal issue from the 
point of view of the substantive elements of that legal relationship. This is 
primarily the question of the authority of the organs who conducted the fulfilment 
of claims and the modalities of compulsory fulfilment, that is, the objects over 
which the forcible settlement was initiated. Under the influence of the Roman rule 
of law, which was valid in the Croatian medieval law, in some of the provisions of 
the city's law, the lender was authorized to arrest the debtor until he did not fulfil 
his obligation.
2
 Such principles of execution of the fulfilment of the claim on the 
debtor‘s personality are partly left under the influence of the glossary when 
leaving the private custody institute and the judicial bodies become competent for 
the procedure of enforcing the claim.
3
 
 
 
Compulsory Settlement of Claims on the Debtor's Property 
 
Research of medieval obligatory and legal relations on the territory of 
Slavonia, compared to earlier comment legal sources, has already been aggravated 
by the circumstance that the existing legal and historical literature was not further 
treated. Margetić considers this to be a consequence of the strong influence of 
Hungarian law that can often be interpreted through the privileges of the Slavonian 
                                                          
1
At the end of the 16th century, the name of Croatia included the medieval area of Slavonia, where 
significant influence of Hungarian law was evident, albeit in the case of private law regulation. On 
the other hand, the area of Istria and Dalmatia was marked by the importance of statutory rights that 
was primarily aligned with the interests of the Venetian Republic, while the Republic of Dubrovnik, 
thanks to the autonomous status over a period of several centuries, succeeded in establishing a 
recognizable legal system known in the legal history as a statutory right of the medieval Dubrovnik 
municipality. See Kasap (2016) at 77-78; Beuc (1989) at 19 & 208. 
2
Beuc points out that private deprivation in Langobard law has also been conducted against the 
debtor, but also against the message, i.e. the guarantor to fulfill the debtor's obligation.; Beuc (1989) 
at 290. 
3
Ibid.  
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cities.
1
 Furthermore, the investigation of this legal system in the area of medieval 
Slavonia cannot be accessed without the interpretation of Hungarian law, since in 
Croatia, Dalmatia and Slavonia there was no single system of legal rules governing 
mandatory relations before the entry into force of the Allgemeines bürgerliches 
Gesetzbuch (ABGB). Relevant sources for the interpretation of non-binding 
relations in the territory of continental Croatia are the provisions of the Slavonian 
Statute of 1273, and the Ilok Statute of 1525. The problem of forced compulsion is 
explicitly regulated by the Tripartitum provisions. After the entry into force of 
Werbőczi's Tripartitum in 15142 valid Croatian-Hungarian law can be interpreted 
by Institutiones iuris Hungarici
3
 by the author Imre Kelemen from 1818, which in 
a certain way also provide insight into the peculiarities of the legal institute. 
Decisions of the Slavonian Parliament are one of the oldest Croatian documents 
from the medieval era and one of the few sources through which it is possible to 
interpret listed legal customs of Slavonia, for the most part procedural and criminal 
law.
4
 
The provision of the Slavonic Statute of 1273, is important to determine the 
characteristics of a debt prison institute as a measure directed against a debtor who 
did not fulfil his obligation. This provision implicitly indicates in its content also 
the order in which the seized borrower's assets were accessed in order to ultimately 
reach the creditor's claim. It was forbidden to close a debtor who owns money or 
real estate. This way it was primarily necessary to seize the debtor's money to fulfil 
the creditor's claim, and only if he was not able to pay to seize his property. 
Suspiciously, the measure of debt was applied only in cases where the debtor did 
not have the goods to pay off his debt. 
The particularities of the enforcement proceedings can be read out from the 
contents of Werbőczi's Tripartitum. Order point to a coherent and well-regulated 
procedural institute both in terms of judicial jurisdiction and in the order of settling 
the creditor's claim on the debtor's property. The enforced person could not have 
been taken away a larger amount of property that was equivalent to the amount the 
                                                          
1Margetić (1992) at 25. 
2Lanović (1929). 
3
Kelemen (1818).  For more details look up at Caput 24, De executione et aestimatione. 
4
Similarly, the question of the debtor's liability to settle a creditor's claim was a regulated by the 
provisions of German customary law, which, by means of certain sources, undoubtedly left the 
influence and arrangement of this problem in the statutes of medieval Hungarian and Croatian 
towns. Thus, the provisions of Sachsenspiegel's debt service were recognised as an institution that 
obliged the debtor to fulfil the creditor's claim. In the provisions of Sachsenspiegel, the creditor was 
entitled to retain the debtor, provide him with food and allow him to make his debt. Specifically, this 
provision is in granting the creditor the power to detain the borrower by tying his legs. Such an 
arrangement was valid in the area of the German countries until the adoption of the rules of received 
Roman law. Blomeyer (1975) at 81. It can be observed in the provisions of the customary law of the 
Holy Roman Empire of the German Sachsenspiegel nation from 1225 at Kaller (2002). See 
provision: Book 3, Chapter 39, § 1-3: ―Wenn einer eigene Schuld vor Gericht fordert gegen einen 
Mann, die dieser nicht bezalen noch Bűrgen dafur setzen kann, den Richter soll ihm den Man 
ausantwrten fur das Geld, den soll er gleich seinem Gesinde mit Speise und mit Arbeit halten, will 
er ihn mit einer Fussfessel festbinden, das kann er tun; anders soll er ihn nicht peinigen.‖ 
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convicted person was convicted for.
1
 If the creditor's claim was secured by a 
mortgage and the creditor was claiming it after the debtor's due date, the debtor 
was obliged to surrender. In cases of equal value, the enforcer had the right to 
choose the subject of the execution of the enforcement order. As mentioned above, 
if the settlement of the debtor's property was left without results, it was permissible 
for the debtor to be arrested on the condition that it had been contracted so earlier, 
the lawsuit sought for such conviction was allowed.
2
 Settlement was always 
resorted to things in the borrower's estate. In the procedures regulated by the 
provisions of the Tripartitum law, the securing of future settlement of the loan 
claim was provided for. In such cases, the things that were pledged had been 
assessed earlier, when the obligation was incurred, and in line with the real value 
of things.
3
 When it comes to the peculiarities of compulsory settlement of claims 
in the area where Croatian-Hungarian law was validated by indirect analysis of the 
institute of the general part of the obligatory law, i.e. securing the settlement of the 
claim by pledging the movable or immovable property, it is possible to conclude 
the characteristics of the forced settlement of the claim. Thus, the pledge of 
movable property to secure a debtor's obligation, according to Kelemen, is the real 
accessory agreement according to which the movable property was surrendered 
during the transfer of loan money, providing that it had to be returned in specie at 
the time of the settlement of the debt.
4
 In the event of a failure, the pledge was sold 
and the creditor used the value of the pledge. On the other hand, when it comes to 
pledging of immovable property, Margetić doubts whether it was a pledge or a 
sale agreement for a certain time. Regardless of the legal nature of the immovable 
property, the forced settlement procedure was initiated by selling the property and 
the creditor's claim with the obligation to return the remaining value to the debtor 
(if any).
5
 
German customary law is a legal source that undoubtedly influenced the 
development of Hungarian customary law, which was also true in Slavonian 
territory. The issue of the order of settlement of a creditor's claim in the 
aforementioned customary law is standardised by the same solutions as those from 
Slavonian medieval sources. In the event that the debtor was obliged to pay the 
sentence determined by the verdict, he initially had to confiscate the movable 
property and if the timing of the debt was insufficient to settle the claim, there was 
the possibility of pledging the debtor's immovable property. If the borrower did 
not cancel the pledge within one year the landlord would become the owner of the 
pledged real estate.
6
 
Furthermore, although when it comes to the Slavonian area, the Ilok Statute, 
which regulated the legal system of a free royal city from 1525, i.e. from the 
period in which the provisions of the Tripartitum law were legally relevant in the 
                                                          
1
Withdrawal of a larger amount of property has regularly led to new lawsuits for the correction 
of execution ad correctionem executionis.; See Werbőczi (1517) at 1723:33 § 3. 
2
See more in: II 68, III 28; Lanović (1929) at 392. 
3See more in Lanović (1929) at 392. 
4See Kelemen (1818) at II 537; Margetić (1992) at 31-32. 
5Kelemen (1818) II 539; Margetić, (1992) at 32. 
6
Sachsenspegel 1, § 53 1-3, 2 §  41, 1-2. See more in Bauer (2009) at 74. 
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Slavonian area, approached the regulation of this issue in accordance with the 
principles that we had the opportunity to expose earlier when it comes to the 
provisions of the Werbőczi's Tripartitum. Forced Settlement is regulated in 
Chapters 7 and 8 of the Book of the Statute and the order of forced compulsion 
provided the following: "[...] settling in silver, gold or money as the primary way 
of settling claims within three days after the creditor‘s claims being filed before 
the competent court, and settlement in the value of movable property only if the 
debtor did not have the same thing."
1
 In the event that he did not possess movable 
property the debtor's obligations had to be settled by the value of his real estate in 
the city area. Real estate was thought to be the value of home and garden, while 
real estate outside the city (meadows, pastures, arable land) were last in the order 
of settlement.
2
 The Ilok statute is the only legal source that, when it comes to 
Croatian medieval law, exempts certain things from the system of forced settlement 
of claims, namely linens, suits and all other things that fall into the category of 
women's clothing. 
According to the above mentioned provisions of medieval sources in the 
territory of continental Croatia, i.e. Slavonia, it can be concluded that there exist 
almost identical features of three legal sources in the period between the 13th and 
16th centuries when it comes to the order of settlement of the creditor's claim. 
Initially, the claim had to be settled in cash, then in the value of movable goods 
(with the exception of the Slavonian statute which does not cover the above 
provisions) and ultimately upon the sale of real estate. It seems that the Institute of 
the debtor's protection was not recognised in the provisions of Slavonian 
customary law governing this issue. The exclusion of the essentially necessary 
things from the procedure of forcible confiscation of goods for the purpose of 
rendering the creditor is a feature recognised only in the provisions of the Ilok 
Statute. 
Reflection on the chosen statutes of our coastal cities regarding the order of 
settlement of claims indicates similar features. In order to make a more systematic 
processing, the legal regulation of the topic of the title in numerous statutes of 
Dalmatian cities will be divided into two legal bases, the legal circle of Dubrovnik 
and Split, the affiliation which depends mostly on the geographical vicinity of 
smaller island communes.
3
 Thus, in the following section, we are going to deal 
with the statutes of the islands of Korčula, Lastovo and Mljet and Ston, while in 
the wider area of the Split municipality we are thinking about the legal regulation 
present in the statutes of the islands of Hvar and Brac and the town of Trogir. The 
elaboration of the statutory regulation of the Dalmatian municipalities will be 
analysed as well as provisions of Šibenik and Pag Statutes. The Kvarner area will 
be analysed through the provisions of the Krk and Rab statutes. 
                                                          
1
See in Chapter 7, 5
th
 book of the Ilok Statute (1970) Vol. at 97. 
2
Chapter 8, 5
th
 book of the Ilok Statute 
3
The islands of Lastovo and Mljet had a special position within the Dubrovnik Commune, later the 
Republic. However, unlike the Dubrovnik area, these islands were self-governed. This is evidenced 
by the provisions of the statutes that we are dealing with, which are largely different if compared to 
the Statute of the City of Dubrovnik. See more at Statute of Mljet (2002) at 5. 
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It is worth mentioning at the outset that the sale of seized items in the 
Dalmatian communes was initiated in the presence of the municipal authorities 
and with special legal precautions.
1
 Some statutes foresee the presence of fair 
members of the community in the process of assessing the value of the confiscated 
property while the value of the seized or sold goods had to be surrendered to the 
creditor with the presence of the Governor. The process of settling the creditors 
was sometimes facilitated by public documents, mostly notaries, which contained 
details of the amount of debt, in which case their execution was very easy by the 
decision of the noblemen and noble judges.
2
 Werbőczi's Tripartitum provides for a 
formal settlement of the creditor's claim. The debates were conducted by the 
delegates of the first instance courts, with a mandatory announcement to the debtor 
about the exact time in which the execution was carried out and with the 
mandatory presence of the witness. 
The value of the provisions of Dubrovnik Statute for the determination of debt 
prison in the event of non-disclosure of the creditor's claim will be further analysed 
below.
 3
 For the purposes of determining the order in which the claim is settled, 
however, the provisions of the statutes that are indirectly referred to the above 
mentioned issue should be interpreted with caution. Chapter XXXI of the 8th book 
of the statute directly refers to the settlement of the creditor in the case of the sale 
of real estate. It states that in the case of a purchase of a real estate the buyer has to 
pay the full price of the thing, and if he had not paid the Governor, he would have 
chosen with his court a commission that had to sell the buyer's goods until the 
price was settled. In case the value of the debtor's assets was insufficient to settle 
the creditor's claim, the institute of imprisonment was applied.
4
 We consider that 
the provisions related to settlement in the text of the Dubrovnik Statute can be 
applied to the settlement of other claims, not just those that come from the sale. 
Unlike the Dubrovnik Statute, which pays little attention to the order of settlement 
of claims, the Korčula Statute describes in detail the settlement procedure. In the 
event of the non-existence of a claim previously recognised by the judgment of the 
debtor's property, they had to be seized in the following order. The first thing to be 
seized was furniture, then wine from the cellar, and finally the land, and if the land 
had not been enough, the borrower's house would have been seized. In the case the 
debtor's assets had not been sufficient to settle the creditor's claim, the debtor 
would have been imprisoned and was not released until the claim was settled.
5
 The 
Mljet Statute, the Stone provisions, and the Statute of Lastovo do not contain 
provisions relating to the institutions of forced settlement of debts.  
When it comes to the wider area of Split Municipality, further in the text we 
are going to deal with legal regulations of debt settlement in the statutes of the city 
of Split and Trogir, as well as of the islands of Hvar and Brač. 
                                                          
1
Beuc (1989) at 290. In some statutory provisions the forced settlement procedure is described in 
details. The example is the Statute of the island of Korčula that in the settlement procedure foresees 
the presence of the authorities of the municipal government, the chancellor and the governor. See 
The Statute of Korčula, Ch. CLXV:   
2
The Statute of Trogir (1988) I, 42.; The Statute of Rab, III, 12. 
3See Kelemen (1818) at II 537; Margetić (1992) at 31-32. 
4
See Gratzer (2008) at 20. 
5See chapter CLXV of the Statute of Korčula. Cvitanić (1987). 
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The Statute of the City of Split, referred to below, does not contain provisions 
which regulates the issue of settlement of claims in more details. The Statute 
regulates the question of forced settlement of claims in the repression provision.
1
 
This provision is specific as it concerns the settlement of the claim of a citizen of 
the city of Split who was robbed outside the city area or was claiming a debt from 
a foreigner. The specificity of the provision lies in the procedure preceding the 
forced settlement of the claim. The procedure started by filing a debt with a 
municipal officer who sought to settle the dispute peacefully in agreement with the 
civil servant of the commune from which the debtor came from. In the absence of 
a peaceful solution to the dispute, the Mayor and his courier, along with three 
judges and six counsellors, were obliged to determine the amount of claims and to 
request the Grand Chamber of the City of Split to impose a repression against the 
alien. By a document approved by the Grand Council-carta repressalliarum the 
lender could have demanded the confiscated property of the debtor in order to 
fulfil his claim irrespective of whether the debtor was a citizen of Split or another 
municipality.
2
 
A more detailed question of settlement of claims is regulated in the provisions 
of Trogir Statute. In some of the provisions of the statutes related to the regulation 
of obligatory and legal relations, it is easy to see how a city commune was able to 
speed up the flow of goods and services and strengthen the trust in contractual 
relations.
3
 The Statute further prescribes the order that must be respected in the 
case of forced settlement of claims irrespective of whether they were determined 
by a court judgment or by mutual recognition of the parties. Primary settlement 
had to be carried out on the movable property of the debtor (except on the bed) and 
on the animals, and if those things were not sufficient, it had to be resorted to the 
settlement on the borrower's real estate other than the home where the debtor lived. 
If even that was not enough to settle the claim, the lender could get into possession 
of the house and the bed and keep them until the time the claim was settled. In the 
event of non-payment of the claim, the creditor was authorised to require the 
detention of the debtor.
4
 The specialty of the Trogir Commune is in the 
appointment of two capable assessors who were obliged to carry out an assessment 
of the value of the debtor's assets. Such regulation is a special feature of the Trogir 
commune. 
The Statutes of the island communes, Hvar and Brač, do not contain provisions 
on settlement order, but the regulation of certain issues from the general part of the 
mandatory law in some cases defines the legal nature of non-fulfilment of the 
contractual obligation. In order to ensure the fulfilment of the creditor's claim in 
the notary documents of the Brijuni commune, it is often possible to recognise the 
provisions on the amount of the contractual penalty prescribed in the case of non-
                                                          
1
See book 6, chapter VI of the Statute of the city of Split. 
2Cvitanić (1979) at 213; The same procedure is foreseen in order to settle claims in other statutes of 
Dalmatian cities. About the repressions in the Dalmatian statutory see Cvitanić (2002) at 715-722. 
3
See 1st Book of Reformations, Chapter 76. 
4
See: Book 1, Chapter 38 of the Statute of the city of Trogir.  
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fulfilment of the contractual obligation.
1
 Such provisions are undoubtfully penal, 
and in the first place they sought to protect the trust between the parties, and on the 
other hand strengthen the meaning of respecting the contractual obligations – 
pacta sunt servanda. The Hvar Statute, other than the other statutes we have 
mentioned above, especially focuses on the protection of the creditor in forced 
settlement by directly allowing the choice between means of forcible settlement, 
settlement on movable property or real estate or debt prison where the order of use 
of the funds was not conditioned.
2
 In small island communities such as Brač and 
Hvar, forcible settlement of claims between natural persons, even though it was 
the 14th century, it did not fall into the category of frequently used legal institutes. 
When it comes to relationships in which the island community appeared as a 
lender, we should not be surprised by the advantage of the Municipality's claims in 
relation to other receivables.
3
 
When it comes to northern coastal communes, it should be mentioned that the 
Rab statute from the first half of the 14th century contains (the oldest preserved 
statute of Rab which was made around 1326, but it is considered that Rab had a 
statute before that year) and its provisions relating to forced exercise of claims. 
Thus, it is stated: 
 
 "[...] if a debtor has pledged to his lender by a public document or a note with 
a penalty of double (reimbursement) of costs, if the debtor does not pay the 
debt in due time, we will, if the lender has announced the auction for the 
property of the debtor, enter into possession of a double charge 
(reimbursement) of the costs according to the contents of its public document 
or record of the debtor's property in accordance with the order of Rab 45 
days after the publication; If the borrower comes and wants to pay before the 
expiration of his debt deadline, the lender should receive his principal with a 
quarter of the penalty and the cost and nothing more [...]. Additionally, if the 
deadline for some public documents or charts is missed and the period of 10 
years has passed,  then the punishment remains on the appraisal of the will of 
the curia of Rab, namely, whether to punish or not."
4
 
 
The analysis of the relevant provisions of mediaeval sources in the area of 
coastal Croatia shows the existence of almost identical features when it comes to 
ordering the creditor's claim, as well as conducting settlement proceedings. In the 
provisions of the majority of Dalmatian statutes, the claim was primarily settled in 
money, then in the value of movable property and ultimately upon the realization 
                                                          
1
The institute undoubtedly reminds the Roman institute of a contractual punishment (stipulation 
peonage). See Book 2, guava VII of the Statute. Hereinafter the Statute of Brač cited by the Statute 
of Brač, Brač Medieval Law (2002). The same provision is found in the Statute of Hvar, Book 2, 
Chapter XXXXIII, The Statute of Hvar (1991). The identical nature of the provisions of the two 
island communes is the consequence of the adoption of the provisions of the Brač Statute of 1305 in 
the drafting of the Hvar Statute of 1331 and the fact that both communes had a common governor 
until 1420.  
2
See book 2, Chapter XVII of the Statute of Hvar (1991). 
3
See the Book of Reformations 3, Chapter XI of the Statute of Brač (2002). 
4
3
rd
 Book, Chapter 12, see in Marge tic & Strčić (2004) at 135.  
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of the real estate. Institutions for the protection of debtors who were previously not 
recognised in Slavonian customary law were applied in the practice of municipal 
authorities, and the prison as the last instrument against insolvent debtors is 
evident without exception in all these statutory regulations. Therefore, a special 
attention is paid to it. 
 
 
Compulsory Settlement of the Claim on the Debtor's Person 
 
One of the characteristic institutes used against insolvent debtors in 
enforcement proceedings in medieval law of some Dalmatian communes is a debt 
prison, previously known from ancient legal systems.
1
 Such use of the institute is 
in accordance with the principle that an insolvent debtor must be imprisoned in a 
public jail until the moment the debtor has fulfilled his obligation.
2
 Often, the 
provisions of legal sources pointing to the institute of debt prison contained a 
provision according to which the insolvency debtor was enabled to surrender the 
entire property to the lender with the list of active and passive assets.
 3
 The reason 
why this institute stands out after consideration of the creditor's claim on the 
debtor's property is the circumstance that the application of this institute in all the 
sources discussed below is subsidiary, the purpose of which is to emphasise that 
the institution of a prison sentence could only be applied if the borrower did not 
have sufficient assets to settle the claim. 
One of the oldest sources (from the 11th to 12th centuries) which refers to the 
use of this institute as a specific means of fulfilling the borrower's obligation is the 
Supetar capitulary.
4
 The provisions of Chapter 214 emphasise the interdependence 
of the servant and his master who could only cease paying the amount due with the 
obligation to respect the rights of certain family members of family real estate. The 
application of the long-term imprisonment, except in the Police area, was also 
frequent in Slavonia, as evidenced by the provisions of the Regulations of 1273, 
item 7, according to which it becomes clear that the application of the long-term 
imprisonment only came into subsidiary consideration against the debtor who did 
not have money or assets to meet his obligation.
5
 
Before the creditor's settlement procedure was standardised by the provisions 
of the statutory law and was solely devoted to the jurisdiction of the courts, i.e. 
municipal authorities, there was the possibility of the creditor to independently 
discharge the debt of the debtor who owed him the fulfilment of the obligation. In 
notarial documents dating from the second half of the 13th century, as Radić 
points out, one can see the principle that authorises the creditor that in the event of 
a claim alone, i.e. without special court permission, not only to arbitrarily seize the 
                                                          
1Radić (2005) at 99, with specific reference to the literature listed in fans. 4 and 5. 
2
Beuc (1989) at 289. 
3
Such use of an cessio bonorum institute is also emphasised by Beuc. Beuc (1989) at 289. 
4The use of the institute in the history of Croatian bankruptcy law is also referred to by: Bartulović, 
Bodul & Vuković (2013) at 930; Provisions of the Supetar capitularies are available in Margetić, 
Sirotković & Bartulović (1989) at 21. 
5Margetić, Sirotković & Bartulović (1989) at 31. 
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debtor's property, but to also personally deprives him of his liberty until full 
satisfaction is obtained.
1
 It should be noted that the self-help institute eventually 
disappeared, and the institute of forced settlement, as it is stated in the sources, was 
entrusted to the competent judicial bodies of the municipality. 
The use of this institute in the later statutes of Dalmatian cities cannot be 
directly determined, however, by indirect interpretation of some of the provisions 
that primarily regulate the remuneration of prison guards in order to perform their 
duties, there is no doubt that debtors who did not settle their due debts constituted 
a special category of prisoners of certain Dalmatian municipalities.
2
 
Inspecting some of the provisions of the Statute of the City of Split and Trogir 
it can be undoubtfully concluded that there were two categories of prisoners, those 
who were deprived of their liberty for debt and those who were closed for some 
other incrimination.
3
 The debt prison did not lead to the termination of the debt 
obligation, but was applied as a means of coercion that sought to influence the 
debtor in order to fulfil the obligation in the shortest possible time. In the case of 
debtors who had the assets needed to fulfil their obligations, the prison ended at 
the time of a debt settlement, while in the case of a debtor who did not have his or 
her own property, and no person who would assume his obligation the length of 
imprisonment was unclear.
4
 
Trogir's statute in the above-mentioned case of a debtor without property who 
disregarded the three creditor's invitations for the fulfilment of the obligation 
anticipated a special procedure for placing the debtor under the jurisdiction of the 
town of Trogir for the time which, depending on the circumstances, had to be 
determined by the mayor and court courier. Whether the debtor would not have 
reached an agreement with the lender for forced residence under the supervision of 
the commune or the creditor had been extended.
5
 In accordance with the 
mediaeval views on the protection of creditors from debtors' misuse, the 
provisions of the statute were attempted to change to ensure fulfilment of the 
                                                          
1Radić (2005) at 102; Barada (1947-1951) [e.g.. I, p. 376, doc. 204: sua auctoritate sine requsitione 
curi˛e , possit intrare in bonis … et ipsum (tj. debitorem) capere et (eum) personaliter tenere donec 
… sibi fuerit integre satisfactum; ali i], passim. 
2Radić (2005) at 99.  
3
See provisions: The Statute of Split, (book. II, ch. XLIX); The Statute of the city of Trogir;    The 
Statute of Zadar (1997) (I, gl. XVII-XIX) 19.; The Statute of Zadar: with all reformations, i.e. new 
provisions passed until 1563 / newly released, with critical apparatus and glossary of people, places 
and things, translated into Croatian language by Josip Kolanović and Mate Kriţman, Zadar, The 
branch of the Matica Hrvatska, Zagreb, Croatian State Archives, 1997: See also the provision of the 
Statute of Dubrovnik, Book 8, Chapter XXX. The particularity of the Dubrovnik settlement of long-
term custody is the circumstance that, unlike other coastal statutes, this statute foresaw the surrender 
of the debtor to the lender, provided he wished to receive it. Only if the creditor refused to accept the 
debtor, the governor had undertaken to close it to Kaštela until he settled the debt or reached 
agreement with the creditor. In the case of a debtor's escape the statute stipulates closing the debtor 
in prison or in into his room. The Statute of the City of Dubrovnik drafted in 1272, Dubrovnik, 
2002; The Statute of the City of Dubrovnik drafted in 1282.(based on the critical editions of the 
Latin text of B. Bogišića and K. Jireček), adapted and translated into Croatian language by Šoljić A., 
Šundrica Z., Veselić I., Dubrovnik (2002). 
4Radić (2005) at 100.  
5
The Statute of the city of Trogir, I, 26. 
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creditor's claim. With regard to the Reformation of the Trogir Statute of 1425
1
, it 
foresees the forcible detention of a debtor who has no movable property and the 
debt is no more than twenty monetary units. Another Reformation of the Trogir 
Statute of 1427
2
  sought to elaborate in more details the position of a debtor whose 
claim was confirmed by the court confession or judgment. Pursuant to the contents 
of the above mentioned provision, a debtor who did not fulfil his obligation was 
allowed to attempt to monetise his goods in order to fulfil the obligation. If he 
failed to do so, he had to be placed in the city's lodge until it was fulfilled. The 
imprisonment was determined as the final measure against the debtor who refused 
to be individually placed in the lodge.
3
 The prison had to last until the fulfilment of 
the obligation. 
The regulation of the position of debtor as the economically weaker side was 
in favour of the provisions of the Hvar Statute that in the smallest details regulates 
the process of settlement of the creditor's claim in case the debtor did not 
voluntarily settle. Once the claim had been established in the proceedings before 
the competent municipal bodies, the debtor was obliged to surrender the movable 
property pledge as a guarantee for the future settlement of the claim if the claim 
was less than five monetary units. Within eight days after the pledge had been 
given, the creditor was authorised to sell the pledge at the auction to settle the 
claim if the debtor failed to fulfil his obligation. However, if the debtor did not 
pledge his movable property, the creditor was empowered within three days after 
the claim had been established to put the debtor in jail or to self-settle the value of 
the debtor's movable property.
4
 The debtor had the opportunity to set himself free 
from the prison if he was able to hand over the movable property if the value was 
one third higher than the amount of the debtor's obligation.
 5
 
The arrangement of personal enforcement was detailed in another medieval 
Dalmatian statute, and the Statute of the Municipality of Pag from 1433.
6
 The 
settlement was initiated by the forced introduction of the debtor in front of the 
Mayor and the Court of Pag where he ought to pay the debt or provide the 
appropriate guarantee for what he owed. If he did not want to pay, he was kept in 
the municipal jail until the lender paid the debt. The basic function of the prison 
was to pay the debtor or hold the suspect. If the debtor was financially fit, then a 
time limit of eight days was set for the lender's debt payment or he had to hand 
over the property list in his possession to the court within the same time for their 
sale at auction. A debtor who did not settle for the debt was held daily under the 
                                                          
1
The Statute of the city of Trogir, Ref. II, 9. 
2
Ibid, at ch. 14. 
3
The modalities of the long-term imprisonment in the form of accommodation in a town's lodge or 
prison, as a final measure against debtors who did not fulfill their obligation can be seen also in the 
provisions of the Hvar Statute. See: The Statute of Hvar (1991) Book II, Chapter XVI. 
4
The creditor's right to settle the value of the debtor's property could only be considered if the 
creditor's claim was greater than 40 monetary units. See: The Statute of Hvar (1991) Book II, 
Chapters XV and XVI. 
5
The release of the debtor from the prison was possible even in private disputes between the creditor 
and the debtor, but also in the case of a dispute between the municipal authorities and the debtor. 
See: Book II,  Chapter XVII of the Croatian Statute 
6Hereinafter the Statute of Pag is cited by Čepulo (2011) at 7.   
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municipal jail for as long as he had not fully paid the debt. If the borrower had 
departed before the full payment of the debt, he should have been kept in the 
municipal prison until he fully disbursed the debt to the lender. Similarly, if his 
property was not sold for public debt, the debtor was obliged to remain under the 
municipal detention until full payment of debt.
1 
In addition to the property sanction of non-fulfilment by the debtor and 
according to the Rab statute there was an institute of so-called personal pledge 
(personal custody).
2
 Namely, the Statute stipulates that "if someone pledged to 
someone to the debt or has received custody or trust, and cannot return the thing or 
mean fully lost the thing he has taken into custody and cannot return it, he or she is 
liable to the lender personally." This provision concerned only fellow citizens in 
mutual relationship, and not the aliens.
 3
 Consequently, the Rab statute explicitly 
stipulated that if a son is obliged to a foreigner outside of Rab, then his obligation 
is valid and binding, and for such a debt the curia of Rab will even resort to 
personal execution against the son-debtor [..."let the curia keep personally detain 
him in the area of Rab, until he fulfils the obligation ... ").
4
 
Sources of the rights valid in the area of continental Croatia, which largely 
date from the 15th and 16th centuries, do not mention personal confiscation as a 
means of compulsorily fulfilling the debtor's claim but rather focus attention on the 
order of settlement of claims on the debtor's property. Only the t Tripartitum legal 
provision for the arrest of the debtor is provided, provided that the attempt to settle 
on his property remained without results. Finally, if we look at the content of the 
provisions of the comparative Dalmatian statutes, it can be seen that there is no 
place to doubt that the subject of custody in medieval Croatian law was primarily 
the debtor's property and only the subordinate of his person. 
 
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
The analysis of the relevant provisions of medieval sources in the territory 
of Croatia in the period between the 13th and 16th centuries shows the 
existence of almost identical features when it comes to the elements of forced 
settlement of the claim, i.e. the order of settlement of the creditor's claim and 
the execution of settlement procedure. As in the provisions of the mediaeval 
sources in the territory of continental Croatia and in the provisions of most 
Dalmatian statutes, the claim was primarily settled in money, then in the value 
of movable materials and ultimately upon the realization of the real estate. The 
imprisonment as the last instrument against insolvent debtors is evident without 
exception in all of these statutory regulations. However, the instrument is 
referred to only in exceptional cases, i.e. when the borrower did not really have 
any assets to settle the debt. Since virtually identical solutions contained in a 
                                                          
1Book 4, Chapter 15, see Čepulo (2011) at 261. 
2Hereinafter the Statute of the Rab commune is cited by: Margetić & Strčić (2004). The Statute 
of the Rab commune from 14
th
 century. Rab- Rijeka, 2004, The Statute of Rab, III, 11. 
3Book 3, Chapter 11, see: Margetić & Strčić (2004) at 133.   
4
Book 2, Chapter 18 at 117. 
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large number of legal sources from different legal areas it can be concluded that 
legal regulation of this issue must have been taken from the same sources. The 
basic principles of dealing with insolvent debtors are undoubtedly taken over from 
Roman law, while the influence of German customary law (which has largely 
received the Roman solutions) is to a lesser extent represented in sources in the 
area of continental Croatia. There is a similarity to the provisions of the Slavonian 
statute of 1273 with the provisions of Sachsenspiegel. Particularities of the 
statutory regulation of Croatian medieval law are manifested primarily in the 
protection of the debtor in the form of the exclusion of his personal belongings 
from the procedure of forcible confiscation of property both in the Slavonian and 
coastal areas, but also in the repetitions that have frequently been expressed as 
measures against insolvent debtors in some Dalmatian communes. When it comes 
to forced labour, it is under the jurisdiction of the municipal judicial organs 
presided over by the mayor, and it can safely be asserted that it has received a 
stricter form in the later elections and is characterised by formal and modern legal 
arrangements. 
It can be concluded that the procedure of forcible settlement and in the 
provisions of medieval sources was recognised as an established instrument which 
had the same function and content as in modern law, with the only exception, the 
impossibility of substituting the unpaid obligation of the debtor by imprisonment. 
That is why we can safely consider it as the forerunner of today's enforcement 
process.  
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Ancient Cypriot Kingdoms:  
Political and Legal Aspects of Their Regimes  
(1200 BC to 30 BC) 
 
Charalampos (Harry) Stamelos 
  
Abstract 
 
This article presents the political and legal aspects of the Ancient Cypriot 
Kingdoms from 1200 BC to 30 BC. It is about the historic period during 
which the various Ancient Cypriot Kingdoms (there had been twelve at first, 
but later on they became ten) had to pay taxes to various rulers. These rulers 
were: the Assyrians, the Egyptians, and the Persians. Alexander the Great 
established a system of autonomy, expanding the autonomous systems of the 
previous rulers. However, in 312 BC under the Ptolemaic rule, Cyprus was 
one province, whilst various local institutions remained unaltered. Finally, in 
30 BC Cyprus became a Roman province. Public law was based on the 
system of the Kingdoms of Mycenae since the Greek Kings and Princes 
established the Ancient Greek Kingdoms after the Trojan War in 1.200 BC 
The King had all the powers under his control. Private law also existed and 
there is a significant written contract, the Tablet of Idalion, being considered 
as the first written contract in the world. Less evidence exists concerning 
criminal law.  
 
Keywords: Ancient Cypriot Kingdoms; Ancient Cypriot Law; Political 
Aspects; Legal Aspects 
 
 
Introduction - The Political Regime of the Ancient Cypriot Kingdoms 
 
The twelve Ancient Cypriot Kingdoms, including a capital city and its 
provinces, were: 
 
1. Salamis1; 
2. Hytroi (later incorporated into Salamis)2; 
3. Paphos3; 
4. Idalion4; 
                                                          
1
Herodotus (7.90) and Strabo (14.6.13) mention that Salamis was established by Teukros the 
Telamonios from Salamis of Attica. It is estimated that this happened either in 1202 or 1201 BC. 
Hadjiioannou (1990) Vol. E at 143. 
2
The Kingdom of Hytroi was established by Hytos. Hadjiioannou (1990) Vol. E at 131-139. 
3
Agapenor from Arcadia established Paphos after the Trojan War According to Pausanias (8.5.2). 
The King of Paphos was also the Head of the Church of Aphrodite (Diodorus Siculus, 20.47.1). See 
Supplement I.     
4
Idalion was established by Halkenor. See Hadjicosti (1997).   
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5. Tamassos (later incorporated into Idalion)1; 
6. Kition2; 
7. Kourion3; 
8. Amathous4; 
9. Marion5; 
10. Solon or Soloi6; 
11. Ledra7; 
12. Lapethos8. 
 
Each Kingdom had its own story. 
All these Kingdoms were founded by the Greek Kings and Princes after the 
Trojan War, at about 1200 BC, based on the model of the Kingdoms of Mycenae
9
.  
Without entering into details, we examine the main political and legal issues 
regarding the Kingdoms of Cyprus from 1200 BC to 30 BC, when Cyprus became 
one Roman province. 
Cyprus was known as the Kingdom of Alassia before the 1.200 BC. 
Cyprus and later the Kingdoms were obligated to pay taxes to different Kings 
from various Empires. 
From 709 to 669 BC the Kings of all Ancient Cypriot Kingdoms paid taxes to 
Assyrians. 
There is written evidence that in 673 BC (prism inscription from Nineveh, of 
Essarchadon, King of Assyrians) ten Cypriot Kings paid taxes to the Assyrian 
King: Akestor of Idalion, Pylagor of Hytroi, Eteandrus of Paphos, Damasos of 
Kourion, Atmesus of Tamassos, Bususus of Kition, Kisus of Salamis, Eresus of 
Soloi, Unasagusus (Onassagor) of Ledra, and Damusis of Amathous. 
The Cypriot Kingdoms were autonomous during the Assyrian rule. This 
meant that the Kings were able to organise their Kingdoms in their own way. 
Actually, the only obligation of the Cypriot Kings was to pay the tax to the 
Assyrian King
10
. 
                                                          
1
Tamassos is considered to be one of the oldest Ancient Cypriot Kingdoms. Stamelos (2018) at 3, n. 
10. Homer, Odyssey, A 184: ‗in Tamassos I give iron, to receive copper‘. 
2
Stamelos (2018) at 3. 
3
Stamelos (2018) at 3. 
4
Stamelos (2018) at 3. 
5
Stamelos (2018) at 3.  
6
Stamelos (2018) at 3. Herodotus mentions that the city of Soloi was founded on the advice of Solon 
the Athenian and hence the city was named in his honour. Soloi was one of Cyprus‘ ancient city-
kingdoms. In 498 BC it took part in the revolt against the Persians. Later on, Soloi sent help to 
Alexander the Great during his campaigns in the east. The city flourished during the Hellenistic, 
Roman and early Byzantine periods. The city of Soloi was located at the top of a hill overlooking 
one of the most fertile areas in north-western Cyprus. See Supplement II.   
7
Stamelos (2018) at 3. 
8
Stamelos (2018) at 3. 
9Cannavò (2008) clearly states that ‗The Cypriot Kingdoms are traditionally viewed as a Mycenaean- 
type institution, introduced on the island by Greek-speaking people who arrived in Cyprus after 
fleeing the collapsing Mycenaean world during the 12th century BC‘. See Supplement III. 
10
Radner (2012).    
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From 565 to 547 BC the Kings of all Ancient Cypriot Kingdoms paid taxes to 
Egyptians. 
King Amasis of Egypt allowed a regime of autonomy to all Kings of Cypriot 
Kingdoms. 
According to Diodorus Siculus, Amasis was not a hard ruler, but an admirer 
of the Greeks and Cypriots. Many Greeks were his soldiers and he had a positive 
view for them. This is why the period of the Egyptian rule did not last long. Again, 
the Kings could organise their Kingdoms in their own way. During the Egyptian 
rule, as during the Assyrian rule,  
From 546 to 332 BC the Kings of all Ancient Cypriot Kingdoms paid taxes to 
Persians. 
The regime of autonomy during the Persian rule was almost identical to the 
regimes during the Assyrian and the Egyptian rules. However, Persians were 
harder rulers than the Assyrians and the Egyptians. This is why the Cypriots and 
the Greeks attempted many times to throw them away from Cyprus. 
In 499 BC an uprising against the Persians in parallel with Ionians failed. In 
461 BC Charitimedes, the Athenian, with 200 ships, failed to beat Persians who 
remained the rulers of all Ancient Cypriot Kingdoms. In 449 BC Kimon, the 
Athenian, with 200 ships, failed again against the Persians. After two more riots, in 
386 BC the Athenians and the Greeks signed the Antalkideios Peace Agreement in 
Soussa, with the Persian King Artakserksis. Evagoras the First (411-374 BC), 
King of Salamis, was left alone, and he signed also an agreement with the 
Persians, whilst he failed to unite all Cypriot Kingdoms. 
The three entirely saved speeches of Isocrates ‗Evagoras‘, ‗Nicocles‘ or 
‗Cypriots‘, and ‗To Nicocles‘ provide us with useful information and evidence 
regarding the Ancient Cypriot Kingdoms. 
In 332 BC Alexander the Great finally won the Persians. Cyprus was under 
his rule. He allowed autonomy of the Cypriot Kingdoms. Later, Cyprus was part 
of the Ptolemaic rule (since 312 BC) under the King Ptolemeos the First, King of 
Egypt and Cyprus. Although Cyprus remained under the Ptolemaic rule, there is 
evidence that different areas had autonomy and various rulers, mainly different 
assemblies
1
 (like in Ancient Athens) and a governor.  
Finally, in 30 BC Cyprus became a Roman province. Later on, the Byzantine 
rule (330-1192), the Francs (1192-1489), the Italians-Venetians (1489-1571), the 
Turks (1571-1878), and the English (1878-1959) took control on the island until 
its independence in 1960. Unfortunately, in 1974 Turkey took 42% of Cyprus and 
until today the ‗Cypriot problem‘ remains an unsolved issue. 
 
 
                                                          
1
Stamelos (2018) at 1-33.3 
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The Legal Regime of the Ancient Cypriot Kingdoms  
   
Public Law 
 
The King in every Ancient Cypriot Kingdom had the full power to legislate, 
to execute and to try all important matters. All three powers, the legislative, the 
executive and judiciary were invested in and held by him. He had unlimited power 
to set rules, to order the citizens to obey his own rules in his own way, and to be 
the Supreme Judge on all significant disputes and to dissolve such disputes in the 
most just way, in his own opinion. This system was not democratic obviously, it 
was autocratic. Of course, people around him helped him to maintain the control 
on his subjects. Gerginoi and Promalagges were policemen and interrogators to 
find out what was wrong or illegal
1
. 
For example, if someone committed the crime of tax evasion, a trader or a 
man of commerce, then he had to appear before the King, to explain what 
happened, and if he had broken the rules, he had to pay all the taxes he owed. But 
if the policemen applied the rule wrongly, then the interrogators had the power to 
set the arrested person free, even before appearing in the premises of the palace to 
apologise before the King. 
The King was the leader of the Army and in Paphos the King was the Head of 
the Church (of Aphrodite). The King was the owner of all the land of every 
Ancient Cypriot Kingdom, unless he transferred the ownership or the possession 
of the land to an officer or a person of his choice. The King was the owner of the 
mines and he could rent them to the persons of his choice to get almost all the 
wealth out of it. This is why the Kings were so rich. The wealth of the Cypriot 
Kings was well known in Greece and the example of Kinyras is specifically 
mentioned as an example of enormous wealth. In that regards, the King had a 
legitimate wife and a yard of other women along with slaves to work for him. The 
luxurious life of the Kings was something logic to the minds of all their subjects. 
Part of taxes was used for the taxes to foreign Kings (Assyrians, Egyptians, 
Persians), another part of taxes was necessary for ships and walls (defence of the 
Kingdom, ships were built only in some Kingdoms, like in Salamis and Paphos), 
and another part of the taxes was used exclusively for the luxurious life of the 
Kings. Of course, the richest persons had the obligations to fund sport games, 
theatre plays and building of warships.  
However, in Idalion, in Kourion, and in Marion after the communication with 
the Athenians, some evidence of democratic rules was found.  
More specific, in Idalion the Tablet of Idalion was found in 1850 (dated about 
480 BC). At this Tablet, which is the first known written contract in the world, the 
King and the citizens of Idalion (an element of democratic rules) agreed with 
Onassilos and his brothers to pay him money and give him land in order that he 
and his brothers provide medical help to the soldiers wounded at the war against 
the Kitians and Persians
2
.  
                                                          
1
Isocrates, Evagoras. 
2
See Supplement IV.        
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Kitians with Persians wanted to conquest Idalion (today the city is Dali, close 
to Nicosia), as Kition (today the city is Larnaca) was under the control of 
Phoenicians (the only Kingdom which remained under the control of Phoenicians 
who arrived in Cyprus much later than the Greeks).  
Also, the Tablet is placed in the Cabinet des Médailles National Bibliotheque 
of Paris (Bronzes 2297) and the true copy made by French artists is placed in the 
Museum of Nicosia and one more true copy is placed in the Museum of Idalion 
today in Cyprus. 
As Georgiadou states: ‗the Tablet attests the first system of social security 
known so far: Shortly after the war, the City-Kingdom of Idalion had a social 
organisation that allowed, or forced, the City to take care of the injured citizens by 
public expense. Even more remarkable is people‘s participation in the institutions 
of Idalion in support of the King, who is presented as having the total control over 
his citizens. In the text, the King and the City (citizens) always appear in 
association with each other as the two main components that make and execute 
decisions, having equal responsibilities in front of goods and people. This 
combination, ―King and the City‖, is mentioned six times in the inscription that is 
each time when the decision-making authority has to be documented‘1. 
In Kourion, there is written evidence mentioning the ‗representatives of the 
people‘ and in Marion there have been found coins having the word ‗Marieon‘ 
meaning ‗in the name of the people of Marion‘ instead of having only the name of 
the King.  
This evidence indicates elements of democratic rules in some Cypriot 
Kingdoms. However, this could not alter the general system of the Ancient 
Cypriot Kingdoms where the King had all the powers under his control. 
 
Private Law 
 
The right to private property existed in Ancient Cypriot Kingdoms. Strabo 
clearly mentioned that Cypriot Kings transferred the ownership or the possession 
of forests to private individuals
2
. The Tablet of Idalion proves that there were 
certain rules regarding contracts and torts.  Written evidence (script) from Pyla (5
th
 
or 4
th
 century BC) clearly states that ‗Aristodemos used this farmland he for 
himself and resided in a house belonged to this farmland without paying. So, he 
must pay for his residence and the use of this farmland according to the law‘. This 
                                                          
1
Georgiadou (2015). The author continues to add the following very important notes: ‗Apart from 
this participation, the people of Idalion possess two more important rights: they appear as the 
owners of land (lines 8, 17) and they possess their own treasury (line 6). Therefore, except for the 
royal land and treasury, ancient Idalion also managed public lands and a treasury. This means that 
the city had two sorts of income-royal and public-each one managed separately. Public property 
could not be used without the consensus of the people. However, the Tablet also suggests that the 
agreement of the people was also necessary for the disposal of the royal property: although the 
payment of the physicians was only based on royal land plots, the donation of those plots was made 
by the King and the city (lines 7-8, 16-17). This can only be explained on the premise that royal land 
plots were not part of the King‘s personal property, but they belonged to the whole community 
although the King was still responsible for managing this land.‘ 
2
Strabo, XIV, 6, 6, 684.  
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means that there was a judgment imposing Aristodemos to pay rental for lease of 
the land and the house based on law provisions related to lease contracts. 
In the area of family law, we assume that monogamy only permitted and 
polygamy was strictly forbidden. Even the King was allowed to have only one 
legitimate wife. The yard of women and slaves appeared later, during the Persian 
rule but still polygamy was forbidden, even for the King).  
According to Pseudo-Skylax's
1
, Marion and Amathous ports were lifeless. 
However, in Salamis, Solon and Paphos ship activities were obvious in the 
respective ports. This is why we assume there were rules of maritime law and of 
maritime labour law. It is possible that the Rhodian Laws were applied, since such 
Laws were well known to all Greeks, Romans, and later also to the Byzantines and 
applied extensively to the entire Greek world at those times.  
     Sport games and events were taken place in Cyprus. A whole stadium was 
found in Kourion and a whole gymnasium (gym) was found in Salamis. Cypriot 
athletes took part in the Olympic Games. Heracleides of Salamis was the winner in 
track-stadion, 144
th
 Olympic Games, 204 BC, Dimitrios of Salamis was the 
winner in stadion, 252
nd
 Olympic Games, 229 AD and also in pentathlon he was 
the winner in stadion and in pentathlon in the 253
rd
 Olympic Games, 233 AD and 
in stadion in the 254
th
 Olympic Games, 237 AD
2
. The rules and regulations of 
sports in Cyprus and in Pancyprian Games (in Salamis, Kition and Paphos) 
probably were similar to the rules and regulations of Ancient Greek Sports Law. 
 
Criminal Law 
 
Orlando stated that ‗the Cypriots keramon call the desmoterion‘3. This means 
that holding a convicted person was the case as this was in Athens, and perhaps 
there was also a penalty of imprisonment. We also assume that other penalties 
were the death and exile or the confiscation of property and fines. 
Crimes probably included murder, theft, fraud, bodily harm, trespass, treason 
and defamation. Unfortunately, we do not have much evidence regarding criminal 
law there. 
 
 
Conclusion - Synopsis 
 
As we can see, the history of the Ancient Cypriot Kingdoms was rich and 
very interesting. We know that the model of the Kingdoms was based on the 
Kingdoms of Mycenae due to the establishment of those Kingdoms by the Greek 
Kings or Princes after the Trojan War (1.200 BC). We are also informed that 
Assyrians, Egyptians and Persians ruled the island and collected taxes. Nonetheless, 
the autonomy of the Kingdoms was respected until 312 BC, when they officially 
ceased to exist under the Ptolemaic rule. However, practically they still existed in 
some way (mainly through assemblies) until 30 BC, when Cyprus became a 
                                                          
1
Shipley (2011). 
2
Stamelos (2018). 
3
Orlando (2014) E. 387, 1.99-100 
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Roman province. It is worth pointing out that under the Roman rule, Roman law 
was applied in parallel with the Hellenistic rules as well as with the customs which 
had originated from the Greek and Cypriots rules at previous times. 
Concerning Public law, all powers, legislative, executive and judicial were 
held by the King. The King was the Leader of the Army and even the Head of the 
Church of Aphrodite in Paphos. Policemen and interrogators (Gerginoi and 
Promalagges) assisted the King to apply the rules. Taxes were collected for the 
King and for building defence walls and ships (ships were built only in some 
Kingdoms. 
Private law provided for ownership on land and goods as well as for contracts 
and civil wrong. We assume there were specific rules for contracts and torts, and 
we assume there were rules regarding labour contracts, maritime issues, as well as 
sports.   
The political and legal regimes of the Ancient Cypriot Kingdoms still draw 
our attention today and we hope that new evidence may be found and shed more 
light to our knowledge on those regimes. 
  
Supplement I 
 
Epaphos was the mythic founding father of Paphos. Epaphos was the son of 
Zeus and of Io. Hera asked Kouretes from Crete to kidnap the baby, but they send 
it to Egypt (Apollodoros, 2.1.3-4). Epaphos became King in Egypt; he married 
Memphis, the daughter of Nile. Epaphos and Memphis gave birth to a girl, Libya. 
Poseidon married Libya and they gave birth to Agenor and Vilos. Vilos had a son, 
Pygmalion. Pygmalion was King of Paphos and grandfather of Kinyras. The 
daughter of Pygmalion, Paphos, was the mother of Kinyras
1
.     
 
Supplement II 
 
A fertile valley with the river Potamos tou Kampou lies along the west side of 
the hill. In the eastern part of the coastal valley the Swedish Archaeological 
Expedition (1927) located the city‘s natural port which was circular in plan. The 
city‘s size has been estimated but apart from the ancient Theatre, no other 
architectural remains have been unearthed. The Soloi and Vounoi excavations 
were conducted from 1927 to 1931 by the Swedish Archaeological Mission. From 
1965 until the invasion of 1974 the city of Soloi was excavated by the University 
of Laval, Quebec as well as by the Department of Antiquities of Cyprus which 
excavated several tombs in the area around Soloi. The Roman Theatre at Soloi was 
excavated in 1929 by the Swedish Archaeological Mission and is dated to the 2nd 
or the 3rd century AD. The Theatre was built on the north slope of the hill very 
close to the coast. The auditorium (which was partially visible at the highest point 
of the hill‘s downward slope prior to the excavations) was cut into the hill‘s rock. 
Between the years 1962-1964 the auditorium was entirely rebuilt. The auditorium 
is 52m in diameter and it had limestone seats. The semi-circular orchestra was 
17m in diameter and was separated from the auditorium by a low parapet of 
                                                          
1
See also Mitford (1963). 
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limestone slabs. Its floor was of cement resting on a substratum of pebbles. The 
stage was rectangular (36,15 X 13,20m) and only its platform survives today. Two 
entrance passages (parodoi) provided access to the auditorium. In 1931 the 
Swedish Mission discovered ‗Cholades‘ site (on a hill 250m away from the west 
gate of the ancient town‘s designated walls), a large complex of five successive 
temples dated from 250 BC until the beginning of the 4th century AD. Two of 
these temples were dedicated to Aphrodite Horeia, two to Isis and the fifth to 
Serapis (beginning of 4th century AD). During the period between 1965 and 1974 
Laval University, Quebec, consistently excavated various points in the location 
known as ‗Palaia Chora‘. In the north-eastern part of the hill the mission 
discovered the remains of an early Christian basilica. The remains of a large paved 
space (possibly the city‘s Roman agora) were also uncovered and at the lowest 
part of the hill‘s north side the remains of various buildings, belonging to 
chronologically successive periods, were unearthed. On the hill‘s acropolis 
monumental walls were excavated and at the necropolis (which is situated to the 
southeast of the city) 28 tombs were unearthed dating to the Cypro-Geometric up 
to the Late Classical period. Finally, in 1972 the Department of Antiquities, 
Cyprus, excavated tombs in the necropolis of Soloi. All the tombs had an irregular 
circular shape with a rectangular dromos and they are cut into the rock. These 
excavations demonstrated that the necropolis of Soloi was in use between the early 
Geometric and the late Archaic periods.
1
    
 
Supplement III 
 
This thesis is substantiated by a number of elements: the introduction on the 
island of the Greek language, with the adoption of a modified form of the second 
millennium Cypriot syllabic script to write it, goes together with a process of 
Hellenization of Cyprus which took place during the 12th and 11th c. BC, at the 
very delicate phase of transition between the Late Bronze and the Iron Age. This is 
what the archaeological and epigraphic data seem to demonstrate, and even with 
some uncertainties in the interpretation the key fact of the introduction on the 
island of a post-Mycenaean civilisation with some of its basic features (like the 
language) is hard to question. The inclusion of a political organisation among 
these basic features is something more delicate that needs to be confirmed by some 
more evidence. Here the textual sources apparently meet the archaeological 
record: the Greek legends, variously attested in classical authors and in some cases 
(as for Salamis) of a certain antiquity, ascribe the foundation of some of the 
Cypriot kingdom capitals to Greek heroes coming back from the Trojan War. ‗The 
dynamic aspect in the history of the Cypriot kingdoms is as or even more 
important than the questions of origin and definition. The kingdoms in Cyprus 
were not statically the same for more than half a millennium: their number and 
extension varied with time, with some kingdoms (for example Kition or Salamis) 
acquiring an extra-regional importance and some others (like Tamassos or 
possibly Kourion) losing weight and finally independence in the course of the 
                                                          
1
Republic of Cyprus, Ministry of Transport, Communications and Works, Department of Antiquities. 
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Classical Age53. Similar differences in extension and evolution of the individual 
kingdoms should also be envisaged during what Maria Iacovou calls ‗the 
foundation horizon‘, that is, the Cypro-Geometric period (between the 11th and 
8th c. BC, before the NeoAssyrian intervention)
1
. It is in this phase that the 
(probably preceding) political organization of the island defined itself as a set of 
independent kingdoms of regional character. The emergence of the single 
kingdoms did not take place always at the same time: when some sites, like 
Palaepaphos or Kourion, could already furnish proof of social stratification and the 
existence of a rich aristocracy, some others, like Amathus, were still at their 
beginnings. This is an aspect contrasting with the idea of the Hellenization of 
Cyprus as a single simultaneous process, and suggesting on the contrary a birth-
process of the kingdoms based essentially on the specificity of single sites and 
their preceding histories.‘2  ‗Continuity, cultural and ethnic homogeneity, regional 
specificity, internal dynamic: these are the basic aspects to keep in mind when 
speaking about Cypriot Archaic Kingdoms. Many other factors should be taken 
into consideration that I cannot examine in detail here: for what concerns the 
external influences on the political organisation of Cyprus, the control of the great 
Eastern empires (Assyria, Egypt, Persia) over the island should not be overlooked 
- even when limited and weak, as surely in the case of Egypt and probably in that 
of Assyria, an external control over such a flexible system as that of the Cypriot 
Kingdoms could have always some consequences at least in term of stabilisation 
or redefinition of internal dynamics‘3 The writer says that there were unique 
characteristics in the political and legal regimes of the Ancient Cypriot Kingdoms. 
This could probable be true. However, the basic structure was based on the 
Ancient Greek Kingdoms originated from Mycenae.  
 
Supplement IV 
 
When the Medes (Persians) and Kitians had the city of Idalion under siege, in 
the year of Philokypros, son of Onassagor, King Stassikypros, and the city-the 
Idalians- called physician Onassilos, son of Onassikypros, and his brothers, to treat 
people who were wounded in battle. And so, the King and the city agreed to give 
Onassilos and his brothers, instead of payment and additional gratuity, a talent of 
silver from the House of the King and the city. But instead of that silver talent, the 
King and the city gave to Onassilos and his brothers land of the King which is 
located in Alampria
4
.  
 
     
 
                                                          
1
Iacovou (2008) at 54. 
2
Cannavò (2008) at 42. 
3
Cannavò (2008) at 43. 
4
See Georgiadou (2015).     
 
 
130 
 
References 
 
Cannavò, A. (2008). ‗The Cypriot Kingdoms in the Archaic Age: a Multicultural 
Experience in the Eastern Mediterranean. Roma 2008 - XVII International Congress 
of Classical Archaeology: Meetings Between cultures in the Eastern Mediterranean, 
2008, Roma, Italy.‘ at http://151.12.58.75/archeologia/bao_document/articoli/5_CA 
NNAVO.pdf  
Fourrier, S. (2007). ‗La constitution d‘identités regionales à Chypre à l‘ époque archaϊque‘ 
in Pallas IE, 73:115-127. 
Georgiadou, A. (2015). ‗The Tablet of Idalion (ICS 217)‘ in Kyprios Character. History, 
Archaeology & Numismatics of Ancient Cyprus: kyprioscharacter.eie.gr/en/t/AO 
Hadjicosti, M. (1997). ‗The Kingdom of Idalion in the Light of New Evidence‘ in 
Bulleting of American Schools of Oriental Research 308:49-63. 
Hadjiioannou, K. (1990). Ancient Cyprus in the Hellenic Sources, Volumes A-H. Nicosia. 
E, 143. 
Iacovou, M. (2008). ‗Cultural and political configurations in Iron Age Cyprus‘ in 
American Journal of Archaeology 112:625-633. 
 Mitford, B. (1963). ‗Akestor, King of Paphos‘ in Bulletin of the Institute of Classical 
Studies 10:27–30. 
Orlando, V. (2014). L'Iliade. Omero per gioco. Florence, It.: Federighi. 
Radner, K. 2012. The many kingdoms of Cyprus, Assyrian empire builders, University 
College London, http://www.ucl.ac.uk/sargon/essentials/countries/Cyprus. 
Republic of Cyprus, Ministry of Transport, Communications and Works, Department of 
Antiquities, at www.mcw.gov.cy/mcw/DA/DA.nsf/0/B57A75ED5A426CF8C2257 
27600350F1C?OpenDocument 
Shipley, G. (2011). Pseudo-Skylax's Periplous: the Circumnavigation of the Inhabited 
World: text, translation and commentary. Exeter, UK: Bristol Phoenix Press. 
Stamelos, Ch. (2018). History of Law of Greece and Cyprus (in Greek). Athens: Nomiki 
Bibliothiki. 
  
 
Sources 
 
Arrian (G.P. Goold (ed.) & P.A. Brunt (transl.), Anabasis of Alexander. Indica, 2 vols. 
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press; London, UK: William Heinemann Ltd. 
1976–1983. 
Ctesias (J.P. Stronk (ed. & transl.), Persian History, Part I: Introduction, Text, and 
Translation.  Düsseldorf, Germany 2010. 
Diodorus Siculus [Diodoros Sikeliotis] (C.H. Oldfather, C.L. Sherman, C.B. Welles, R.M. 
Geer & F.R. Walton, eds. and transl.),  Library of History, 12 vols. Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press; London, UK: William Heinemann Ltd. 1933–1967. 
Herodotus (A.D. Godley, ed. & transl.), The Persian Wars, 4 vols. Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press; London, UK: William Heinemann Ltd. 1920–1925. 
Homer (Alexander Pope, transl.) The Odyssey, 24 books. Norwalk, Conn.: The Easton 
Press 1978. 
Isocrates (G. Norlin & L. Van Hook, eds. & transl.) Works, 3 vols. Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press; London, UK: William Heinemann Ltd. 1928–1945. 
Strabo (AKA Stravon) (H.L. Jones, ed. and transl.), The Geography, 8 vols.  Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press; London, UK: William Heinemann Ltd.. 1917–
1932. 
131 
 
Additional Recommended Bibliography  
  
Baurain, C. (1991). ‗L‘écriture syllabique à Chypre‘ in C. Baurain, C. Bonnet & V. Krings 
(eds.), Phoinikeia Grammata. Lire et écrire en Méditerranée. Actes du Colloque de 
Liège, 15–18 novembre 1989. Namur: 389–424. 
Baurain, C., Bonnet, C. & V. Krings (eds.) (1991). Phoinikeia Grammata. Lire et écrire 
en Méditerranée. Actes du Colloque de Liège, 15–18 novembre 1989. Namur. 
Beckman, G. (transl.) & H.A. Hoffner, Jr. (ed.) (1996). Hittite Diplomatic Texts (Writings 
from the Ancient World, Society of Biblical Literature, vol. 7). Atlanta, Ga.: Scholars 
Press. 
Bekker-Nielsen, T. (2004). The Roads of Ancient Cyprus. Copenhagen, Denmark: 
Museum Tusculanum Press. 
Boardman, J. (2001), Cyprus between East and West (16
th
 Annual Lecture on the History 
and Archaeology of Cyprus). Nicosia, Cyprus: The Bank of Cyprus Cultural 
Foundation. 
Borger, R. (1956). Die Inschriften Asarhaddons, Königs von Assyrien (Archiv für 
Orientforschung, Vol. 9), Graz, Austria: Published by the author. 
Briant, P. (1987). ‗Pouvoir central et polycentrisme culturel dans l‘Empire achéménide. 
Quelques réflexions et suggestions‘, in H. Sancisi-Weerdenburg (ed.), Sources, 
Structures and Synthesis. Proceedings of the Groningen 1983 Achaemenid History 
Workshop (Achaemenid History, vol. 1). Leiden: Nederlands Instituut voor het Nabije 
Oosten, pp. 1–31. 
Coldstream, N. (2012). ‗Cypriot Kingdoms, Cretan City-States, What Parallels‘ in British 
School at Athens Studies, 10-17. 
Ioannou, M. N. (2012). ‗Ancient Cyprus: Island of Conflict‘, thesis submitted for the 
degree of Master of Philosophy,  Discipline of Classics, School of Humanities, 
University of Adelaide, Australia. 
Kolotas, F. (1988). ‗Research on the political and legal institutions of the Ancient Cypriot 
Kingdoms‘,  in Cypriot Law Review 21:3267-3283(in Greek) 
Körner, C. (2016). ‗The Cypriot Kings under the Assyrian and Persian Rule (Eighth to 
Fourth Century BC): Centre and Periphery in a Relationship of Suzerainty‘ 
in Electrum 23. http://www.ejournals.eu/electrum/Volume-23/art/7999. 
Osborne, M. J. (1972). ‗A closer join in the first Evagoras Degree‘ in Zeitschrift für 
Papyrologie und Epigraphik 9:55-63. 
Papantoniou, G. (2013). ‗Cyprus from Basileis to Strategos: A Sacred-Landscapes 
Approach‘ in American Journal of Archaeology 117:33-38 
Tsavli, E. (2009). Kinyras, Study on the Ancient Cypriot Myth. Thesis submitted for Ph.D. 
degree, National and Kapodistrian University of Athens (in Greek). 
 
Additional Recommended Sources 
 
Josephus Flavius (H.S.J. Thackeray, R. Marcus, A. Wikgren & L.H. Feldman, eds. and 
transl.). The Life Against Apion, The Jewish War, and Jewish Antiquities (Books I-
XX). (Complete Collection in Nine Volumes). Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press; London, UK: William Heinemann Ltd. 1963. 
Pausanias (W.H.S. Jones, H.A. Ormerod & R.E. Wycherley, transl.) Pausanias 
Description of Greece, in 4 Volumes. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press; 
London, UK: William Heinemann Ltd. 1918-1955. 
132 
 
Polyaenus (P. Krentz & E.L. Wheeler, eds. & transl.), Stratagems of War, in 2 vols. [P. 
Krentz & E.L. Wheeler, eds. & transl.) in 2 Volumes. Chicago, IL: Ares Publishers, 
Inc., 1994 
Theopomp of Chios (B. Gauger & J.D. Gauger, transl.), Fragmente der Historiker  
(FGrHist 115/116). Stuttgart 2010. 
 Xenophon (C.L. Brownson, transl.), Hellenica, in 2 vols. London, UK: William 
Heinemann Ltd.; New York: G. P. Putnam‘s Sons, 1915. 
  
 
133 
 
134 
 
 
